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Abstract
Corporate restructure is pivotal to the efficient operation of Australia’s economy,
including the ability for companies to respond to a dynamic macro environment and the
productive utilisation of market capital. The ability of a distressed company to
effectively and efficiently restructure has significant implications for stakeholders,
employment, productivity, enterprise value and the community. The present research
attempted to understand the ways in which the current insolvency framework - and in
particular the Part 5.3A voluntary administration legislation - is experienced by experts
in the field, with a view to identifying ways in which it may be developed. The
methodological approach was a qualitative study utilising semi-structured interviews
with 15 insolvency practitioners to gauge a deep understanding of the research
questions. Findings indicated that there was broad based support for the effectiveness of
the current legislative framework, however eight recommendations were drawn from
the themes identified in the analysis to facilitate improved insolvency outcomes. These
recommendations encompassed refinements to the existing legislation, reassessment of
the policy and regulatory environment in which the legislation operates, and the broader
development of a framework conducive to facilitating a corporate rescue culture. The
present research reiterates the criticality of an effective corporate restructuring
framework for the efficient operation of the Australian economy and to facilitate the
rehabilitation of companies with viable underlying businesses as a matter of course.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
RESEARCH CONTEXT
In 2013, over 10,000 distressed Australian companies entered into external
administration (ASIC, 2014); their downfall was associated with poor returns, loss of
employment and the destruction of value and livelihoods. How corporate restructuring
takes place thus has significant implications for the Australian economy and workforce.
In acknowledgement of the widespread economic and social implications of insolvent
companies, legislation was introduced in Australia in the early 1990s to provide a
mechanism to restore a company to financial health and provide an improved return to
creditors. This framework, called voluntary-administration, was introduced under Part
5.3A of the Corporations Act.

The recent cycle of economic volatility has its genesis in what has become known as the
Global Financial Crisis (GFC), which had widespread effects on the Australian
economy. Along with deteriorating levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the local
equities market dropped by 54% from its peak in 2007, unemployment increased by 2%,
credit spreads rose and liquidity in the market rapidly contracted (Reserve Bank of
Australia, 2008). Within this global economic context and ongoing financial
uncertainty, effective insolvency legislation, and the capability to successfully
restructure distressed companies it provides, has never been more relevant. There is
particular evidence for this in regions most heavily affected since the GFC, such as
Europe, where the significant number of insolvent companies has highlighted the
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shortcomings of the existing, and somewhat timeworn, rehabilitation framework. Even
in healthier economies such as Australia’s, the need to evolve and re-shape the
corporate-insolvency framework remains critical to the viability of a healthy economy
and to withstand the threat of financial shock, such as that experienced during the GFC.

It is thus important that distressed Australian companies with viable underlying
businesses are restored to financial health as a matter of course. Currently, only a
minority of these companies are being saved. The present thesis constitutes an attempt
to understand how insolvent companies are currently handled and rehabilitated, with a
view to understanding how corporate restructuring can be better facilitated. It also seeks
to examine in depth the recent calls to shift the insolvency framework away from a
creditor-outcome-focused path, with an emphasis on punitive regulatory enforcement, to
a greater focus on corporate rescue and saving companies. The research also considers
the relationship between an increased likelihood of business survival and viability, on
the one hand, and improved outcomes for stakeholders and more efficient use of capital
in the market, on the other.

RESEARCH AIMS
The present study seeks to examine the practical perspectives, experiences and views of
registered and official liquidators and insolvency lawyers (together termed “insolvency
practitioners”). It uses a qualitative methodology to gain an in-depth understanding of
the effectiveness of, and barriers to working within, the existing Australian corporaterescue framework. The research examines insolvency practitioners’ views on the
practical significance and implications of key legislative differences between the
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Australian Part 5.3A legislation and alternative frameworks, both conceptual and those
from overseas jurisdictions.

The following research questions are embedded in assumptions of an economic and
social nature. These assumptions reflect the policy environment of the time, with the
underlying insolvency principles in the Australian setting outlined in the aims of the
Harmer Report (1988). These aims are particularly relevant given the absence of a
developed theoretical perspective on corporate insolvency in Australia (Symes, 2008).
The present research questions contemplate the theory of value maximisation (Eow,
2003) in the context of corporate rehabilitation, and the equitable value redistribution to
stakeholders in considering the optimal insolvency outcome. The theoretical framework
underpinning contract law is also used to inform the research questions insofar that the
operation of creditor and debtor rights are founded in the underlying contractual
relationship itself.

The specific research questions to be addressed in this thesis are as follows: -

1) How do insolvency practitioners in Australia perceive the Part 5.3A legislation,
and what are their views on its effectiveness?
2) What factors account for the relative decrease in voluntary-administration as a
means of handling insolvent companies?
3) What are the barriers in practice to the effective rehabilitation of insolvent
Australian companies as a matter of course?

14

4) How can we improve the mechanisms and effectiveness for insolvent companies
to be restored to financial health, and what value might this have for a
reconsideration of the Australian framework?

It is hoped that by developing an in-depth understanding of the constraints of
restructuring in practice, this study will contribute to furthering the Australian
corporate-rescue framework. This thesis begins with a review of the literature and a
discussion of the current knowledge regarding corporate rescue in Australia. Chapter 3
presents the way in which the research was conducted, and describes a qualitative
methodology and the use of semi-structured interviews to gain in-depth information
from participants about their views and experiences with insolvent companies. Chapters
4 and 5 present the findings from this research, and Chapter 6 discusses the major
implications and considerations for future directions.
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CHAPTER 2: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
INTRODUCTION
The main focus of this literature review is the legislative framework forming the
mechanism for the corporate restructuring of companies in Australia. From a historical
context, the beginnings of an Australian corporate-rescue framework that was aimed at
rehabilitating distressed companies were adopted from the UK scheme of arrangement
procedures. In 1993, in response to the findings and recommendations of the Harmer
Report (1988), the Part 5.3A legislation was introduced, along with other significant
reforms to Australia’s legislative framework on insolvency, under the Corporate Law
Reform Act 1992 (Cth). Whilst the Harmer Report (1988) recommended the adoption of
a voluntary-administration regime of corporate rescue to operate in conjunction with the
existing scheme of arrangement provisions, until recently the latter has largely been
rendered redundant for insolvent companies. The Part 5.3A framework has largely
replaced schemes of arrangement, and through the deed of company arrangement has
become the prevalent procedure, permitting a compromise or arrangement binding on
all its creditors and implementing a rescue strategy (Insolvency Practitioners
Association of Australia, 2009).

Whilst in Australia the scheme of arrangement legislation continues to remain available,
the regime has been described as cumbersome, slow and costly (Harmer Report, 1988).
With substantial costs for even relatively simple schemes, and the time required for
scheme implementation often exceeding 6 to 12 months, the regime is particularly
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unsuited to the average distressed company (Harmer Report, 1988). Furthermore, a
significant problem inherent with schemes of arrangement is the ongoing insolventtrading obligations of company directors, which effectively prevent borderline solvent
companies from continuing to trade whilst restructuring. For these reasons, this research
will focus on the Part 5.3A legislation in examining the Australian restructuring model
available to distressed and insolvent Australian companies, and compare it to alternate
frameworks including those used overseas. Against this backdrop, this research will also
seek to understand the rationale and drivers of the recent reappearance of the scheme of
arrangement legislation for very large distressed companies in Australia, and consider
the implications this has for the broader corporate-rehabilitation landscape.

Significantly, Australia has never had a separate insolvency statute, as its corporate
insolvency legislation has been incorporated within Chapter 5 of its general company
legislation, now known as the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The objectives of the
legislation followed recommendations contained in the Harmer Report (1988) to
implement an Australian regime to help distressed companies restructure themselves
that was efficient, uncomplicated, flexible, cost-effective and, to a significant degree,
free from judicial interference. The legislation outlines the object of Part 5.3A voluntary
administration in a general provision under s 435A Corporations Act 2001 (Cth):

The object of this Part is to provide for the business, property and affairs of an insolvent
company to be administered in a way that:

maximises the chances of the company, or as much as possible of its business,
continuing its existence; or
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if it is not possible for the company or business to continue in existence – results in a
better return for the company’s creditors and members than would result from an
immediate winding up of the company.

The backdrop of the Harmer Report was premised on a number of high-profile
corporate collapses in the 1980s. This included companies such as Rothwells Merchant
Bank, Qintex, Hooker Corporation, Bell Group and Bond Corporation; their demise,
among others’, providing the impetus for a constructive approach focused on company
preservation. The fundamental objective of voluntary-administration is to rescue viable
companies from being wound up, where the threat of insolvency would otherwise likely
result in steps being taken by creditors to place the company into liquidation. Through
the successive cycles of recession experienced in the late 20th century as a catalyst, and
the corresponding high levels of individual and corporate failure, Part 5.3A was devised
to facilitate corporate rescue. The benefits of facilitating this rescue process and
enterprise continuation represent a potentially tangible upside to stakeholders of the
company, including preserving employment, enterprise value and existing business
synergies for creditors (particularly unsecured) and members (Fridman, 2003). The
procedure provides an attractive alternative solution to the often inevitable poor returns
and devastating value destruction resulting from winding up a company through
liquidation, and the wide-ranging socio-economic welfare repercussions. Indeed, the
social and economic impact of corporate collapse, including unemployment, the
destruction of knowledge and management expertise, and the impact on the promotion
of innovation, should not be underestimated (Merrett, 2003).
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Through this voluntary-administration process, particularly where a deed of company
arrangement is entered into, there exists significant flexibility in achieving required
restructure outcomes. The voluntary-administration regime is effectively a formal
moratorium-type administration, which seeks to facilitate a unique stay on creditor
actions. This provides an opportunity for a company to restructure, thereby increasing
the likelihood of saving the company from liquidation and producing a situation
ultimately beneficial to creditors and other stakeholders. The deed of company
arrangement process can be used to achieve a wide spectrum of arrangements specific to
the distressed company’s requirements. This may include a simple compromise of
debts, complete corporate restructure, capital raising or a moratorium followed by
resumption of normal business operations. It seeks to strike the fine balance between
making the legislation sufficiently attractive to facilitate a corporate-rescue culture,
without making the procedure susceptible to abuse by short-circuiting ordinary
safeguards (Fridman, 2003). Furthermore, it is well recognised that unsecured creditors
generally receive minimal to no benefit from liquidation, and in that regard bear
significant financial burdens from insolvency (Lipton, 1993). An effective rescue
regime requires the balancing of stakeholders’ various and often-disparate interests,
particularly those of creditors. Through this creditor-focused process of obtaining
approval for rehabilitating the distressed company, Part 5.3A seeks to provide a “rescue
based legislative environment [where] voluntary-administration is the means, corporate
restructuring is the end” (Sloan, 2008b, p6).
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IMPORTANCE OF A CORPORATE-RESCUE FRAMEWORK
The significance of an effective corporate-rescue framework is highlighted by the
continued record high levels of 10,746 Australian companies that were placed under
external administration in 2013, representing a staggering 156% increase since 2000.
Figure 1 shows the number of companies entering external administration over the 13year period between 2000 and 2013.

Figure 1: Number of Australian Companies Entering External Administration

The significance of this growth is particularly highlighted when contrasted to the 68.2%
growth recorded in the number of registered companies in Australia over the same 13year period; from 1,196,114 to 2,012,241. Figure 2 shows the number of Australian
registered companies between 2000 and 2013.
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Figure 2: Number of Australian Registered Companies

This translated into the corporate failure rate of Australian companies deteriorating from
0.35% of registered companies at the turn of the century, to 0.53% by 2013. In a
broader global context, this can be contrasted to improving corporate failure rate trends
in other comparable jurisdictions such as the UK, albeit trending from a higher base.
From a UK insolvency framework perspective, failure rates over the period have seen
an improvement from 0.98% to 0.53%, with notable advancement following the
introduction of the Enterprises Act 2002. Similar statistical comparative data for
benchmarking from a US Chapter 11 context is unfortunately constrained by the
limitation on statistical data relating to US corporations due to registration being the
responsibility of state governments, with requirements and reporting varying according
to state law.
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Figure 3: Corporate Failure Rate Historical Trend

Under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Australia has a three-tier insolvency regime for
companies entering external administration, broadly broken down as follows:-

1) Liquidation (creditors’ voluntary and court appointed);
2) Voluntary-Administration (Part 5.3A); and
3) Receivership (secured creditor or court appointed).

Available empirical research data suggests that, of the companies entering external
administration under voluntary-administration, fewer than half were successful in
rehabilitating under the procedure. This in turn caused creditors to incur unnecessary
costs pursuing the prospect of rehabilitation, only to discover that any reorganisation
proposed was not viable (Routledge, 1998). These statistics formed the impetus for the
changes to Australia’s insolvency legislative framework contained in the Corporations
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Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 (Cth), with the aim being to facilitate the easier entry
of distressed companies directly into the creditors’ voluntary-liquidation process (which
will be discussed further below). This effectively removed the role of the Part 5.3A
legislation as an “appointment mechanism” for companies without ongoing viability or
the prospect of restructure, prior to proceeding to the dissolution of non-viable
companies through liquidation (Bickerdyke & Ors, 2000). These amendments
streamlined the existing procedure for creditors’ voluntary liquidation, removing the
requirement to hold the members and creditors meeting on the same day and requiring
the appointed liquidator to convene the meeting of creditors. These changes were also
implemented to provide a safeguard to ensure that only those companies with a real
potential of successful rehabilitation or realisation of improved creditor returns
compared to liquidation would use the voluntary-administration procedure.

Further analysis of the trends in external administration type by form indicate that the
prevalence and use of the voluntary-administration procedure has been diminishing
against the backdrop of increasing Australian insolvency trends. Figure 2 demonstrates
that ‘court wind-up’ and ‘creditor wind-up’ have now surpassed administrator
appointment as the preferred insolvency procedure in Australia.
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Figure 4: Number of Australian Companies Entering External Administration by Form

This rapid decrease since the introduction of the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency)
Act 2007 (Cth) has seen voluntary-administration fall to the third most popular
insolvency procedure used by distressed companies in Australia. This relegation of the
corporate-rehabilitation framework poses potentially significant questions around the
existence of a corporate “rescue-based” culture in Australia, with just under one in six
insolvent companies using the voluntary-administration procedure in 2013. A potential
mitigation to the significance of this deterioration in the popularity of the voluntaryadministration process is the extent to which the above statistics represent changes
preventing unmeritorious use of the procedure. The question, therefore, is whether the
amendments under the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 (Cth) now
reflect an improved ability for selection of the most effective regime for the distressed
company. That is, do they maximise stakeholder benefit whilst remaining careful to
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ensure that the rescue goal is not inefficiently or fruitlessly pursued to the detriment of
all stakeholders?

Rescue Culture – the Australian Context
Following the recent economic instability seen during the GFC and financial-market
turbulence relating to the ongoing European Sovereign Debt Crisis, the importance of a
strong rescue framework in Australia has never been more relevant. Recent statistics
indicate that in Australia during the depths of the GFC, “the value of new asset
impairment charges of the banks more than tripled in the year to September 2008 to
$13.3b” (www.restructuringworks.com.au). Such statistics have focused the spotlight on
the current Part 5.3A legislation as the mechanism responsible for facilitating the
survival and restructure of distressed companies. Empirical research into voluntaryadministration shows that creditors generally receive a better return under the procedure
compared than with immediate liquidation, with one study finding that the average
return is up to five times higher (Routledge, 1998). This increasing recognition of the
linkage between enterprise continuity and the impact of failure on stakeholders includes
the important role companies play in ensuring the continued economic prosperity (or
otherwise) of a nation’s economy:

We support a change to the laws which would make our insolvency laws more focused
on reconstruction like the United States Chapter 11 process…one of the most admirable
things about the United States is that their economy or industries appear to hit a brick
wall and then restructure and then they’re back in the race again…and I think that is
partly

due

to

the

way

in

which

their

insolvency

laws

operate.

(Turnbull, 2009)
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The Part 5.3A Procedure

The platform for Australia’s corporate-rescue and rehabilitation legislation is outlined in
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), with Part 5.3A titled “Administration of a company’s
affairs with a view to executing a deed of company arrangement”. The benefit of the
voluntary-administration framework in this context is that it provides an effective means
of assembling the distressed company’s creditors to potentially obtain approval for a
means of rehabilitating the company. This process can occur without the need to
negotiate with each creditor individually, whilst having the benefit of being binding on
all creditors without the requirement of unanimous approval.

The commencement of the voluntary-administration procedure can be initiated by three
groups of stakeholders, facilitating corporate rescue without court involvement. These
stakeholder groups include the directors of the company as set out in s 436A
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the liquidator or provisional liquidator of the company (s
436B), or a secured creditor holding a charge over the whole (or substantially the
whole) of the company’s property (s 436C). These critical features of a cost-effective
and speedy process are founded in the recommendations of the Harmer Report, 1988,
which advocated that the procedure be “primarily designed to enable a company to deal
with its insolvency on its own initiative”. The Australian legislation is structured to
facilitate - to the extent possible - incentives for the board of directors to use this
corporate-rescue procedure where the company is facing genuine insolvency or the risk
of it (Fridman, 2003). Primary amongst these incentives is the insolvent-trading regime
(s 588G) and available defences (s 588H). From the perspective of the company’s
directors, the underlying aim of this process is to provide an efficient mechanism for
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directors to transition to external administration upon the company becoming insolvent
(Anderson, 2001). In fact, under s 436A, all that is required to appoint an administrator
is a board resolution that states: “(a) in the opinion of the directors voting for the
resolution, the company is insolvent, or is likely to become insolvent at some future
time; and (b) an administrator of the company should be appointed”. Section 95A of the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) defines an insolvent company on the basis that it is unable
to pay all its debts as and when they become due and payable. Upon appointment of the
administrator, the company’s board of directors continue to remain in office; however,
their powers to manage the company under external administration are suspended until
such time as control is returned.

The statutory moratorium upon entering into voluntary-administration protects the
distressed company from various creditor claims and actions. This moratorium extends
to charges on the company’s assets becoming unenforceable under s 440B Corporations
Act 2001 (Cth), other than charges over perishable assets under s 441C. This is subject
to one very significant exception: secured creditors who are substantial chargees over
the company’s assets under s 441A. The initial Australian moratorium is 25 business
days (effectively 5 weeks), albeit with the potential for a 60-day extension by creditor
agreement for adjournment under s 439B or by court application under s 439A. The
purpose of this moratorium is to enable the insolvency practitioner to investigate the
likelihood for a successful restructuring, whilst signalling the urgency inherent in the
process as creditors’ rights are postponed. Voluntary-administration provides this
function to permit the investigation of the company’s affairs without the prospect of
creditor liquidation, which makes the corporate-rescue process unique, and valuable to
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all stakeholders. It facilitates a “circuit breaker” to provide the distressed company with
breathing space to evaluate the prospect of rescue and give consideration to
rehabilitating the company.

Of primary concern for an administrator upon appointment to a distressed company is
the transition of the distressed company moving forward. This usually occurs either by
parties defining, and the administrator recommending, a deed of company arrangement
or by liquidation. The Australian Part 5.3A corporate-rescue procedure can be seen to
incorporate three distinct stages: commencement, investigation and plan formulation
and voting on the decision. The administrator, as soon as practicable after
commencement, is required under s 438A to form an opinion on whether the best
interests of the company’s creditors are served by:

i)

the company executing a deed of company arrangement;

ii)

the administration ending and control reverting back to the directors; or

iii)

the company being wound up.

This final stage in the voluntary-administration process represents the decision-making
phase, which will ultimately determine the distressed company’s fate. The Part 5.3A
model relies exclusively on determination by creditors’ vote, with the exercise of the
administrator’s casting vote where required, relying on creditors’ ability to use the
information reported by the company’s administrator to make the correct decision. The
aim of these provisions is to facilitate a quick and informal decision-making process
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that ignores shareholder interests, with recourse to the Court for adjudication by any
aggrieved stakeholders seeking recourse.

The deed of company arrangement provides virtually unlimited scope to facilitate
corporate rehabilitation and rescue. If the distressed company is to be rescued following
external administration, it is likely this will be achieved by a resolution at the second
creditors’ meeting in favour of a deed of company arrangement being executed
(Fridman, 2003). In accordance with s 444D, upon this resolution being carried, the
deed then becomes binding on all the company’s creditors, subject to execution
occurring within the three-week period specified under s 444C. Significantly, the
current Australian provisions provide limited flexibility at the second meeting to
facilitate a revised restructure plan. Although under s 439C creditors can consider
revisions to the restructure plan, and the possibility exists for adjournment, no specific
alternative exists for creditors to vote on a time extension for consideration of a revised
rehabilitation plan (Anderson, 2008). Indeed, liquidation under the existing Australian
legislation becomes the default alternative for creditors, rather than the development of
rescue alternatives to the rejected plan.

Model Characteristics for Corporate Rescue
This section will outline the model characteristics of a corporate-rescue framework to
facilitate rehabilitation of viable insolvent or potentially insolvent companies as a matter
of course. The ability to devise strategies that embrace all creditor interests and make
financial and commercial judgements is the key hallmark of a good rescue regime
(Finch, 2005). This concept of corporate rescue seeks to look beyond the concept of
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insolvency itself, often advocating a rescue culture as an alternative to liquidation
(Hunter, 1999). It achieves the fine equilibrium between those championing the
promotion of corporate rescue at the expense of creditors’ absolute priority rights and
those who see the rights of creditors in insolvency and rehabilitation as paramount
(Skeel, 2001). The concept of corporate rescue must therefore seek to achieve a balance
between the rules of ut res magis valeat quam pereat (“the transaction shall not perish,
but flourish”) and pacta sunt servanda (“contracts must be honoured”).

The distinguishing feature of the voluntary-administration framework is the facilitation
of efficient corporate rehabilitation in scenarios where expected creditor returns from
corporate rescue outweigh the returns in the event of winding up (Anderson, 2001).
Ideally these returns should also consider the social costs following corporate collapse,
which are often difficult to quantify and often significantly underestimated and
overlooked. There exists a body of evidence that advocates that corporate rescue and
maximisation of outcomes for creditors are best served when distressed companies are
not subject to undue delay by directors in seeking external appointment (Milman, 2004).
This proposition is supported by the likelihood for directors to exhibit increased
business risk-taking when a company is on its last legs, in the hope of saving the
company and retaining their offices. This in turn places at risk the going-concern value
of the company, and has the potential to prejudice rescue operations, resulting in
liquidation and thus further diminishing the value available for creditors (Hahn, 2004).
In that regard, the literature also identifies the role for professional accountants,
including auditors, to assist in the timely recognition of distress and insolvency, and to
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assist with earlier initiation of the voluntary-administration process and the formulation
of a restructuring strategy (Routledge & Gadenne, 2000).

This needs to be balanced with the entry criteria required for companies to benefit from
this type of rehabilitation regime, with advantages such as the enforcement moratorium
representing significant restraints on creditors’ pre-negotiated rights. The literature
reviewed emphasises the importance of only providing the opportunity to rescue and
rehabilitate insolvent companies that have the potential to emerge as efficient and
sustainably viable companies (White, 1994). This is due to the risk of higher overall
economic and opportunity costs stemming from the failure of an insolvency framework
to keep inefficient companies from using such procedures, restructuring and adversely
affecting the economy. In that regard, a trade-off exists between the facilitation of entry
flexibility to voluntary-administration to encourage use of the procedure and the
economic cost of allowing inefficient companies to restructure.

The involvement and participation of creditors in the corporate-insolvency process has
widely been regarded as essential in any well-balanced framework, with the level and
nature of this participation increasing in corporate-rescue scenarios (Tomasic, 2006).
This creditor participation is important not only in ensuring fairness and confidence in
the corporate rehabilitation system, but in ensuring that justice “is seen to be done”.
Indeed, it should be acknowledged that the position of the unsecured creditors of a
distressed company is an uncomfortable one, ranking below the status enjoyed by
secured and other priority creditors (Milman & Durrant, 1999). Furthermore, the
participation of creditors in the rescue process, and in determining the company’s fate,
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is likely to benefit from the considerable knowledge often held by creditors of the
distressed company’s viability and operations. Thus, creditor participation should not
create undue impediments, delay or undermine proceedings. Rather, efficient and
effective creditor participation in corporate-rehabilitation proceedings can be expected
to contribute to avoiding the devastating domino-like effects, both economic and social,
of corporate collapse (White, 1994).

Additionally, whilst it must be acknowledged that the intent and design of the Part 5.3A
framework was to avoid the requirement for court intervention and supervision as a
matter of course, the literature suggests that greater flexibility in achieving rescue could
be achieved with appropriate industry and judicial cooperation. The provisions under s
447A(1) Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) state that “the court may make such order as it
thinks appropriate about how this Part is to operate in relation to a particular company”.
Such broad wording of the s 447A provisions in relation to Part 5.3A has provided a
mechanism for supervisory powers over administrators, approval and amendments to
deeds of company arrangements, powers relating to procedural matters and resolutions
of creditors’ meetings and the removal of administrators or placement of companies into
liquidation. The s 447A provisions provide the Court with wide-ranging general powers
that provide scope for the exercise of judicial discretion to alter the substantive
operation of provisions under the Part 5.3A legislation (Harris & Gordon, 2005). This
flexibility created by s 447A provides the power for courts to mould the statutory
prescriptions of how voluntary-administration operates to the characteristics of an
insolvent company’s particular circumstances (Barrett, 2003). Notwithstanding this
potential for such general powers to provide flexibility to the voluntary-administration
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process, some have advocated the need for caution regarding the scope of its
application. In particular, the increased involvement of courts poses the potential risk of
inhibiting the speed of the procedure, increased uncertainty in outcomes, higher costs
and the potential misplaced focus on commercial morality (Collins, 2004).

Recent Legislative Reforms
This section will consider the reforms to the corporate-restructuring legislation under
the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 (Cth), and whether they have been
sufficient to facilitate an effective rescue framework in Australia. Notwithstanding
recognised limitations within the Part 5.3A procedure, the literature suggests broad
underlying support for the voluntary-administration process (Morrison & Anderson,
2006). This in turn has seen a strong preference in governmental policy for evolutionary
change as a means to enhance the corporate-insolvency framework in Australia. Indeed,
whilst there is little doubt that the “voluntary-administration process has resulted in the
saving of many businesses through restructurings…a significant number of
administrations (if not the majority) result in liquidation” (Sloan, 2008b, p6). The
significant number of companies that ultimately follow this path into liquidation has led
many to advocate that the current Australian rescue regime is not sufficiently “rescuefocused”. These criticisms surround the inability of the Part 5.3A framework to
facilitate the restructuring of companies as a matter of course (Sloan, 2008b). In
particular, the corporate collapse and liquidation of Ansett Airlines and HIH in 2001
demonstrated the difficulty of using the Part 5.3A procedure for rehabilitating larger
companies (Anderson, 2008). The spotlight on Australia’s corporate-rescue framework
was the subject of further attention following the economic fall-out after the GFC and
high-profile corporate collapses, which included ABC Learning Centres, Allco Finance
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Group, Australian Discount Retail, Commander Communications and Babcock &
Brown. It also formed the basis for renewed calls for a debtor-in-possession model of
corporate rescue similar to Chapter 11 in the US, to improve the probability of
successful corporate rescue for larger Australian companies.

The 2007 reforms consisted of a number of amendments to the current provisions
contained in the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 (Cth) which were
adopted with a view to increasing the flexibility to rehabilitate insolvent companies
(Table 1). These reforms have made headway in addressing some of the concerns and
criticisms of the previous legislation.

Table 1: Summary of Reforms Relating to the Part 5.3A Corporations Act 2001
Reform
Share Dealings
by Administrator
(Item 29
Schedule 1)

Description
This reform includes watering down the previous prohibitions
relating to an administrator’s ability to deal with a company’s shares
without court approval. It includes the provision of powers to an
administrator to sell shares of the company with the consent of
shareholders. This reform can be seen to facilitate the potential for
restructuring the balance sheet through the use of equity rather than
relying purely on “cramming down” debt, thereby providing the
opportunity to strike a sensible balance between the rights of
members and creditors respectively.

Debt-to-Equity
Swap Exemption

This reform provides exemptions from the fundraising regime for
deeds of company arrangements that include a debt-to-equity swap,
similar to those applicable to schemes of company arrangements.
This provides significant benefits to encourage creditors to
participate in and share in the benefits of the future of a company
through the swap, with minimal time and cost, including removing
the need for a prospectus.

Changing of
Company Name
(Item 49
Schedule 1)

This reform includes addressing difficulties encountered by an
administrator to alter a company’s name, by removing the need to
obtain shareholder consent through a special resolution of the
members. This will assist in addressing the significant devaluation
of the company’s name and brand that often transpires as a result of
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insolvency.
Exemptions to
notify DOCA
(Item 50,
Schedule 4)

Administrators’ now have the ability to apply to the court for
exemption from the requirement to notify that the company is
subject to a deed of company arrangement (DOCA), providing
significant benefits for companies seeking to avoid the detrimental
impact and continued stain of failure on the company’s trading,
whilst subject to a deed.

Subsequent to the 2007 legislative changes outlined above, the Australian Federal
Government released a discussion paper titled Insolvent Trading: A Safe Harbour For
Reorganisation Attempts Outside of External Administration (Safe Harbour, 2010). This
discussion paper focused on attempts by insolvent Australian companies to informally
rehabilitate outside of external administration in the context of the existing insolvent
trading laws. It examined a number of potential options for legislative change to
facilitate improved outcomes and business rescue, including:

i)

a modified business-judgement rule relating to a director’s duty to avoid trading
whilst insolvent; and

ii)

a moratorium being invoked from insolvent trading whilst the company attempts
to rehabilitate.

The Federal Government acknowledged that “placing a company into voluntaryadministration may not always represent the most appropriate method to effect a
corporate rescue [and that] informal work-outs play an important role in preserving a
troubled business” and protecting stakeholders (Safe Harbour, 2010). In particular, the
discussion paper sought to examine barriers created by the existing insolvent trading
legislation during insolvent companies’ bona fide attempts to restructure. This included
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the impact of illiquidity or restrictions on the availability of credit, which had the
potential to trigger temporary insolvency for distressed companies, such as that
experienced during the GFC. Whilst the discussion paper resulted in the Treasury
receiving 22 submissions, the changes considered under the discussion paper were not
pursued under the Government’s corporate-insolvency reform. Instead, the recently
introduced Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2013 focuses on a narrow framework of changes
surrounding the regulation of the industry, common rule alignment between corporate
and personal insolvency and the registration, regulation, discipline and deregistration of
practitioners. In that regard, these reforms hold limited relevance to the scope for
corporate rehabilitation, and thus the subject of this research. The 2010 Safe Harbour
discussion paper will, however, inform the interpretation of subsequent findings later in
this thesis.

Barriers to Restructuring
Notwithstanding the above government and legislative measures concerning reform to
the insolvency framework and industry, the review of literature indicates a substantial
body of information that continues to identify a number of fundamental barriers to
successful restructuring in Australia, including the secured creditor exemption, the
insolvent-trading regime, ipso facto clauses, procedural accountability & abuse,
employee creditors and entitlements and globalisation & cross-border insolvency
convergence. The review of the literature has also revealed research gaps regarding
detailed “rescue” statistics under the Australian insolvency framework. Despite a
number of reports from government bodies, committee papers and calls for review
submissions, there remains a lack of detailed data and empirically based information on
the procedure, which has constrained policy debate. Indeed, there is some suggestion
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that as few as one in 15 Australian companies successfully manages to resume trading
following voluntary-administration (Restructuring Workings, 2009). Furthermore, from
a cultural perspective the concept of insolvency and corporate rescue in Australia
potentially carries the stigma of corporate failure. This stigma is particularly challenging
to address due to the difficulty in altering such entrenched values through public policy
(Hofstede, 2007). This is particularly important in an environment where the reputation
of a company has become increasingly important as a factor influencing consumer
decisions and investor behaviour (Hale, 1999). This stigma of failure can be contrasted
with the corporate and financial environment in other jurisdictions such as the US,
where “if you go into Chapter 11, you put it on your curriculum vitae” (Crutchfield,
2003, p124).

Secured Creditors
This section will consider the exemption of secured creditors holding a charge over the
whole, or substantially the whole, of the company’s property under the Part 5.3A
legislation, and the potential resultant barrier to the effectiveness of the regime. This
limitation arises in that secured creditors are only bound under a deed of company
arrangement to the extent to which they agree or, in limited circumstances, the court is
able to order under s 444D(2). Whilst the rights of limited secured creditors can be
restricted by the Court under s 444F, the Court has no power to restrain a secured
creditor that holds a charge over the whole or substantially whole of the company. The
result is that distressed companies using the voluntary-administration procedure have
“no protection from banks then putting the company into receivership….saying ‘right
we’re going to get our money out of it’” (Turnbull & Franklin, 2008). The potential for
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this type of opportunistic behaviour is identified as a serious threat to the restructuring
process, with consequent, and unnecessary, value destruction.

The UK legislation seeks a mid-point whereby the restructuring legislation prohibits
floating-charge holders from using administrative receivership, instead requiring
general enforcement by secured creditors through the administration process. This seeks
to provide some redress from the prior position, whereby receivers tended to focus on
the speedy resolution of the secured-charge holders’ interest, often without any
sustained consideration or obligation to the remaining body of creditors. The challenge
in legislating to constrain secured creditors’ rights is the converse reality that insolvency
practitioners often depend on banks for repeat insolvency work, particularly resulting
from bank powers surrounding appointment of choice (Davies, 2002). This in turn leads
to administrators developing and pursuing ongoing relationships with banks.
Furthermore, administrators often rely on banks for funding throughout the rescue
process, which results in the banks having a vested interest in ensuring that any
restructure proposal occurs under acceptable terms, providing considerable power to
influence strategy (Day & Taylor, 2001). In that regard, it must be acknowledged that
“there is no legislation that can address the economic facts of life: he who pays the piper
will call the tune” (Swain, 2003).

The absence of “super-priority” ranking for funding advanced to assist in the
rehabilitation process has also been identified as a constraining factor in banks’
willingness to facilitate the rescue of distressed companies. Instead, without superpriority, banks advancing additional rescue funds are likely to behave in a manner
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highly motivated and focused on negotiating strategies that protect their existing
exposure and interests (Finch, 2005). Herein lies the considerable difficulty in raising
post-appointment finance for a distressed company to facilitate restructure. In fact, this
has provided the basis for the British Bankers Association’s claims that “receivership
operated as an effective way of saving businesses because receivers, acting for the
banks, could operate very dynamically” (British Bankers Association, 2001), benefiting
from single-party decision-making. In addition to banks’ pivotal role of providing
ongoing funding during the rescue process, they are also likely to possess valuable and
detailed operational and financial information about the distressed company. However,
the inclination for banks to work with insolvency practitioners to share this information
cannot be accepted as a given. Whilst contractual negotiation of commercial interests
often presents an effective option from the perspective of secured creditors, the need for
external administration of distressed companies is significantly more important to
creditors without security to rely upon (Anderson, 2001).

The current direction of UK reforms has sought to elevate the corporate-rescue goal by
shifting privilege and protection away from secured creditors’ rights by prohibiting the
use of receivership by floating-charge holders. The premise of this paradigm shift is the
prevention of instances where secured creditors used the appointment of receivers to act
precipitously, thereby diminishing the likelihood of corporate rehabilitation (Fridman,
2003). The Australian voluntary-administration framework constitutes a trade-off in
favour of the challenges associated with having to concentrate the minds and objectives
of diverse creditor classes to facilitate corporate rehabilitation, whilst pursuing greater
creditor fairness. A rehabilitation regime for distressed companies with a moratorium
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that includes all creditors would restrict the power of secured creditors to instigate the
receivership procedure, thereby assisting the objective of rehabilitation and a broader
creditor-focused approach (Merrett, 2003).

Insolvent Trading
Section 588G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) outlines a duty on company directors
to prevent insolvent trading. The insolvent-trading provisions under the existing
legislation have been the source of a number of criticisms and policy arguments
surrounding the Australian rehabilitation system (James, Ramsay & Siva, 2004).
Implemented under the recommendations of the Harmer Report (1988), the provisions
seek to deter “hold-out” behaviour by directors of a distressed company approaching
insolvency, through the belief that there is nothing to be lost in continuing if there is
potential upside just around the corner. This has been argued to compound the financial
negative impact on unsecured creditors as a result of external administration. In turn,
these insolvent-trading provisions have been subject to criticism for having the effect of
encouraging directors to become unduly adverse to risk (James, Ramsay & Siva, 2004),
resulting in directors prematurely placing companies into voluntary-administration to
avoid the threat of personal liability. There exists, however, a fundamental flaw in the
argument that insolvent trading prevents the effective rescue of companies that could
potentially trade out of financial distress under existing circumstances or informal
restructure. There are tangible reasons why the risks of corporate failure in the lead-up
to insolvency should not be borne by creditors. A key reason is the incentive for
directors to engage in excessive risk-taking “to put it all on the line” in their pursuit of
evading insolvency. In that regard, the mechanism of personal directors’ liability is to
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ensure that the interests of the creditors intrude (Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd
[1986]), effectively preventing further gambling using creditor’s funds.

The contemporary issues surrounding the impact of insolvent trading liability under the
Australian legislation have resulted in the “impetus for most administrations being the
avoidance of personal liability for insolvent trading” (Sloan, 2008b, p10). Whilst such
strict liability undoubtedly has merit for the protection of creditors, the literature
includes arguments that it also creates an incentive to place the company into
liquidation and “start again” (Robinson, 2009). This provides a platform for
consideration to advocate corporate rehabilitation through external administration
mechanisms to “introduce American-style bankruptcy laws that allow companies to
continue trading whilst insolvent…known as Chapter 11” (Cameron, 2008). The
potential merits of this “debtor-in-possession” model is discussed later in this chapter.

A further issue surrounding the insolvent trading legislation is the reluctance it creates
for third-party involvement in the rescue of a company, due to the potential for shadow
director liability being imposed through the process of informal rehabilitation
(Routledge & McNamara, 2005). The s 588G provisions relating to insolvent trading
contain a broad definition of a company director, expanding the duty to include shadow
directors and de facto directors. The concept of a shadow director incorporates a person
who is not appointed by the board, but whose wishes or instructions are followed by the
directors of a company, and under whose direction the latter are accustomed to act
(Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico, Nos 1 and 2 [1995]). De facto
directors, on the other hand, are persons acting as a company director without being
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validly appointed to the position. This broad definition of “director” under the
legislation has been argued to represent a significant deterrent to qualified experts
becoming directors of distressed companies (James, Ramsay & Siva, 2004) at a time
when their expertise is most critical. Overseas, two key trends identified in achieving
the resurrection of insolvent companies are the “innovations of the placement of chief
restructuring officers into a company in financial difficulty and the employment of a
‘loan to own’ strategy” (Sloan, 2008b, p10). The feasibility of such reconstruction tools
in Australia is limited by the shadow-director provisions of the insolvent trading
legislation, which discourage such appointments to companies in failing corporate
health. This strict shadow-director framework has also been argued to inhibit the
proactive involvement by bankers in the redirection of the company for fear that
shadow-director liability may be imposed on them (Brown, 2009). The question thus
arises as to whether narrowing the s 588M definition of a director and softening the
scope of such shadow-director liabilities would mitigate the reluctance of such experts
to facilitate the restructuring process.

Ipso Facto Clauses
An ipso facto clause is a contractual clause stipulating the consequences of the
insolvency of a party to the agreement. The significance of ipso facto clauses as a
common provision in most contracts in Australia derives from the corresponding right
of the counterparty to terminate a contract in the event that a company becomes
insolvent. This has the potential to significantly inhibit a company seeking to
restructure, as the appointment of an administrator will almost always provide such
grounds for termination. The absence of a measure under current Australian
restructuring legislation preventing “a supplier or a customer of the company from
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cancelling contracts of supply on the basis solely of insolvency (as opposed to nonperformance or repudiation)” (Onefone Australia Pty Ltd v One Tel Ltd [2007]) often
corresponds to a crippling and immediate cessation of a company’s operations and any
possibility of restructure. The absence of protection under Australian legislation of the
enforcement of this type of ipso facto clause, such as a moratorium on enforcement, will
often strike at any company’s ongoing ability to trade, and destroy its major asset: its
customer base.

Indeed, ipso facto clauses have been advocated as one of the key criticisms of the
Australian framework, with the ensuing catastrophic results from the voiding of
contracts causing irreparable damage to business (Parbery, 2008). The standard
presence in contracts of ipso facto clauses that trigger upon entering into voluntaryadministration often bring down the business upon appointment and kill any
restructuring prospect (Eyers, 2009). This effectively changes the Part 5.3A provisions
designed to help companies keep afloat from a life jacket to an anchor by depriving the
business of essential contracts. Chapter 5 of this thesis will discuss the potential for the
adoption of restructuring provisions such as in the United States (Bankruptcy Code s
365(e), United States Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978), where reliance on ipso facto
clauses for the termination of contracts on the ground of insolvency alone is prohibited.

The Administrator and Procedural Accountability
Once appointed, the company’s administrator takes sole custody of the power to deal
with the company’s assets under s 437D, acting as the agent of the company in respect
to the exercise of all powers and functions as administrator. However, the use of these

43

powers is tempered in the restructuring process under Part 5.3A, and the administrators
also become liable under s 443A for any debts incurred in the ongoing trading of the
business and performance or exercise of their powers. In practice, the extent of any such
exposure is usually mitigated by the entitlement under s 443D for the administrator to
be indemnified from realisations of the company’s assets. Notwithstanding, this tradingrisk exposure can be seen to weigh heavily on administrators’ shoulders as they seek to
facilitate a restructure and relegate the corporate-rescue priority during the voluntaryadministration process (Agardy, 2002).

All participants in the insolvency rescue process - the insolvency practitioner, directors
and bankers - are affected by differing incentives and motivations surrounding the
rehabilitation process, and often see the world from differing perspectives. These multiparty interests may range from banks focusing on the priority protection of secured
corporate asset values, directors protecting employment and insolvency practitioners on
complying with their statutory mandates and protecting creditor interests. Ultimately,
the voluntary-administration corporate-rescue regime, such as in the Australian and the
UK legislation, creates a complex hierarchy as it sets out an administrator’s objectives
in serving a broad spectrum of creditor interests (Frisby, 2004). Furthermore, these
objectives should be recognised in the context of the challenges associated with
commercial decision-making, in that “actions which at the time of taking were known to
be risky but justifiable in terms of expected benefits, can seem unjustifiable with
hindsight when a ‘bad’ outcome has materialized” (Armour & Frisby, 2001). This in
turn is likely to translate into insolvency practitioners behaving in a highly risk-averse
manner, thus potentially obstructing the likelihood of corporate rescue as the outcome.
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This potential for undue conservatism in the quality and consistency of administrators’
recommendations to creditors in their assessment of a company’s restructuring and
realisation prospects was identified as an impediment to the operational effectiveness of
the Part 5.3A legislation. This was regarded as particularly important, given the extent
to which creditors rely on such recommendations in making their decision about the fate
of the insolvent company (Routledge & Gadenne, 2000).

The importance of procedural accountability and administrator independence and
objectivity is particularly highlighted in the Australian context, with pre-packaged
restructure arrangements. In the Australian market, the use of so-called “pre-packs” to
achieve a planned corporate restructure has had limited application in practice, despite
the existing infrastructure under the legislation to achieve this outcome (Lloyd, O’Brien
& Robertson, 2009). Whilst pre-packs have taken various forms across different
insolvency jurisdictions, of most significance for Australian comparative purposes has
been the widely popular UK version. Using the UK voluntary-administration
framework, this form of pre-pack reflects the negotiation for the sale of all or part of the
insolvent company’s business or assets prior to the formal appointment, with the
subsequent sale occurring shortly after appointment. Often such an arrangement is
undertaken among the related parties to the insolvent company, with the transaction
occurring without marketing the business to other potential purchasers and without the
need for creditor or court approval (Walton & Wellard, 2012). The challenge of this UK
model in an Australian context has been the clear actual or perceived threat to
objectivity where an administrator has been involved in the planning of a pre-pack,
potentially providing a direct conflict to their duty to the company’s creditors. This lack
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of creditor transparency prior to the execution of a pre-pack business sale also risks the
perception of an administrator’s independence being compromised or tainted, and
brings into question their ability to impartially investigate an insolvent company’s
affairs.

In particular, where such pre-pack sale occurs in conjunction with parties related to the
insolvent company, such criticisms surrounding independence, objectivity and conflict
concerns are likely to become heightened and result in greater creditor disenchantment
(Walton & Wellard, 2012). This issue of practitioner independence and such
requirements in the Australian context are outlined both in professional codes of
conduct such as those of the IPAA and in general law, and have evolved to be
considered almost absolute. Whilst codes of conduct do not have the force of law, they
are extensive in application and play an important role in insolvency practice, with
Australian courts recognising their importance in assessing actual and perceived
independence (Walton & Wellard, 2012). This presents a significant barrier not only to
the potential for administrator involvement in the negotiation, engineering and
preparation of a pre-appointment sale of business, but also is more broadly restrictive of
the scope of pre-appointment planning undertaken by administrators.

Whilst the literature recognises a prima facie acknowledgement of the potential merits
of pre-packs in an Australian context, there is a distinct preference for achieving such
outcomes through court sanction or within the paradoxical confines of a creditorapproved deed of company arrangement or similar process (Walton & Wellard, 2012).
Whilst it is acknowledged that administrators in Australia have the power to exercise
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their commercial judgement in sanctioning an early sale of assets without testing the
market, there exists a clear prima facie aversion to such course of action in the absence
of a compelling justification or court approval. In that regard, in the Australian context
the acceptance of these types of pre-pack arrangements have been limited to scenarios
where a trading administration is clearly likely to destroy goodwill or business value,
and the pre-pack is the only feasible option (DKLL Solicitors v HMRC [2008] 1 BCLC
112). From a framework-development perspective, this has seen the key focus of
Australian pre-pack discussion on increased planning and identification of restructuring
outcomes prior to formal insolvency, rather than the timing of its implementation
(Poulos & McCunn, 2011). In other words, the pre-appointment plan is prepared with
the goal of potentially preserving asset values and achieving certainty by reducing the
timeframe to achieve the desired outcome. The pre-pack concept discussion in Australia
has sought to distance itself from the UK model of diminished creditor participation and
abrogation of rights, and has attached itself to the concept of earlier intervention and
planning to achieve improved restructuring outcomes. Whilst there is recognition that
the timing of pre-pack implementation has an inverse relationship to the level of value
destruction likely to occur, is has been acknowledged that the UK model of immediacy
of sale post-appointment runs contrary to Australia’s entrenched culture of creditor
determination (Poulos & McCunn, 2011).

Employee Creditors & Entitlements
With Australia’s employee-entitlement regime being amongst the most comprehensive
in the world, it is no surprise that a key challenge to any restructure relates to addressing
employee creditors. A company “pregnant with employee entitlement obligations is a
very unfavourable take-over target in a restructuring” (Sloan, 2008b, p8), as the heavy
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burden assumed by an acquirer of the outstanding employee entitlements, unlike that of
general creditors, remains subject to s 556 priorities. This inability to “cram down”
employee entitlements under a deed flowing from the mandatory priority of these
entitlements inhibits the likelihood of restructuring, often wiping out and exceeding any
residual enterprise value in the business. In the continuing absence of an employeeentitlement limit, despite one of the most generous entitlement regimes in the world
(Whelan & Zwier, 2005), the ongoing threat to distressed companies remains that such
entitlements will diminish the very jobs by which they have accrued.

A further important issue that arises under the current restructuring regime is that the
safety net for employee entitlements provided under the General Employee Entitlements
and Redundancy Scheme (GEERS) is normally only applicable to companies placed
into liquidation, thereby excluding companies that are subject to a deed of company
arrangement. Thus, when confronted by a choice between the potential for the
restructure of a company under a deed or placing the company into liquidation, there is
an inherent and perhaps inadvertent incentive for employees to pursue the latter course
where employee entitlements are threatened (Whelan & Zwier, 2005). With employee
creditors often controlling the majority vote by number in an administration, the
resultant creditor voting pool can produce results that ironically protect entitlements at
the resultant cost of ongoing employment. Whilst there is no doubt that the importance
and rights of employees, including their entitlements, is fundamental and should be
protected, this research will seek to understand the implications of restructuring where
such challenges are present. The context is thus that of preserving not just entitlement
payments, but also business viability, and thereby ongoing employment.
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Globalisation and Cross-border Insolvency Convergence
In the context of the current dynamic economic environment, there has also been an
increasing focus on globalisation and increased uniformity in international standards for
insolvency legislation. In that regard, the spotlight has turned to comparing the current
Part 5.3A legislation to its international counterparts to identify and consolidate crossborder uniformity and a best-practice framework. This increasing focus on global and
regional insolvency legislation and international best-practice norms is seen as
fundamental in providing a foundation for the globalised market economy. Whilst in the
Asia-Pacific geographic region, extensive efforts have been made in recent years to
incorporate and develop insolvency legislative frameworks towards international
standards, the legal protection of creditors in Asian jurisdictions remains relatively
weak (Tomasic & Little, 1997). The development of these broader international
principles and guidelines of insolvency law have largely been derived from the insights
and experiences gained from countries with established insolvency frameworks and
recent reform efforts. These guidelines have sought to outline flexible, internationally
recognised insolvency benchmarks and standards to provide a broad-spectrum
assessment tool that can help countries evaluate the effectiveness of insolvency systems
and creditors’ rights (World Bank, 2010).

Prior to the regional Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s, insolvency legislation in
the region was often “out of date and irrelevant to modern commercial needs” (Harmer,
2000). However the actual practice of implementing international best practice and its
compatibility with local countries’ existing insolvency framework, especially in relation
to the less-developed countries, has remained a challenge. This has reflected a need for
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sensitivity to the reality of existing weaknesses in legal systems, financial institutions,
mechanisms for social protection and corporate governance, coupled with resource and
capacity constraints and local corrupt practices (Tomasic, 2006). This can be seen to
have largely been responsible for a significant “implementation gap”, particularly in
eastern Asia, whereby the existing legal systems have provided a major impediment to
the adoption of international insolvency standards. In particular, effective creditor
participation has remained elusive, with local traditions and culture often affecting the
nature and extent of creditor participation in the corporate-rehabilitation process.
Indeed, much of the restructuring that has taken place in Asia has represented fictional
rescheduling of debt without any operational restructure, using negotiations to extract
additional equity, security, fees or security without any commitment to long-term
rescue, and without any realistic expectation of companies’ survival (Vassiliou, 2006).
This widening bridge between insolvency standards across the Asia-Pacific region
remains an ongoing issue of concern in the adoption of standardised insolvency
practices, and it has become increasingly clear that such reforms will not be fully
embraced until countries recognise that such a framework is fundamental to sustainable
economic development. Given the generalised and widespread lack of institutional
capacity, together with cultural appetite for informal corporate rescue - particularly in
developing parts of Asia - corporate distress will likely continue to be resolved
informally as the region transitions to a convergent insolvency framework.

Furthermore, an impediment to the adoption and acceptance of international and crossborder insolvency standards can also be seen to occur where a country such as Australia
has a well-developed and strong framework of insolvency legislation (Tomasic, 2006).
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It is only natural that any move towards globalised-insolvency law reform and
convergence towards common insolvency legislation should draw from jurisdictions
that have a history demonstrating how proposed legislation may function. However, it
should be also recognised that it is one thing to advocate for common cross-border
insolvency legislation, and quite another to have that legislation function in the same
manner across different cultural and social conditions, legal frameworks and
commercial environments (Anderson, 2008).

Corporate Restructuring Models in Other Jurisdictions
This section will consider the operation of other international best-practice rescue
frameworks, with a view to locating and overcoming the barriers to effective
restructuring in Australia. Whilst New Zealand has recently implemented a voluntary
targeted corporate-rehabilitation scheme similar to the Part 5.3A legislation, an analysis
of the UK and US legislation is also valuable in examining the Australian framework.

Enterprise Act 2002 - UK Insolvency Regime

On a best-practice basis the comparative understanding of the UK Enterprise Act 2002
is worthwhile. The UK legislation represented a fundamental reform that has sought to
establish a robust rescue regime in the UK. This was seen as essential in providing
distressed companies with a reasonable chance for rehabilitation (Finch, 2002). The
framework of the UK regime is grounded on the furtherance of rescue by providing the
mechanisms to implement sound rehabilitation strategies and judgements, which
facilitate timely decision-making and coordinated action (Frisby, 2004). Similar to the
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Australian voluntary-administration legislation, the UK model places control of the
distressed company in the hands of an independent insolvency practitioner, in the form
of an administrator. This advocates the proposition that in times of corporate distress,
“English insolvency law has traditionally been built on the assumption that where a
company becomes insolvent this is usually due to a failure of management…who are
responsible for the company’s plight in the first place” (Finch, 2002, p124). This is
diametrically opposed to the model implicit under the US regime, which seeks to treat
corporate distress as an issue requiring attention rather than blame, often under the
continued judgement and skill of the existing management (Moss, 1998). The argument
in favour of the UK model is that insolvency practitioners have the ability to determine
the extent of the role played by directors based on their independent assessment and
judgement powers. This in turn provides a “best of both worlds” approach to corporate
rescue, with the administrator bringing together divergent interests that would otherwise
provide a tendency to undermine cooperation, driven by differing motives and the
absence of an alignment of interests.

Most notably, however, the UK regime differentiates from the Australian model by
focusing on the importance of judicial oversight to support coordinated action and
facilitate rescue outcomes (Finch, 2005), revitalising judicial involvement in the
administration process. In that regard, not only does the responsibility for the protection
of stakeholders’ substantive and procedural rights lie with judges, but their review
powers also serve as a mechanism for coordination between vested parties to enhance
the likelihood of rescue. In practice however, judges are unlikely to intervene when it
involves second-guessing the commercial judgements of administrators (Swain, 2003).
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It is more likely that judicial contribution will take the form of shielding administrators
from unnecessary delays in pursuing their statutory objectives, with a view to
expeditiously achieving restructure. During administration, the UK model operates in a
rescue-optimising manner by imposing a moratorium on the enforcement of chargeholder security and any commencement of other insolvency proceedings. These
amendments seek to remove the predisposition to solely focus on realising returns for
floating-charge holders under administrative receivership, and to benefit the interests of
all creditors. Significantly, the UK legislation also “ring-fences” a proportion of net
floating-charge realisations from the company, which are required to be made available
to unsecured creditors (Finch, 2005). Floating-charge holders are subsequently only
able to benefit from the distribution of funds surplus to the above becoming available
for distribution.
Chapter 11 – US Bankruptcy Regime

The focus of this section is a comparative analysis of the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy regime
and the mechanisms that make the framework “widely considered to be one of the most
debtor-friendly reorganization laws in the industrialised world” (Lewis, 2001). The
primary distinction between the US regime and the Australian voluntary-administration
model is that the former embraces a debtor-in-possession (DIP) regime, rather than the
administrator- or practitioner-in-possession (PIP) model adopted in Australia. The DIP
model largely leaves the management in the control of the company (Westbrook, 2004),
advocating that the existing directors are likely to bring to the table greater firm-specific
operational and staffing knowledge in facilitating a restructure. This is contrasted to the
PIP regime, where rehabilitation expertise, strategies and funding are likely to be
provided by the insolvency practitioner and banks, overriding the need to place a great
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deal of reliance on the input of directors. However, one factor that appears to have been
overplayed in the DIP-versus-PIP debate in assessing the more effective mechanism for
rescue is the degree to which under either scenario the existing management or the
independent practitioner is really in charge (Franken, 2004). In fact, whilst both models
contain a single formal authority to lead policies or decision-making, the dominance of
that authority is tempered by discussion, negotiation and consultation arrangements
between various parties in final decision-making.

Table 2 shows the top 10 bankruptcy filings under US Chapter 11, and demonstrates in
a majority of these appointments, the company was able to successfully restructure.

Table 2: Ten Largest Bankruptcy Filings Under Chapter 11
Company

Date

Assets US$M

Outcome

Lehman Brothers

2008

$691,063

Liquidation

Washington Mutual

2008

$327,913

Liquidation

WorldCom

2002

$103,914

Restructure

General Motors

2009

$91,047

Restructure

CIT Group

2009

$80,448

Restructure

Enron Corp

2001

$65,503

Liquidation

Conseco

2002

$61,392

Restructure

Chrysler Corp

2009

$39,300

Restructure

Thornburg Mortgage

2009

$36,521

Liquidation

Pacific Gas & Electric

2001

$36,152

Restructure
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The available literature supports the proposition that whilst a majority of Chapter 11
cases do fail, when the question becomes whether most large companies under Chapter
11 fail, the answer is no (Broude, 2003).

Furthermore, the Chapter 11 regime is attractive to directors as a rehabilitation process
because it offers a moratorium on claims, whilst allowing existing management of the
distressed company to retain control (Fridman, 2003). This retained stake in the
distressed company’s future provides a strong motivation for focusing attention on, and
investing effort in, ensuring the success of the restructuring process. Herein lies the
challenge posed by the DIP system: does liquidation or rehabilitation offer the most
appropriate path for the distressed company, taking into consideration the potential
managerial incentive to opt for rescue and thus remain in office? This presents a
scenario whereby companies that should be placed into liquidation potentially file for
reorganisation, which conflicts with maximizing the return and protecting the interests
of creditors (Bogart, 1998). In this regard, the PIP model, which assumes an
administrator with very broad control powers, presents a lower bias risk relating to the
decision to liquidate with the removal of control from directors. This bias is partially
mitigated, however, by the close oversight of the US Bankruptcy Court under Chapter
11 proceedings, in contrast to the limited supervisory role played by the Australian
courts under voluntary-administration (Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee,
2003).

Indeed, whilst companies under Chapter 11 restructuring benefit from the automatic
stay on secured parties from enforcing their security, and from the prohibition against
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relying on insolvency as grounds for contract termination by parties to an agreement1,
there are also significant shortcomings with the Chapter 11 procedure. These include an
approach to corporate rehabilitation that is expensive, takes too long and is
administratively cumbersome (Broude, 2003). In fact, whilst estimates of the average
time a distressed company spends in Chapter 11 vary significantly, no average suggests
a timeframe shorter than 10 months (Lewis, 2001). Any benefits that accrue with the
DIP model under existing management and without the constraints of an administrator
are also eroded by management spending this extended period potentially distracted by
the Chapter 11 case. A further distinction relates to the extent of creditor rights under
the respective procedures, with creditors and, in particular, unsecured creditors under
voluntary-administration afforded rights that effectively allow them to shape the future
of the distressed company. Under the Chapter 11 regime, there exist far stricter controls
around creditor participation, including the prevalence of ‘cram-down’, where a
rehabilitation plan becomes binding upon dissenting creditors (Lewis, 2001). This
approach can be contrasted with the traditional insolvency claims hierarchy, whereby
creditors effectively supplant shareholders as primary beneficiaries of the preservation
and realisation of going-concern value (Baird & Jackson, 1988). This is due to the
equity of an insolvent company becoming largely worthless. In that regard, the literature
suggests the US Chapter 11 model, whilst possessing attributes that should be
considered for adoption into the Australian framework, provides a limited framework
for restructuring beyond those very large US companies, and fails to consistently
achieve the primary objective of a rescue culture; that is, “distinguishing those firms

1

United States Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978, Bankruptcy Code ss365(E)
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with long term potential viability from those firms without such prospects, and assuring
continuance of the former and liquidation of the latter” (Lewis, 2001).

CONCLUSION
The literature reviewed thus far relating to corporate rehabilitation and the voluntaryadministration legislation in Australia provides, in the opinion of the author, strong
foundations for the current research and ongoing commentary in the area. The purpose
of the current research is to examine and study practitioners’ perspectives of the
Australian Part 5.3A legislation in practice, with a view to identifying themes and trends
relating to the existing rehabilitation regime. The author hopes that this study will
provide potential explanations for the trends identified and increase the body of
understanding surrounding the operation and effectiveness of the present legislation. It
is hoped that this research will contribute to the body of knowledge through
understanding the practical experience of restructuring insolvent Australian companies
and avoiding the spectre of corporate failure.

The importance of developing a corporate culture where social values and ongoing
employment are maintained through averting corporate collapse, is as significant in
assessing the value of corporate rescue as the economic and financial value such rescue
brings. This is in contrast to the present status quo in Australia, where, according to the
literature reviewed, primacy of legislation focuses on the maximisation of return to
creditors rather than the rescue of distressed companies per se. This is anticipated to
include the role and implications relating to secured creditors in Australia, and, in
particular, banks and their potential reluctance to compromise and restructure loans to
prevent distressed companies from becoming insolvent. From the author’s experience
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and observations, banks may be reluctant to compromise loans due to the potential to set
a market precedent that encourages other distressed companies to seek debt relief,
which would in turn potentially affect loan recovery. This is further compounded by the
priority ranking from which secured lenders benefit, providing little incentive for banks
to prioritise a company’s rescue; thus the brunt of value destruction is borne by
unsecured creditors. This presents conflicting risks: the potential for premature
liquidations where secured creditors are permitted to enforce their security when a
company enters formal administration, versus the likelihood of increased costs and
reduced availability of financing where secured creditors’ rights are constrained
(Broadie, Chernov & Sundaresan, 2007).

The research will also seek to examine the appropriateness of a move towards a more
“debtor friendly” approach to restructuring. This concept relates to legislation such as
the US Chapter 11 being characterised by the debtor remaining in possession (in the
absence of specific “fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross mismanagement” under
Bankruptcy Code ss 1104(a)(1) (United States Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978), with no
financial-solvency standard required. The DIP approach has largely been attributed to a
desire to avoid the displacement of management by an administrator who may have
little understanding of the business and its operations. This potential benefit in turn
needs to be weighed up to ensure that “management doesn’t spend more time managing
the Chapter 11 case than it does managing the business” (Broude, 2003, p4).
Viewpoints range between both ends of the creditor debtor spectrum. Those advocating
the merits of the “creditor friendly” regime pursued in the Australian framework include
detractors of the “pro-debtor-anti-creditor juggernaut known as Chapter 11. The debtor
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in possession? Good grief! Why let the miscreants who brought about the financial
failure continue to captain the sinking or sunk ship?” (Broude, 2003, p4). On the other
hand, advocates of the debtor friendly system have responded with opposing criticisms:
“That’s right, sell only enough to pay the secured creditor and damn the unsecured
creditors, employees, or anyone else with the temerity to claim an interest in the
distressed business” (Broude, 2003, p4).

Whilst it has been advocated that Part 5.3A is the “best system for Australian conditions
while perhaps not providing a perfect solution for all companies…subject to a dramatic
downturn in economic activity” (Anderson & Morrison, 2007, p.257), the economic
volatility from 2007 to the present provides this very catalyst. In the current distressed
economic climate, an opportunity exists to undertake research and formulate law-reform
proposals in the corporate-rehabilitation area, which until recently had largely been
academic in practice, given the sustained period of strong economic growth (Eyers,
2009). The researcher recognises, however, that legislators need to be careful that we do
not advocate short-lived legislative amendments, specifically framed to respond to
individual financial crises, which cause more damage or inequity when the crises
subside. Consequently, a key focus of this research will be to ensure that impediments
identified to achieving successful corporate restructurings are examined in sufficient
depth.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
This chapter outlines the selection and justification of the methodology used in this
study to explore the perspectives and experiences of insolvency practitioners working
within the Australian insolvency field. This research is grounded on the perspectives
and experiences of insolvency practitioners, suggesting a qualitative approach to
research design. The objective of using insolvency practitioners as participants was to
gain insight into the perceived operating effectiveness of the legislative framework in
practice. This participant group is significant insofar as they have expertise in and
responsibility for administering the voluntary-administration legislation, are suitably
qualified and are entrusted with the independent assessment and judgement powers
relating to the procedure. Insolvency practitioners are also independent of key
stakeholders, including the company, directors, creditors, employees and customers, and
in that regard provide relative objectivity to the voluntary-administration process.
Insolvency practitioners are most familiar with the use of the legislation to restructure
companies in practice, including its operation and effectiveness. This will provide an
important insight into practitioners’ perspectives on how the advancement of a
corporate “rescue-based” culture could be facilitated in Australia, and provide feedback
on the relevant issues insolvency practitioners are experiencing, including any practical
barriers that inhibit best practice in the restructuring of viable companies.
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Following a brief description of the theoretical considerations that have informed the
present research, the design of the project will be described in detail. This chapter will
then go on to describe the methods undertaken in addressing the research questions.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The epistemological and ontological assumptions that influence the present research are
constructionist in nature, and identify the theoretical perspective as interpretivist. This is
grounded on the assumption that practitioners’ perspectives are informed by their
experiences, which are in turn informed by the legislative framework, which itself is
socially constructed (Turkel, 1988). Ontologically, this research assumes that reality is
constructed by individual practitioners, the discipline of insolvency, the law and society
itself; thus the position adopted is constructionist. This linkage between the
constructionist epistemology and interpretivist theoretical perspective reflects an
underlying assumption that knowledge and interpretation are not distinct (Crotty, 1998).

Traditionally, it has been asserted that “mainstream accounting is grounded in a
common set of philosophical assumptions about knowledge, the empirical world, and
the relationship between theory and practice” (Chua, 1986, p.601). However, adopting
an interpretive approach introduces an alternative perspective that is potentially rich in
research insights. Indeed, the accounting discipline and research have historically been
criticised as being hampered by some theories about practice that bear little relation to
actual accounting practice (Kaplan, 1984). Traditional accounting assumptions have, in
this respect, limited the scope of accounting research undertaken and the application of
research methods, and thereby impaired fundamentally different potential insights
which would enrich the understanding of accounting in practice.
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Because of the belief in a means-end dichotomy, accounting researchers take as given
and natural a current institutional framework of government, markets, prices and
organisational forms. Questions about the goal of a decision-maker, firm or society are
seen as outside the province of the accountant (Chua, 1986, p.610).

The use of interpretivism, whilst not conventional in mainstream accounting and
finance research, is warranted in this case because the present research assumes that
both reality and knowledge are socially constructed, and hence operate within a
dynamic context. The present study of accounting in action - by moving research into
the life-world of practitioners in practice through an interpretive perspective - provides a
mechanism to evaluate and potentially change institutional structures and influence
policy development at the macro-level. An interpretive focus will assist in developing a
deep understanding of the research questions as discussed in the available literature, and
in particular surrounding the practical perspectives of practitioners, whilst
simultaneously pointing to the importance of answering such questions. The
interpretivist theoretical perspective underpinning the current research reflects this
objective of gaining practitioners’ perspectives of the Australian insolvency legislation
outside of a predetermined framework. However, it should also be acknowledged that
this theoretical framework is accompanied by limitations: given the dynamic social and
accounting reality, such meanings surrounding insolvency practitioners’ perspectives
will effectively be constituted by their changing social, political, legal and historical
contexts (Chua, 1986). In particular, research outcomes will need to be located within
the parameters of the relevant environmental context, such as how a time of crisis (for
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example the 2007 global financial crisis) affects the interpretation of findings, as well as
the risk of the researcher’s own subjectivity and interpretive bias. These limitations will
be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

It is hoped that by supporting an in-depth understanding of the practical constraints and
barriers to restructuring, this study will contribute to furthering existing legislation
surrounding the Australian corporate-rescue regime. Policy-makers’ current focus on
corporate rehabilitation provides the opportunity to foster an environment conducive to
corporate rescue, and thereby reduces the likelihood of corporate collapse through
reconceptualising the process of rehabilitation. That is, it could potentially facilitate
corporate rehabilitation accountably and expertly, whilst maintaining fairness and
efficiency. This is primarily the reason for this study’s use of an open-ended qualitative
research methodology. This chapter will also examine the assumptions and objectives
underpinning the proposed research to highlight the benefits of using qualitative
research methods. As outlined in Figure 3, the methods selected have been influenced
by the theoretical framework identified for the development of knowledge and the
philosophical assumptions behind the research design (Crotty, 1998).

Figure 5: Selection of Methods
Epistemology:

Theoretical Perspective:

Methodology:

Methods:

Constructionist

Interpretivist

Thematic

Interview
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RESEARCH DESIGN
This section will outline the use of a qualitative design and identify the research
technique as an interview study. This research seeks to develop an in-depth view of the
key areas and themes that practitioners identify as fundamental barriers to corporate
rehabilitation in practice. The epistemological assumptions embedded in the present
research are accounted for in a qualitative design, as seeking in-depth information from
participants in the system of relevance, inherently supporting a constructionist
framework. In this regard, it can be seen that for the purposes of this research, the
qualitative design represents an ideal approach to enhancing understanding of the
complexities surrounding practitioner perspectives of the insolvency legislation. The
data will generate a useful practical insight into the perceived operating constraints of
the current creditor-friendly Australian legislation, as well as providing a perspective on
the validity of the drivers behind a current push for the adoption/transition to a more
debtor-friendly corporate rescue framework, such as Chapter 11 in the United States.

The present qualitative methodology is justified by the need for understanding the
complex determinants to the research questions, which would be unattainable through
quantitative research. Within the realm of qualitative research, any method that
attributes a pre-established framework onto the data would similarly restrict its
interpretation, thus ruling out such potential approaches as content analysis. Further, as
previously discussed, accounting research is traditionally limited in its ability to
consider complex questions from frameworks outside the assumptions of quantitative
research, further justifying the need for qualitative approaches to data collection and
interpretation (Chua, 1986).
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Qualitative research methods in social research have a rich and long history as a
fundamental source of knowledge. In particular, qualitative research involves the
investigation of individuals and groups in their social setting. Qualitative studies thus
form the best mechanism to facilitate research that seeks to understand and investigate
the feelings, thoughts and experiences of insolvency practitioners as participants within
the operational context of the Part 5.3A legislation. For the purposes of this research, a
number of different types of qualitative research designs were considered, with the most
suitable design determined to be a thematic-analysis approach influenced by grounded
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Such an approach to research
design allows the researcher to extract the personal meanings of insolvency
practitioners’ practical experiences in the context of the corporate-rehabilitation
framework and legislative environment. This in turn will provide the systematic
grounding to gain insights into practitioners’ perspectives of the operation and
effectiveness of the legislation, with the research method benefiting from an absence of
strong preconceptions or fixed hypotheses.

Grounded theory is a qualitative research approach suited to theory development
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990); that is, theory is grounded in empirical observations within a
practice. The approach uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively
derived theory that arises from the data. This is in contrast to deductive research, in
which a theory is tested using mostly quantitative research methods. Grounded theory
thus inductively develops a deep understanding of the phenomenon of interest (Strauss
& Corbin, 1990). The basic idea of grounded theory is to analyse data and “discover” or
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label variables (e.g., categories, concepts and properties) and their interrelationships.
Research continues until “data saturation” is obtained, and no new concepts arise from
the collection of data; at this point, the theory is complete.

To complete a study based on grounded-theory techniques is a time-consuming,
complex and intense exercise. However, the inductive nature of grounded theory also
gives rise to its technique of thematic analysis as a means to approaching data, without
the formality of the full range of grounded-theory techniques, such as theoretical
sampling. Therefore, the present research will be informed by grounded theory, but will
use thematic analysis as its primary data-analysis technique, and will not formally
attempt to engage in theoretical sampling. Using thematic analysis in this way is
justified because it can be considered a research approach in its own right (Braun &
Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis occurs when a researcher searches for themes, both
between and within participants, that are important to the topic being researched (Daly,
Kellehear & Gliksman, 1997). The technique of thematic analysis identifies patterns in
the data, and these emerging themes then become categories for analysis (Fereday &
Muir-Cochrane, 2006). The present research will draw on the thematic-analysis
approach described by Boyatzis (1998), which is outlined in more detail in the section
of this chapter regarding data analysis.

The objective of the proposed research is to use insolvency practitioners’ accounts to
develop an in-depth assessment of corporate-rescue effectiveness and barriers relating to
the Part 5.3A voluntary-administration rehabilitation regime. By conducting interviews
with each participant and using open-ended questions, which are exploratory in nature,
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this study limits the degree to which participants are influenced by previous theoretical
constructs (Strauss & Corbin 1990). The benefits of this open-ended questioning are
likely to be the eliciting of dense and rich descriptions of practitioners’ experiences and
perspectives of the Part 5.3A procedure. Later-stage interviews are effective to check
the content areas introduced through actively verifying the emerging theory with
participants (Silverman, 2006). In addition, this method highlights the importance of
using participants’ own language to further ground the theory construction and add to
the credibility of findings (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). A key focus of this approach is to
ensure that the identified impediments to successful corporate restructuring are
examined in sufficient depth and to appropriately “place” these barriers within the
emerging theory.

However, whilst qualitative research lends itself strongly to the in-depth understanding
of the subject matter and phenomena, the descriptive and unstructured nature of the
data-collection methods raises challenges surrounding external and internal validity
(Guba & Lincoln, 1983). In that regard, consideration in research methods for the
proposed topic will need to account for strategies that ensure the reliability and validity
of the research methods; these will be addressed in the section of this chapter regarding
research quality.

The specific method used in the present research was a semi-structured interview.
Adopting the semi-structured interview design allowed for the emergence of a more
complete picture of the research topic and facilitated the opportunity for participants to
guide the direction of the interview (Smith, 1995). A semi-structured interview is
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justified by its ability to capture the complex data that was required for the present
research questions. Further, the interpretive nature of inquiry in the present research is
consistent with the selection of a semi-structured interview, which introduces a
constructionist epistemological and ontological framework (Chua, 1986). In conclusion,
the research design chosen for the present study will leave the author in an ideal
position to answer the research questions and provide the tools for rigorous data
collection and analysis, and the development of conclusions.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Several ethical issues warranted consideration for the present research, and have been
the subject of approval by the University of Wollongong Higher Research Ethics
Committee (Appendix B). First, it was necessary to ensure that participation in the study
was completely voluntary, and that no form of coercion was used while attempting to
recruit participants for the project. Participants were advised verbally and in writing
(through the participant information sheet and consent form, Appendices C and D
respectively) that their participation was completely voluntary and that they would not
be discriminated against in any form should they choose not to participate. Similarly,
participants were advised that they could withdraw their consent at any time during the
study (including after the interview) without penalty or prejudice.

The second ethical consideration was privacy. Information obtained from the semistructured interviews was kept confidential to protect the privacy of participants. In this
way, any form of published data (e.g., interview quotes) would not be identifiable with
a particular participant. Pseudonyms are used in the presentation of data as a means of
protecting participants identify. As the insolvency field is predominantly male and there
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was only one female participant, a number of gender-neutral names have been used as
pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the female participant.

The third ethical consideration is honesty. It was necessary to ensure that informed
consent was obtained from participants. This was achieved by a clear participant
information sheet and consent form.

Last, the research needed to ensure that the analysis and reporting of results was
conducted in an ethical manner. Specifically, results of the project would need to be
published and presented in a way that accurately represented the findings of the project.
Participants of the study were posted a brief summary of the findings as a way of
thanking them for their participation.

METHODS
Sampling
The study identified a sample of insolvency practitioners who were recruited using a
purposeful approach to sampling (Patton, 2002). Purposeful sampling allowed the
researcher to specifically target participants who were relevant to the research question
(Silverman, 2006). The sampling population was insolvency practitioners including
registered liquidators, official liquidators and legal practitioners specialising in
insolvency law. These professions all overlap to meet the population criteria for experts
in the field of insolvency and business failure. Although the nature of the roles played
by liquidators and legal practitioners specialised in insolvency law are distinct in their
aims and objectives, it was important that the population sample could capture these
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different perspectives and data was analysed accordingly to understand the potential
differences these perspectives may bring. Snowball sampling techniques were also
considered should purposeful sampling not engage enough participants, and three
participants were recruited in this manner. Participants were recruited from the Sydney
and Brisbane areas so that the researcher could access a location convenient for the
participant to be interviewed.
Recruitment Strategies

Participants were approached for their participation through posting a letter of invitation
(Appendix E) that included the participant information form, the consent form and a
reply-paid envelope. Once participants consented to participate in the research, they
were contacted to arrange a convenient time and location for the interview.

Participants for the study were divided into 1) registered liquidators and official
liquidators; and 2) legal practitioners specialising in insolvency law. The Insolvency
Practitioners Association of Australia (IPAA) website has a register of professional
service firms in this area (accounting and legal firms), from which one can then see the
individual practitioners at the firm. It is also possible to run a "find a practitioner near
you" function on the IPAA website, which enabled the researcher to identify further
practitioners for the research sample.

From there, the practitioners’ names (other than legal practitioners) were checked in
ASIC's Professional Register to see whether they were a current registered liquidator or
official liquidator, and find the date that they commenced registration. Whilst
registration commencement is not necessarily a full reflection of experience, given the
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scope for significant work experience in the field prior to registration, this provided a
baseline indicator of the practitioners’ experience. Participants were selected if they had
been registered for more than four years, to ensure that they had adequate practical
experience to contribute to the research.

Procedures
Instruments

The primary instrument for the present research was an interview guide (Appendix F),
which helped the researcher go through the relevant topics for the interview while also
providing scope for participants to consider further information and expand upon their
responses with tangential commentary (Patton, 2002). The interview guide commenced
with the collection of demographic information and was followed by open-ended
questions that directly mapped onto the research questions for the present project.
Data Collection

Once an interview began, participants were reminded about their ability to withdraw
from the study at any time without penalty or prejudice, and the interviewer asked for
their permission to record the interview audio for the purposes of data transcription and
analysis.

Throughout the course of each interview, the researcher followed the questions on the
interview guide and ensured that all broad topic areas were covered. At the same time,
the researcher probed for further information and allowed participants to direct the
interview and discuss in depth topics of relevance to them. To facilitate this process, the
interviewer used such strategies as building rapport with participants and encouraging
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them to provide as much information as they saw fit using open-questions (Silverman,
2006).

Data Analysis
Interviews were transcribed verbatim from the audio recordings. From each
transcription, data was analysed through the development of an initial tentative coding
scheme, a form of data reduction (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This inductive process
sought to reduce the data into categories that were common across and within
interviews, filtering out insignificant text, and beginning to construct a framework for
revealing the main themes of the findings (Patton, 2002).

The present study used thematic analysis as the method to make sense of the findings.
While this approach is derived from grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss
& Corbin, 1990), it can be considered a data-analysis method in its own right. Boyatzis
(1998) describes the approach of coding for thematic analysis as one where important
information is identified prior to the process of interpretation based on inductive
reasoning. Codes are thus able to capture rich ideas about the phenomenon of interest,
and the identification of themes can then emerge. A theme is therefore something that
encapsulates the patterns that have emerged in the data and assists in the interpretation
of relevant aspects of the research phenomenon (Boyatzis, 1998).Thematic analysis thus
provided the means to develop an in-depth understanding of the interview findings.

Data analysis began after the first interview and continued until a meaningful
interpretation could be made from the themes developed. Data was initially sorted into
tentative codes, which over time became more definitive until they resulted in the
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themes that will be presented in the following chapters. Throughout data collection and
analysis, the researcher also kept memos to track the development of themes and aid in
the analysis of data.

To track and save ongoing data analysis, the computer software NVivo 10 was used.
This software aided in the recording of data-analysis processes such as labeling codes
and conducting Boolean searches during later interpretive analysis, thereby increasing
the efficiency of the data analysis (Bringer, Johnston, & Brackenridge, 2004).

It was considered that the themes be counted and presented from the perspective of how
many participants endorsed each theme. However, there are a number of contradictions
to such an approach. First, there was no attempt made to capture a representative sample
in the present research, so applying statistical analysis to the findings would be
misleading. Second, the attempt to quantify qualitative data forms a deductive approach
to data analysis, which is different from the inductive way in which the present research
aims have been framed. Any calculation of the representation of themes across
participants is also based on different epistemological assumptions from interpretivism,
which seeks a deep understanding and is a shift away from the objective assumptions
behind quantification (Crotty, 1998). For these reasons, there was no frequency count of
how many participants endorsed each theme.

RESEARCH QUALITY
The open-ended and iterative nature of qualitative enquiry (Miles & Huberman, 1994)
means that the researcher is in many ways not separable from the interpretation of
findings, and neutrality is thus not possible. The risk of using qualitative research is that

73

the researcher needs to free him/herself from preconceptions in the collection and
analysis of data (Patton, 2002) to truly develop the data inductively. One way to
approach such a dilemma is to consider a reflexive approach to research (Woolgar,
1988). Reflexivity in the present research involved speculating and continuously
reflecting upon how the researcher affects the collection, analysis and representation of
findings (Patton, 2002). This section will therefore outline some information regarding
the researcher’s experiences and insights regarding the research topic, and describe the
researcher’s use of a reflective journal.

Researcher Experience
This section will explain my own construction of the research phenomenon and
acknowledge how this affected the inquiry, thereby enhancing the credibility of the data
interpretation. Such an acknowledgement can make it clear how my experiences,
including working in the insolvency field and in the financial-services industry, may
have contributed to the way the data was collected and interpreted.

My professional background has included working as a chartered accountant in the
insolvency profession for four years, including on high-profile corporate collapses in
Australia. This included the opportunity to recognise first hand the extent of enterprisevalue destruction and the significant economic and social cost associated with corporate
failure. Subsequently, I spent almost 10 years working in the banking and finance
sector, including senior debt involvement in the successful restructuring of several large
and public companies. This has included working closely with company boards, privateequity and insolvency-advisory firms to maximise the likelihood of corporate
rehabilitation and value extraction of distressed companies.
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It has been in the context of this exposure to the current insolvency framework in
Australia that both the facilitators and barriers to the successful rehabilitation of
companies have become apparent. Whilst my experience indicates that the Corporations
Act Part 5.3A legislation is an effective foundation to facilitate the restructure of
Australian companies, increased scrutiny of insolvency legislation following the GFC
has highlighted that this restructuring process follows a significantly different trajectory
to that undertaken in other jurisdictions, such as the United States. In that regard, the
current research seeks to take advantage of my commerce and law background and
experience to gain an in-depth understanding from insolvency practitioners of their
experiences working within the existing Australian framework.

These experiences, while providing a foundation for knowledge related to the present
research topic, also has the potential for research bias. This includes differing priorities
that the researcher personally places on competing economic and social objectives, as
well as certain assumptions about the world and society. For example, my background
in the banking and finance sector has the potential to result in an inherent tendency to
value capitalist ideologies over socialist ones. This in turn has implications for the
critical analysis and hierarchy of priorities that need to be considered to facilitate the
restructuring of companies amongst competing needs, such as those which influence the
creditor- or debtor- friendly approach discussed in the literature review. Furthermore,
my experiences have undoubtedly been influenced by my workplace environments,
reporting superiors and educational experiences to date, which all have the ability to
result in potential bias. A broader bias of my research that is embedded in the very way
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my research questions are framed is that it is beneficial to have a higher rate of
successful corporate restructures. Whilst such an aim is in my opinion valuable, it is
nonetheless grounded upon an economic and social aim that is not value-neutral.

Reflective Journal
Throughout the research process, a reflective journal was maintained that was used to
outline my thinking regarding the process of research and data collected. Such a journal
served as a means to highlight – and therefore bracket, and ideally reduce – bias towards
the analysis and interpretation of findings.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented the methods used in the present research to understand the
perspective of insolvency practitioners towards corporate-restructuring practices in
Australia. The present methodology is informed by an interpretivist framework and uses
a qualitative approach to data collection through a semi-structured interview. Ways in
which the potential bias of qualitative research has been addressed have also been
discussed. The next chapter will present findings from the interviews conducted.
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CHAPTER 4: OBJECTIVES AND OPERATION OF
CORPORATE REHABILITATION IN PRACTICE
INTRODUCTION
This chapter outlines the findings from interviews with insolvency practitioners. It
describes their experiences in practice using the Part 5.3A voluntary-administration
legislation in working with and rehabilitating insolvent companies in distress.

DEMOGRAPHICS
Participants in this research consisted of 10 registered/official liquidators and five
insolvency lawyers, who had been registered for a period of more than four years. This
section will outline key background and demographic information in relation to the
interview participants and the nature of their practice and experience in the insolvency
field.

Participants had been registered for an average of 12 years and had been practising for
an average of 18.4 years. The client revenue that participants worked with ranged from
zero to 1.8 billion dollars. All registered/official liquidators had experience in the areas
of voluntary-administration and liquidation, and 13 of the 15 also had experience with
receivership and advisory work. All five insolvency lawyers had experience with
insolvency law, and three also had experience with bankruptcy law. Fourteen of the 15
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participants were male, which is roughly reflective of the gender distribution of the
field.
Table 3: Summary of Participant Demographics
Participant

Lee

Registration

Registered /

Years

Years

Registered /

Revenue

21

$10.0M to Receivership, VA,

25

8

20

Official Liquidator
Shannon

Registered /

6

16

Official Liquidator
Dale

Registered /

18

28

Official Liquidator
Philip

Registered /

Registered /

6

14

5

26

Official Liquidator
Cameron

Registered /

5

14

Official Liquidator
Evan

Registered /

12

21

Official Liquidator
Taylor

Registered /

19

21

Official Liquidator
Jamie

Registered /
Official Liquidator

$100.0M

Liquidation, Advisory.

$0.0M to

Receivership, VA,

$200.0M

Liquidation, Advisory.

$1.0M to

Receivership, VA,

$1.8B

Liquidation, Advisory.

$25.0M to Receivership, VA,
$1.5B

Official Liquidator
Julian

Areas of Practice

Registered Practicing

Official Liquidator
Leslie

Client

Liquidation, Advisory.

$10.0M to Receivership, VA,
$500.0M

Liquidation, Advisory.

$0.5M to

Receivership, VA,

$5.0

Liquidation, Advisory.

$20.0M to Receivership, VA,
$500.0M

Liquidation, Advisory.

$5.0M to

Receivership, VA,

$20.0M

Liquidation, Advisory.

$0.0M to

VA, Liquidation.

$5.0M
9

13

$0.0M to

Receivership, VA,

$50.0M

Liquidation, Advisory.
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Alex

John

Sam

Lawyer

Lawyer

Lawyer

15

18

5

15

20

9

$0.5M to

Insolvency &

$100.0M

Bankruptcy Law

$5.0M to

Insolvency &

$1.5B

Bankruptcy Law

$50.0M to Insolvency Law
$500.0M

Adrian

Chris

Lawyer

Lawyer

24

9

24

10

$1.0M to

Insolvency &

$200.0M

Bankruptcy Law

>$10.0M

Insolvency Law

Participant Response to Research
Participants who agreed to be involved with this research appeared to have a strong
interest in the operation and advancement of the Australian insolvency legislation. They
viewed the rehabilitation framework as fundamental not only to the practice of
insolvency and the profession, but also to the efficient and effective operation of the
Australian economy and broader society. A number of participants also expressed their
interest in the research as being driven by barriers they regularly encountered in
working as insolvency practitioners, and were happy for the chance to express their
views in the forum as to how these could be addressed.

“I was very interested in your topic and I’m sure we’ll go onto it, but it’s very
frustrating in the sense that you see what happens in other jurisdictions, and we
just have some clunky rules here and you can sort of see the distress doesn’t
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need to be the distress that we work out in the Australian market, it can be
otherwise.” (Cameron)

Participants also expressed enthusiasm throughout the interview process that the
questions put forward were pertinent to understanding the corporate-rehabilitation
framework in Australia. Discussion included challenges experienced by practitioners in
the industry and potential mechanisms for improvement.

LEGISLATIVE AIM
This section will outline participants’ perceptions of the objectives of the Part 5.3A
legislation and the priority in which the aims of the legislation are pursued. It will also
discuss why, in practice, the stated objective of rehabilitating a company (or as much of
its business as possible) is often given lower priority than the pursuit of the best
outcome for creditors.

Difference Between Part 5.3A Objectives and Practical Application
The participants’ view of the underlying objectives of the Part 5.3A legislation and what
the broad aim of the legislation should be in practice were aligned. That is, a focus upon
the continuation of the company - or as much of its business as possible - and the
pursuit of a better return for creditors were considered to be the objectives.

“Well, I think it is actually pretty well expressed in the legislation itself. It’s got
two essential aims. It’s either to contemplate the continuation of the corporate
entity in a better form than the benchmark, which would be what the wind-up
scenario would look like. The other limb is that even if you can’t have the
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business survive, if you can utilise the moratorium provisions of the VA to have
a better result, let’s say sell down the underlying assets or business as a going
concern within the VA period. And notwithstanding that you ultimately go into
liquidation, at least you are getting a better result for creditors than if you went
straight into the liquidation.” (Evan)

Some participants questioned the legislative objective of the company itself surviving or
being restored to financial health. Instead, they advocated for the objectives to be
focused on ensuring the survival of a viable business, with the potential for a deed of
company arrangement to rehabilitate an insolvent company being just one mechanism to
facilitate this outcome.

“There is this concept in the legislation about saving the company itself, and I
guess I sort of ask, ‘What does that mean?’ More often than not, if a business
makes money…someone wants a business if it can make a profit, maybe it’s had
losses in the past or had the wrong capital structure and it’s actually a viable
business…someone wants it. What normally happens is that a business gets sold
to a Newco. Really, how does a DOCA give you a better chance of rehabilitating
as opposed to the sale of a business? I would argue not a whole lot really. Often
it means that the existing directors’ and owners’…[they] get to keep it. That’s
about all it facilitates.” (Phillip)

Indeed, a number of participants highlighted that given the hierarchy of stakeholder
claims corresponds to the potential benefit and risk associated with a company’s
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success, a sound rationale existed for the primary consequence of failure being borne by
equity.

“The idea though that a lot of this comes from equity if you like, I will
collectively call them equity, who despite the fact that they are equity and get all
the upside opportunity, that they mismanage the business and they want
everyone else to pay for that as a way of recapitalising their business. I don’t
think that is acceptable and should not be accepted. There is a ranking. That
ranking reflects the risk and the return.” (Taylor)

This brought into question whether the primary objective of Part 5.3A for the
rehabilitation of an insolvent company was inconsistent with this hierarchy of
stakeholder claims, and should instead prioritise the maximisation of creditor returns.

“Clearly, the aim when a company no longer has equity value should be to
preserve value for creditors. I think that should be broad and should not be
constrained in terms of how that is achieved, but it should be preserving and
maximising the outcome for creditors. Generally speaking, creditors like to see
their interest converted into some form of cash, and generally speaking their
interest is not for a long-term work out.” (Dale)

Significantly, a majority of participants commented that despite the stated aim of the
Part 5.3A legislation of saving the company and underlying business, this aim was often
relegated as secondary to the pursuit of this return to creditors under the framework.
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“I think in practice, despite the aims articulated under the legislation, that
reality inevitably defaults to the objective of providing creditors, including
unsecured creditors, with a better outcome than they would achieve in a
liquidation scenario and to, where possible, allow the continuation of trading
entities as a going concern.” (Alex)

“Look, I think in practice it’s about getting the best possible return, primarily
for creditors and then following that all other stakeholders, in a transparent and
lowest cost of process way.” (Philip)

This creditor focus is largely due to the operation of the Part 5.3A legislation, which
requires creditors to ultimately vote and decide on the outcome of the voluntaryadministration process. Participants identified that this creditor reliance within the
rehabilitation framework created an overriding creditor-return consideration to the
likely success of any restructure proposed under voluntary-administration.

“I guess that the mechanism - if you step away from the object as set out in the
Act and look at the mechanism itself - as to how you get an arrangement
approved, the administrator’s job is still to demonstrate that the creditors would
be better off under the proposal compared to liquidation or alternatives. So the
other objective does take a back seat to the return to creditors, given that if you
don’t get over that obstacle and show that it is in creditors’ interests, then
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ultimately your arrangement can be challenged and set aside, if it gets approved
in the first place.” (Taylor)

The perception that the default position did not focus on the objective to rehabilitate the
company itself was raised as an area of concern by those participants whose experience
and background focused on debtor-side advisory and appointment work. These
participants argued that if there was a sensible commercial rationale for the company
continuing in existence, then there was merit in saving the company as a whole.

“If you look at the two objectives of the Act, the idea that it allows a company to
continue in existence is a sensible objective, but in practice I think that objective
is often secondary or tertiary in terms of what people find themselves doing in
that regime and arena. So, I think it very very quickly morphs into, ‘How do we
get cents in the dollars for everyone and how do we protect employee
entitlements?’, not ‘How do we actually allow this company to continue in
existence if in fact there is a sensible business case for salvaging this
company?’. The latter is what I think it should be, I think there should be a
rigorous assessment around does this company deserve to continue, and if yes,
how do we make that happen? Quite often, the idea that you just go and sell it to
the highest bidder and get out is actually counterintuitive to that objective, to be
honest.” (Shannon)

This ideological viewpoint was contrasted with other participants whose work was less
debtor focused, who suggested that a focus on maximising the chance of the company
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itself emerging from administration had the potential to actually be detrimental to the
broader economic objectives:

“I am not sure that the goal of having the company continue to exist as it sits at
the moment sits very well with that object…because on one view that objective
almost seems to be an objective of pardon. There is research that says that one
of the most effective ways of improving the productivity in an economy is in fact
getting rid of those unprofitable, non-viable entities.” (Taylor)

In practice, participants reported that the voluntary-administration framework played an
important role in bringing insolvent companies to a decision juncture. In that regard,
participants acknowledged that the Part 5.3A process provided a valuable mechanism to
pursue an alternative outcome to liquidation.

“The prospect of an orderly winding up of the company with a reasonable
return to creditors, or some return to creditors, still often is a lot better and a lot
more efficient way of dealing with the assets and finalising the affairs of the
company than allowing it to continue on down a path with no structure and
continuing further losses being incurred. The consequences of personal
liabilities for the directors and those sort of things that go with it, you can often
end up with a much worse disaster than you would have if you [had] dealt with
the problem a little bit sooner. You have got the prospect of convincing
companies to deal with it sooner whilst they have that chance of some
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alternative other than the worst-case scenario of liquidation and bankruptcy and
other things that go with it.” (Paul)

Whilst the success rate of companies restructuring under the legislation was less than
ideal, participants saw merit in providing breathing space to enable a thorough
assessment of whether there was value in restructuring a potentially viable business.

“I think [voluntary-administration] is designed to create a status quo to see if a
business or company can be saved. I think in practice the number of companies
that end up back trading viably [after] having been restructured via a deed of
company arrangement or some other means is very small, and probably a lot
smaller than was intended when the path was created. But I don’t necessarily
see that as a failure of the Part 5.3A legislation. One, because you get an
opportunity to have a go at a restructuring even if it doesn’t come about and no
proposal can be put up…you still have a chance to save the business itself.”
(Adrian)

Participants were shown to support the objectives of the legislation, albeit with a
priority focus in practice on achieving improved creditor realisations rather than
salvaging the corporate entity. This was in contrast to the objectives under the
legislation, which focuses upon rehabilitation of the company, or as much of its
business, followed by improved creditor returns as an outcome. This was found to be a
function of the creditor driven conclusion to the voluntary-administration process, with
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the potential outcome for the insolvent company contingent on the likely comparative
return to creditors.

Creditor-outcome Focus
Participants

contrasted

this

creditor-outcome-focused

approach

to

corporate

rehabilitation of Australian companies with the focus in other jurisdictions, where
primacy of importance was placed on how the company could be salvaged. There was
also recognition of a broader set of factors that the administrator was obliged to
consider under Part 5.3A, rather than just an immediate rescue focus.

“I think there is a contrast between the Australian system and the American
system, where the American system is more looking at saving the company, so
more debtor-friendly if you like. Whereas in Australia we tend to have a view,
‘well, the bank can appoint or we need to appoint a VA in the interest of the
creditors’, so we tend to have a greater focus on how we are going to get the
money back to the creditors. I suppose the American system is more ‘how can
we save the business?’, with less emphasis on insolvent trading and creditor
positions and all that sort of stuff. Obviously they’ve got to be looked at and
dealt with at some point, but they start at a different point.” (Lee)

“In relation to the rescue culture, in the US and abroad this seems to be a far
more in-the-spotlight objective, whereas in Australia it seems much more of a
creditor-focused process. So getting the best return for creditors rather than
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keeping the company alive. My view is, that is a noble objective. It’s what it
should be.” (Julian)

However, participants acknowledged that the creditor-driven process under the
voluntary-administration framework risked promoting short-term and narrow objectives
that were incongruent with the rehabilitation of viable insolvent companies. In
particular, such outcomes were likely to be influenced by such factors as the quantum
and timing of returns to creditors.

“I think there is a tension between those two objectives, because people
generally, when they are dealing with the company and they are owed money,
they generally need that to be converted into cash. They generally don’t want
that rolled into a long-term equity interest or deed of company arrangement
which is realised in a classic two-, three-, four-year timetable. So creditors
generally need to convert it to cash, which generally drives a sale of some form.
Often businesses that are down, a sale in that point in time will not maximise the
outcome for the stakeholders. I see that as just a natural tension that sits
between what happens when businesses get into stress, who are the stakeholders
at that point in time and the nature of the stakeholder claim, [which] is not a
long-term interest, it is more a short-term interest”. (Dale)

Some practitioners also questioned the extent to which in practice the legislation truly
facilitated a creditor-aligned outcome, particularly in the smaller market segment.
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Participants speculated that the creditors of smaller businesses were less likely to be
aware of and engaged with the voluntary-administration process.

“I think there is a bit of a misconception, to be honest. It is considered creditorfriendly because creditors vote on the outcome, but generally speaking it
depends on what part of the market you’re at. Creditors often aren’t all that well
informed and are often not all that engaged in the process. The administrator is
usually appointed by the debtor. The debtor is the most engaged in the process,
normally, certainly at the smaller end, which is in reality where the vast
majority of VAs happen, and if there’s no secured creditor or a small secured
creditor. So I get that on paper it looks like a creditor-controlled process;
however, I am not sure that in reality that’s always practically how it works.”
(Philip)

Participants were of the view that the primacy of creditor-focused outcomes was a
function of the environment in which insolvency operated in Australia and how it was
applied in practice. They reported that the importance of creditor participation and
determination was a concept firmly entrenched in the Australian culture and custom,
rather than just the legislation itself. Cultural considerations will be referred to in more
detail in Chapter 5.

“The legislation itself I think by and large is fine, with a number of exceptions,
but I don’t think it very often actually achieves what it sets out to achieve. But I
think that is more cultural and environmental, not necessarily a problem with
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the legislation. You are never going to get a perfect answer and I think you can
only do so much with the letter of the law, and a lot of this is about how it is
practised”. (Shannon)

Practitioners identified that despite this focus on creditor outcomes, an emerging trend
of creditor behaviour was increasing commerciality in recognising the value of rescuing
a business as a going concern and the potential for ongoing relationships.

“So the creditors have to vote on which way to go, and generally in my
experience creditors are increasingly commercial at creditors’ meetings. There
is more of a sense of ‘that could be me’ than ‘you stole the money from me’ or
‘you have done me wrong’. Also creditors think that if there’s an opportunity for
the business to continue in existence, again depending on the size of the
relationships, they’ll have someone to continue to trade with.” (Leslie)

Over time, this has reportedly resulted in creditors recognising the value of considering
alternative restructure proposals, rather than simply pursuing a liquidation process of
nominal creditor realisations. Participants reported that this has often been influenced
by historical experiences that have shifted creditor behaviour and willingness to
compromise their debts earlier in the restructure, and thus provide an opportunity for the
company to be salvaged.

“Senior creditors, and generally creditors, are now more familiar and
comfortable with the way in which insolvency works. And many of them have
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had experiences where they have received unsatisfactory or nominal returns at
the end of the day. So I think people know where things are heading. If it looks
like the company is going down that orthodox liquidation path, creditors are
generally being commercial and proactive in saying, ‘Look, well, I’m just going
to make a commercial decision here, I’m prepared to take a haircut at an early
stage. Even though it involves a bit of pain, it’s likely to be less pain than I am
going to experience if this process runs its course’. I think there is a greater
awareness and a bit more proactivity in that respect.” (Sam)

Where participants felt that creditor judgement fell short, however, was in the creditor’s
ability to assess and recognise the value of broader stakeholder implications, such as the
good of the community.

“One of the things that we certainly discuss at a partnership level whenever we
are involved in a substantial VA is actually going back to that purpose of 5.3A.
And I think there should be more focus on things like keeping people employed
and impact on the community. So I do think that there is an over-focus on
creditors…to culturally get creditors to accept that as a creditor of a company
in administration, they are going to get a lesser return because a community is
saved, is a very difficult thing for them to get their head around.” (Jamie)

Participants highlighted the challenge of gaining acceptance of broader stakeholder
considerations in administrators’ recommendations where there was conflict with the
direct financial interest of creditors. Participants contrasted the rights of creditors to
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pursue their own objectives with the absence of a clear mechanism to facilitate such
potentially beneficial administration outcomes.

“I think if you give individual creditors rights, they are often entitled to act on
those rights without seeing [their actions] wider impact upon enterprise value or
going-concern value. So I think in that sense it’s this individual creditor right
versus creditors as a whole acting as a group.” (Dale)

The creditor focus on the voluntary-administration process was thus shown to create a
broader spectrum of considerations in the rehabilitation process than just the rescue of
the insolvent company. This section has identified the foundations of creditor
participation in Australia to be cultural as well as legislative, which is a key driver for
creditor objectives influencing the ultimate voluntary-administration outcome.
Participants recognised a transition to greater commerciality exercised by creditors as
they became more familiar with the existing insolvency framework; however, this fell
short of considering broader stakeholder implications such as community impact in
determining outcomes for insolvent companies.

Success Rate and Rehabilitation Definition
The anecdotal evidence from participants on the success rate of insolvent companies
successfully emerging from the voluntary-administration process in a rehabilitated form
indicates that a majority of companies proceed into liquidation.
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“The number of companies in my experience that are able to successfully
emerge through the voluntary-administration process would be less than 5%.
It’s a very low level, unfortunately.” (Lee)

However, participants were of the view that this low rate was not reflective of a failure
of the legislative framework, but was rather a misrepresentation of the statistics. The
consensus from participants was that the legislation was more effective in practice once
people looked beyond what happened to the corporate-entity shell and considered the
survival of the underlying business.

“I think that is a fundamental misinterpretation of the numbers, and one of the
things that happens is that a lot of the companies and corporate entities that go
into voluntary-administration end up in liquidation. What that in my view is
primarily a result of, is that a company appoints a voluntary-administrator and
enters the voluntary-administration process, and then as a result of that process
the business out of the company is sold. Or part is sold and the corporate shell
at the end of that then with no business in it ends up going into liquidation. The
big mistake that a lot of people make in interpreting some of these statistics is
that in order for a restructure to be successful, there must have been a deed of
company arrangement executed, which isn’t true.” (Leslie)

“Well, it gets down to noting of course that the ability to be restructured and
survive is only one valid aim of voluntary-administration. The other valid aim is
to yield a result better than going straight into liquidation. I mean sometimes an
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effective restructuring could be the sale of the underlying business and assets to
a third-party entity. If, for example, notwithstanding that the legal entity left
behind is put into liquidation, that means continuity of employment for a number
of employees. The business is still contributing to GDP, and for the benefit of
society generally, that could be well deemed as a successful restructuring.”
(Evan)

Participants were of the view that how the term “rehabilitation” was defined was a key
determinant of interpreting the success of the legislation and the insolvency statistics
themselves.

“So, drawing a distinction between whatever the statutory regime is being
applied to the corporate shell can have zero bearing or zero relevance to the
actual restructure or actual rescue of that particular business. And I think this is
where public perception breaks down…they simply hear that the corporate shell
is in liquidation, which is a disaster. Well, those are corporate entities or
corporate shells, which doesn’t necessarily equate to businesses.” (Leslie)

Participants reported that the high number of companies that proceed into liquidation
from voluntary-administration reflected a lack of filtering at the appointment stage and
the ongoing use of the process as a default mechanism.

“So the VA process is a quick process of getting the company away from the
directors and stopping the insolvent trading and putting it in the hands of the
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insolvency practitioner, who then makes a decision after he’s assessed the
business as to what should happen. Objectively if you look at it you’d say, ‘Well,
all those companies on that side of the room should never have gone through the
VA process because there was never a hope in hell of them being restructured,’
but they’re all going through it and therefore the level of deeds of company
arrangement is very low.” (Lee)

There was agreement amongst participants on the importance of administrators gaining
an understanding of the company, its underlying business and what the directors were
seeking to achieve in determining whether the Part 5.3A regime should be pursued. This
in turn tended to be a key determinant of the likelihood of achieving a successful
outcome in the process.

“When talking to directors and talking to management who are contemplating
going down this road [voluntary-administration], the very first thing I will
generally ask is, ‘What do you want to achieve through this process, where is
your mind at and what is it that you want to get to?’ Now if the answer to that is,
‘I just want to get out, the industry is completely different to what it used to be, I
am finding it very hard to navigate my way through the commercial world at the
moment because my business is no longer relevant to my target population
whatever it might be.’ In those circumstances, or if the financial distress is so
dire, I generally recommend to them, ‘Don’t bother with voluntaryadministration.’ The reason for that is because voluntary-administrations are
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expensive. Effectively, voluntary-administration is an exercise you embark on
with a view to restructuring a company.” (Sam)

A historical factor that participants identified as distorting the voluntary-administration
success statistics was the role played by the legislation as a quick appointment regime
for directors of insolvent companies.

“When it initially came out I think it was used as a quick and cheap way to get a
company into liquidation but with the changes to the law for entering into CVLs
[Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation] and the way they’ve made it easier has
meant that administrations aren’t used for that purpose as much.” (Adrian)

Changes to the Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation (CVL) legislation in 2007 made it
procedurally easier for companies whose directors had already reached the conclusion
that the business was not salvageable or were not seeking rehabilitation to simply go
straight into liquidation. These legislative improvements corresponded with a sharp
decline in the unmeritorious use of the voluntary-administration process in the ASIC
statistics.

“Often these guys come too late and if they come too late you can’t do much
about it. So they are screaming, ‘I’m on the hook for insolvent trading, I want to
get off it now,’ and it wasn’t until they changed the creditors’ voluntary rules
that you could accelerate what was otherwise a 21-day or more process to get
the company to liquidation. Once the members had passed the resolution to
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liquidate the company, the effect was immediate, and then they were off risk
from trading whilst insolvent. I think that these CVL changes certainly have
cleaned out many companies that didn’t have any prospect of going through an
administration, and some that could not even afford the cost of going through an
administration.” (Cameron)

Notwithstanding these improvements to the CVL appointment process, some
participants were of the view that the success statistics continued to be affected by
companies entering voluntary-administration simply because of the ease of the process.

“I think people are just probably still using the VA, because you can basically
come in today, you talk to me and I talk to you. You have a meeting with
directors, I’m appointed, I give you consent, off it goes. It’s done. Whereas the
CVL option is still a little bit longer.” (Lee)

Participants also highlighted the significance of correctly selecting the appropriate
appointment type from the outset into voluntary-administration or CVL, which has
implications for the economic cost associated with the insolvency process.

“The CVL process is also a materially cheaper process, [and] so [is used] when
a director comes in and when there is no prospect of either utilising the
moratorium process in the VA to improve the result or alternatively there is no
real prospects of restructure. My firm and most others would say, go the CVL
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route because it’s cheaper, because we don’t have the same detailed reporting
obligations and the cost of convening meetings of creditors.” (Evan)

Participants also sought to point out that the large majority of insolvency appointments
occurred with very small businesses, where often there was very little to work with in
terms of rehabilitating the company or underlying business:

“Firstly, that’s just where the most in volume is, where the most failures are,
most businesses in Australia are small businesses. Small businesses, you know,
there is probably a higher propensity of them falling over, because they are
often run by people with no financial background, they don’t keep good records,
they don’t keep themselves well informed.” (Philip)

In particular, participants referred to the distortive impact on success statistics identified
due to the increasing prevalence of phoenix-type companies, which have been
responsible for the significant growth of the insolvent-company volume.

“I mean the phoenix activities which we see so much of, clearly [have] a
contributory function in distorting the Part 5.3A stuff. So as an overview I think
that what it appears to be being used for, is for directors to bump a company
when they are about to get personal liability for insolvent trading, or when they
get a section 222 notice from the Australian Tax Office to make them liable.”
(John)
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Another distortive factor in analysing the insolvency statistics is the potentially
significant impact of the number of companies that have been using the corporate
structure to register what effectively amount to “personal services” companies.

“I also think that there are a lot of very small businesses who are out there,
effectively sole traders who are tradesmen and things like that and have two,
three, four, five employees. Or if they are a sole employee - obviously the
construction industry is a classic example, where all the tradies are sole traders,
which helps big builders get around various other things. So I see a lot of them
and there [are] so many of those sorts of businesses on their own, they’re
employees. They are, to use the tax definition, basically income-services
companies, for want of a better term. Their whole purpose is to get the income
for the director because that’s all he really works for. So there’s a significant
potential for a lot of the statistics of companies using this legislation to be
somewhat clouded.” (Julian)

There was acknowledgement by participants that, based on anecdotal evidence and
personal experience, the statistical rate of companies emerging from voluntaryadministration was low. It was apparent, however, that participants did not regard such
statistics as a reflection of the ineffectiveness of the legislation, given the objectives of a
successful rehabilitation outcome as defined under the Act. That is, if salvaging the
company cannot be achieved, the legislation facilitates the going-concern rescue and
sale of the underlying businesses, or achieves a better return to creditors than
liquidation. The findings attributed the statistical criticisms of voluntary-administration
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to a misunderstanding of the legislation’s objectives, the distortion of statistics by highvolume phoenix or “personal service” companies and ease of process entry. The
importance of effective screening and filtering of distressed companies using the
process was thereby identified as important for both the efficient use of the procedure
and managing the costs of insolvency.

WHAT HAPPENS ONCE A COMPANY GETS INTO TROUBLE?
Once a company begins to get into financial trouble, several pathways can be taken in
an attempt to restructure or salvage it. This section will discuss the importance of
appointment timing and preparation in determining the success of restructuring
insolvent Australian companies under the Part 5.3A legislation. It will then discuss the
implications for the corporate-rehabilitation framework of the insolvent-trading
legislation, and how this legislation interacts with both formal and informal
restructuring of distressed companies.

Participants noted that the role of the insolvent trading legislation in the current
environment was often pivotal to the appointment of a voluntary-administrator. The
research highlighted the earlier identification of distress by directors or a company’s
auditors as critical to proactively and successfully pursuing formal or informal
rehabilitation of a company.

“The insolvent-trading positions are intended to be, and perceived by the industry to
be, a big stick, to make directors appoint voluntary-administrators, which in my view
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is a shame that that is the perspective. Because if you try to restructure a company
successfully and maximise returns to all parties, the voluntary-administration
process is fantastic to achieving that. An earlier intervention, when directors still
have the resources available to fund something, always generates a better result.”
(Leslie)

The issue of insolvent trading as a driver of voluntary-administrator appointment and
the role of appointment timing is examined further in the section below.

Appointment Timing and Preparation
The present research shows that once an Australian company gets into trouble, a key
factor influencing the low rate of companies successfully rehabilitating under voluntaryadministration is delay in the appointment.

“It’s a function of when people decide to put their hand up and say, ‘I’m in
trouble.’ So, you know, they can wait too long, and therefore the company that’s
there can’t be restructured. It’s just too highly geared, there’s no equity in the
business and you know it’s been destroyed over a period of time.” (Lee)

“I don’t think [the success rate] has got anything to do with the legislation and
it’s got everything to do with the directors not making the decision early enough.
Directors generally have got their head in the sand and think things are going to

101

turn around. If companies were put into VA a lot quicker by directors then I
think the statistics would be a lot better.” (Adrian)

Participants were of the view that directors seeking professional advice following early
signs of corporate distress or insolvency, increased the likelihood of the company
enduring the voluntary-administration process and successfully restructuring. Early
action was also able to align the stakeholders, capital and other requisite success factors.

“I am of the view that you don’t appoint a voluntary-administrator or embark on
the voluntary-administration process unless there is some chance of the
company emerging or some chance of the company being successfully
restructured, and management have the mindset and the determination to follow
that through. Because it is a difficult process and it is hard work. Turning a
company around or getting a company through a voluntary-administration
requires a lot of determination, a lot of courage as well as a balance sheet, and
support from employees and from creditors. So there are a lot of different
ingredients in place, or a lot of factors that need to be aligned in order for the
process to work.” (Leslie)

The earlier involvement of practitioners also provides an opportunity for identification
of those troubled companies that may benefit most from the voluntary-administration
process, and then to lay the groundwork.
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“I think that it really does come down to before you embark on an exercise like
voluntary-administration, making sure there is an understanding of what the end
game is and making sure you understand what is hoped to be achieved by all
parties and making your own assessment. So if liquidation is the likely or
desired outcome, rather than going through that whole exercise, which might be
a completely unnecessary cost, [it] can be circumvented in its entirety by just
starting the liquidation process.” (Philip)

The inadvertent impact from the growing prevalence of informal restructuring in the
Australian market and changing perspectives of what corporate rehabilitation may look
like also affects the issue of formal administration appointment timing.

“There is probably successful restructuring going on all the time, but not in a
formal sense - that is going on inside the companies in a way. So, I guess more
of it is going on behind closed doors than perhaps we recognise in any formal
statistics. So I don’t think that it is the value of restructuring that is the question,
it comes down to the practicality of it being too late once you are prepared to
formally put the business in the hands of somebody else.” (Sam)

Practitioners identified this reluctance of directors to pursue the voluntaryadministration process because of an underlying concern around the likely process
outcome and the likelihood of liquidation.
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“I think a major factor is that people see it as a terminal process, even though it
is not designed to be a terminal process, and there is absolutely a stigma issue
around that for directors. And therefore it’s being done much too late. It’s not
plan B, C or D. It’s kind of plan X, Y, Z in my view. I have seen a lot of
situations where there is a reluctance to have a rigorous insolvency plan for fear
that will become Plan A. You have to have it there and if Plan A isn’t better than
Plan B, then Plan B does become Plan A by definition.” (Shannon)

Participants were of the view that instead, the early intervention by directors of troubled
companies provided the opportunity for greater planning, and in turn greater likelihood
of the successful rehabilitation of insolvent companies.

“Generally the directors tend to come and see you later rather than sooner, and
really what has happened there is the position has deteriorated further. From an
administration perspective, this has a significant impact on what resources are
available and what stage the company is in, in which to embark on the process
of trying to turn it around and trying to improve the position and trying to work
with something. I don’t think there is any insolvency practitioner, in Sydney or
in the world, that wouldn’t say that we could have done a better job had you
arrived earlier or it would have been a different outcome if we had seen you
earlier.” (Leslie)

Participants also flagged the importance of developing a plan as to how the desired
rehabilitation outcome would be achieved.
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“I think that the key things to me are around earlier intervention and a strategy
to turn things around. I think if you had those two elements covered off you
would probably see more companies [that get] into the process getting out. I
think a lot of companies go into VA thinking this is going to be the solution, but
they actually don’t have a financial solution. They need fresh capital, or a
supportive banker or a supportive equity holder, and they go into the process
without having that in place, and therefore it gets difficult pretty quickly. So
working out a strategy for dealing with them prior to an appointment is
critical.” (Jamie)

One mechanism for improved planning of the voluntary-administration process and
restructure outcomes for a distressed company is the concept of pre-packaging a
rehabilitation or asset-sale plan, such as the UK pre-pack model. This was suggested to
have the potential to provide greater certainty and quicker implementation of a solution
to mitigate the rapid destruction of a company’s underlying value and goodwill postappointment. Participants were of the view, however, that the introduction of this type
of prepack model in the Australian context would require mandating it in the insolvency
legislation to facilitate its acceptance as a viable option.

“I think VAs are a fantastic tool in the sense that you can take control
immediately, but the problem with VAs is that you just vaporise value pretty
quickly, so you need to do something very, very quickly to preserve the value in
that situation. That is where the value of pre-appointment work certainly comes

105

to the fore. I also think the increased use of pre-packs definitely would have a
major impact, and I think heading more towards specifically authorising that
type of thing to happen under the Act would be a good idea. I think that
Australians generally are a bit more cynical and not trusting about pre-packs,
so recognition of this path under the Act I think would create greater acceptance
in circumstances where a pre-pack could work.” (Adrian)

Participants indicated that the reason for the limited use of the pre-pack approach in
Australia relative to other overseas jurisdictions was the s 420A provisions under the
Corporations Act. Section 420A requires that in exercising a power of sale in respect of
a corporation’s property, reasonable care is taken to sell the property for not less than
market value, or otherwise, the best price reasonably attainable in the circumstances.
Participants were of the view that these provisions influenced administrators despite
relating to a controller’s duty of care.

“What I think is the reason that pre-packs are not often utilised is to do with the
way [administrators] value the businesses and s 420A. I think there is a real fear
by practitioners that pre-packs are a recipe to get sued, so they’re difficult to do.
The other thing is if you’re looking at one where s 420A applies, well, how do
you satisfy the requirements of 420A when you don’t advertise and stuff like
that, potentially and you just do a deal, so there’s those issues. So even though a
VA might say, ‘I am a VA and I am not bound by 420A’, it is just drilled right
into us, the way the market works.” (Lee)
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Participants noted that whilst the use of pre-packs were prevalent in overseas
jurisdictions such as the UK, with anecdotally improved levels of restructuring success,
the theme of independence was identified as a key barrier to the administrator playing a
meaningful role in any pre-appointment preparation. This raised the question of who
should undertake the advisory work under a pre-pack scenario.

“I cannot speak for England and Wales jurisdictions but they seem to do it quite
well. The problem is, when do we get involved as the insolvency practitioner? Is
it the lawyers who present the deal to us? That is probably the better way to do
it because the whole integrity of the VA process is to say I am independent of
this, I’ve looked at this. So, to be honest, it does not really work that I get
involved in it and help out that process.” (Cameron)

“It really is the main question of independence, in terms of an administrator
being expected to act and be seen to be independent of the company. The extent
of involvement pre-appointment can affect that. As well as having been called
into a situation where insolvency is precarious, the question of how you get
remunerated for that work is also a live issue, because extracting money from a
company known to be insolvent is likely to be a voidable transaction. So the
extent of advisory involvement by a future administrator really is limited in that
pre-appointment context. Alternatively, it’s just not going to ultimately be the
same person who will give the pre-appointment advice and then take the
appointment.” (Taylor)
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Participants also sought to generalise the definition of a pre-pack in the Australian
context to capture a broader concept of the value of planning leading into the voluntaryadministration process for providing a more certain outcome. This was advocated to
facilitate an improved ability to meet the tight statutory timeframes and improved
proposal planning and documentation to realise stakeholder support for a predetermined
deed of company arrangement or specific asset purchase.

“Pre-pack is a word that can be in some respects misused and misunderstood.
But I think from my point of view that the best way in which you can turn your
mind to pre-packing and successful pre-packing is looking at how much of a
rescue regime you can plan ahead and document with a view to things being
done more quickly, and more comprehensive documents being provided to
creditors at or prior to the second meeting. So often there’s not a lot of scope for
that, because time simply doesn’t permit things to be done quickly enough in
advance. Or perhaps the variables are too uncertain to be able to plan it in
advance. So in an appropriate administration a pre-pack certainly has a place
and can work very effectively.” (Alex)

This section has indicated that a key reason for the low rate of successful rehabilitation
of insolvent companies is appointment timing. The findings showed that directors’
reluctance to embrace the voluntary-administration process earlier was due to a
perception of the framework as a terminal path to liquidation. Participants identified the
need for early-stage recognition of corporate distress and timely action to develop a plan
for rehabilitation. In that regard, participants also sought consideration of the potential
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benefits of a pre-packaged approach to insolvency, as a mechanism to mitigate the rapid
destruction of a company’s underlying value post-appointment. There was recognition,
however, that for a UK-style pre-pack regime to be successful in an Australian context,
there was a need for legislative endorsement of the process, given the issues of
independence, influence of the s 420A provisions and the corporate regulatory
environment.

Formal vs Informal Restructuring
Participants reported that there has been an emerging trend for distressed companies to
seek to rehabilitate using informal mechanisms.

“Increasingly, the restructuring of the main assets and main business are dealt
with at least outside of formal appointment, outside of administration or
receivership…. It’s only if that restructure itself doesn’t work out that you might
end up down the track of having a formal sort of mop-up.” (Evan)

Participants mentioned concerns over the value-destruction of the distressed company.
They favoured an informal rehabilitation approach, particularly if the distressed
company had not yet reached the point of insolvency, and particularly in the larger
corporate space.

“Look, I think the reason people often [use informal rehabilitation] is because
they feel there’s going to be value destruction in a formal appointment. That’s
the reason why they look for some sort of informal arrangement. I mean there
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can be logic to it other than just the general proposition that, well, if you
appoint an external administrator to something, well, then it’s going to be worth
less because the goodwill starts to evaporate. Therefore you go from effectively
a multiple-type value of a business that could be there, to basically, well, what
are the auction values of the business?” (Lee)

“So I see VA as being a relatively successful restructuring tool only to be used
as a last card. Obviously if you can do it informally and avoid using it, do that
first, particularly up the bigger end of the scale. Having informal processes to
try and help businesses restructure I think is the way to go, because you get a
much better outcome. Whereas once you make a formal appointment, I mean
you can turn it this way or turn it that way but you destroy value and you destroy
goodwill and those sorts of things. So I think there should be more emphasis
placed on informal restructuring before companies are trading whilst
insolvent.” (Dale)

Participants identified the reputational and brand issues that formal appointments raise
as a key driver of enterprise-value destruction in voluntary-administration.

“Well the big challenge with a formal process, I think, is the reputational issue
and the perception of it being a distressed seller of assets. Formal insolvency
brings with it the real risk of value destruction. Brand is also obviously a key
issue, and the appointment of a VA can have a real effect, actually a huge effect
on particular companies.” (Alex)
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Participants pointed out that informal restructuring can provide a distressed company
with the opportunity to pursue rehabilitation without the spotlight of corporate failure
necessarily hanging over its head.

“The key advantages of informal restructuring [are] that it does give a
relatively out of the spotlight opportunity to work through issues, so certainly
your ability to control what gets out – within limitations. And I think we’ve all
got accustomed to the idea that some information is likely to be made more
broadly available, and therefore people tend to become more careful of what
they say and when they say it and in what forum.” (Jamie)

Participants took a very broad view of what forms an informal restructuring process
could take.

“When I talk about an informal work-out I am talking about collaboration
between a distressed company (and distress can be from a number of sources),
[and] its stakeholders, typically lenders (however, other stakeholders can come
into play), with the objective of keeping that company out of a formal
administration. A nice, consensual arrangement that achieves a solution to the
distress, so that covers a vast range of possibilities to avoid the formal
insolvency regime.” (Dale)
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Discussion around the benefits of informal restructuring also focused on the ability to
bring creativity to the restructuring process, particularly with the growth in advisory
services provided by some of the traditional insolvency firms.

“This time around I think there has been a trend away from formal
appointments, and on both sides of the divide. The retention of professional
advisers, be they insolvency practitioners, insolvency accountants or turnaround
professionals, for want of a better word, to try and implement more creative
strategies without a formal appointment, knowing that if a formal appointment is
effected it’s likely to go down a certain path. That path is going to have some
benefits and some downside, and as a means of strategically avoiding the
downside, often a strategy can be tailored to deal with the problem without the
need for a formal appointment.” (Sam)

Reference to this trend towards informal restructuring from both the debtor and creditor
perspectives reflects the increasing tendency for secured creditors to provide
opportunities for informal restructure, before pursuing a formal appointment.

“The reality is, people are rehabilitating entities without going through an
insolvency process, particularly at the larger end of the scale. That’s a function
of banks being more pragmatic and realistic and not just hitting the appoint
button. It’s interesting too, it reflects on…well, okay, why are people doing that?
They think it’s a better option than going through a VA, including the cost of the
process.” (Philip)

112

Often this informal process would be supported by an insolvency practitioner acting as
an independent accountant who monitors the process on behalf of the secured creditor.

“I think banks sort of look at it and sort of think, ‘Well, okay, would it be better
to put this through in an informal way?’ But often you will have an insolvency
practitioner who is reporting to the syndicate of banks, and he’ll be looking at,
well, okay, how is this going, are we getting the right numbers, does it make
sense, has something else happened that causes us to change our mind. That
type of thing.” (Lee)

Participants identified that the criticality of time presented a conflicting benefit between
formal versus informal insolvency, with the former having an ability to immediately
bring focus to the criticality of insolvency and the latter avoiding the procedural
obligations of an administration.

“I think there are situations where insolvency is a fantastic tool to focus
everybody’s mind and actually get a result done, but on the flipside the risk
around proper conduct of a transaction is very much being focused on the
individuals that have been appointed. Discharging some of those [statutory]
obligations takes time, it’s just not very easy to make that go away without a
proper series of steps.” (Alex)

The risk of an informal process being too slow was linked to the threat of further value
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destruction, particularly if directors became reluctant to abandon a process that had been
heavily invested in and to cede control of the process to an administrator:

“One of the risks around informal restructuring is that everyone spends so much
time and resources on it that they don’t want to see it fail, but actually there can
be a lot of value-loss creep with that, which actually makes it line ball, perhaps
even worse than the insolvency scenario. But because you have come so far
down the road, the mentality becomes, ‘It would be nice to finish it and not have
to put it into voluntary-administration.’ Also, I think that goes with a preference
for control, certainly on behalf of certain people, the idea that you put it into the
hands of somebody who has these statutory obligations, like a voluntaryadministrator, when you have got directors and hedge funds who like to control
their own destiny.” (Shannon)

In addition to perceived benefits of informal restructuring, a number of participants
flagged concern about the trend towards companies pursuing an informal restructuring
process because of the absence of protections offered under a formal process.

“I think it’s dangerous. I think the advantage of a VA as a restructuring tool is
that you have various protections, such as the various moratoriums. And I think
that the VA is the perfect way to restructure, as it gives you that status quo-type
situation, perhaps with the stand-out exception of ipso facto clauses. For
instance, with landlords, if you don’t pay in an informal restructuring you would
likely trigger a default under your lease. Whereas in a VA, they obviously can’t
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do anything during the moratorium period…it’s an event of default, but they
can’t repossess it because of the legislation.” (Adrian)

Instead, a number of participants advocated that a well-planned and strategic formal
approach to restructuring and rehabilitation planning was likely to produce the best
outcome for a distressed company approaching insolvency.

“I would argue that [voluntary-administration], used properly and planned
properly, absolutely should be part of a restructure process. I would
differentiate that from unplanned insolvency and kind of free-fall insolvency, but
sometimes the quickest and the best way through a work-out might be using
some form of insolvency, albeit it might be [in] a limited form. Because
sometimes you get better and more efficient use of the existing contractual
arrangements, rights and documents through the insolvency regime.” (Shannon)

“So, reaching a point of restructure or the desire to restructure generally is a
collaborative approach with directors or with management, and often it’s a
matter of organisation. They’re basically saying, ‘Okay we need to prioritise the
triage of issues with how we are going to trade. Then with the very, very shortterm issues, are there any areas here where we can free up some cash
immediately?’ So working capital management and control. And the next issue
is, ‘Now can we start negotiating with creditors and suppliers and see what we
can work out?’ Now from my perspective, the voluntary-administration process
is best placed to deliver this.” (Leslie)
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Whilst participants acknowledged the insolvent trading regime as a key motivator to
formally appoint, a more sophisticated approach to this legislation has facilitated the
increasing prevalence of informal restructuring. This has been assisted by the careful
monitoring of the insolvent-trading risk through improved legal advice to directors and
specific framing of advice to navigate around this risk in pursuing restructure.

“I mean, the insolvent trading regime often drives boards to an administration
rather than some other form of achieving the restructuring. I think the
Australian lawyers who practice in this space have got better at that, rather than
the historically quite narrow advice to directors around what they needed to do
in certain circumstances. As lawyers have got better at framing that advice and
helping everyone work through the practicalities of structuring so they do to not
trip up the insolvent trading regime, that enables them to continue to explore
restructuring. So I think that the legal framework has been more carefully
applied by the practising lawyers around, to enable people to achieve informal
restructurings, but it remains a highly pertinent issue for the company’s
directors.” (Dale)

Participants stated that irrespective of whether a formal or informal restructuring
mechanism was pursued, ultimately the successful turnaround was contingent on the
company exhibiting the necessary characteristics to successfully emerge.
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“I think the other things are that whether it’s a turnaround that’s within the VA
legislation or outside of it on an informal basis, you still need the three or four
key elements of a successful turnaround. That is, generally you need a
management team, you need supportive financiers, supportive equity and you
need an underlying business that has a future.” (John)

The findings in this section have shown an emerging trend towards informal restructure,
particularly in the larger corporate space and as a result of improved insolvent-trading
advice provided by lawyers. The trend has been driven by concerns in formal
insolvency over the risk of enterprise-value destruction, reputational impact and brand
damage. Participants also identified the ability to creatively achieve outcomes,
particularly with available turnaround advisory and without the constraints of
procedural obligations under a voluntary-administration. It became apparent, however,
that a challenge to informal insolvency was focusing people’s minds on the criticality of
insolvency and the risk of people becoming caught up in a process they were reluctant
to abandon.

Insolvent Trading
Participants reported that the s 588G insolvent-trading provisions under the
Corporations Act operated as a real deterrent to company directors trading whilst
insolvent due to the imposition of personal liability. This obligation on directors
operating in a distressed environment played an important role in bringing about the
appointment of a voluntary-administrator.
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“So [the insolvent trading provision] is very real and it is a very real deterrent.
It is a good way to focus people’s minds on the need to appoint a voluntaryadministrator, and it’s a shame that that’s required, as opposed to the viewpoint
of directors thinking, ‘I can’t pay creditors now, I’m in a position of robbing
Peter to pay Paul, and I’m paying this creditor in advance of that creditor etc.
This situation is untenable, I need to appoint an administrator and restructure
the company’s affairs.’” (Chris)

“It has made directors conscious of the need to avail themselves of voluntaryadministration, and more reluctant to try to continue and do deals to salvage a
company that’s doing poorly. If anything, the insolvent-trading liability has in
my experience resulted in a great incentive to directors to make appointments of
administrators in circumstances where they should.” (Julian)

Whether a company was public or private was reported as a significant differentiator
between how much of a deterrent the insolvent-trading legislation could be, with public
companies being more affected by this legislation because of the separation between the
company’s directors and shareholders.

“I think there is a real difference between the public-company market and the
private-company market in relation to the way insolvent trading works or
doesn’t work in relation to directors and their behaviour. Where you have got
in, public companies, quite a bit of separation between the owners and
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shareholders and the people who are directors, the latter generally holding a
fairly small shareholding in the company itself. So, they will be inclined to act
generally in what’s in their own interests, which is not necessarily aligned with
the company once it starts to get into genuine insolvency. Whereas in private
companies, the directors are pretty much all in. Often it is all of their assets,
their personal assets, their personal guarantees - they are already personally
liable for a lot of the debt. So they will often not be deterred by the personal
liability proposition…they have got to keep on going.” (Taylor)

Participants questioned the value of the insolvent-trading provisions beyond acting as a
deterrent, given the small number of prosecutions of directors actually successfully
undertaken from a regulatory-enforcement perspective.

“Now, about the insolvent trading rules, though, and what the danger of that is.
The danger is not significant, and the reason why depends on the circumstances.
The test for insolvency, and the test for whether a company is insolvent, falls
down to whether it’s able to pay its debts as and when they fall due. So one of
the first things that you do in your investigation is to work out a date of
insolvency and formulate a rationale for that. From then on, it is trading whilst
insolvent. Then you come to [a] director’s personal liability for insolvent
trading and that’s where it becomes a bit more grey, and there are other
defences that can be raised which can muddy the waters. So it becomes quite a
subjective test. So for that reason there have been few actual successful
insolvent-trading actions in Australia.” (Leslie)
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A majority of participants were of the view that this incongruence between the
legislation’s “bark and bite” presented an effective balance to assist directors to achieve
an appropriate level of corporate fiduciary responsibility.

“Despite all of the risk and angst that is created in the minds of directors about
their potential exposure to insolvent trading, you’ll probably find that in the vast
number of cases the risk doesn’t equate to a serious exposure or claim being
brought for whatever reason. So perhaps it’s fair to say that we’ve probably got
the current balance about right in that professional directors are certainly
aware of the need to act proactively, but there doesn’t seem to be a chronic
problem at the moment whereby risk is so great that it’s dissuading people from
accepting and continuing appointments as company directors.” (Alex)

However, a number of participants argued that the rigid provisions of the s 588
legislation presented directors with a dangerous distraction and reputational risk, which
inhibited their flexibility to pursue bona fide restructure of a distressed company in
pursuit of the best interests of stakeholders.

“So you get a lot of board focus on their personal positions, forever distracted
and concerned by the potential to be held personally liable for insolvent trading
rather than the focus [being] where it should be - on fixing the company’s
problems - which is potentially incredibly distracting. This creates a reputation
issue as well, particularly if you are dealing with high-profile companies with
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high-profile directors. They might not want to stick around for reputational
reasons, and they have got better opportunities elsewhere. Whereas what you
really want to do is to encourage and motivate the board to stick around,
because they are the best-placed people to solve the problem”. (Leslie)

Indeed, some participants advocated that such flexibility in the insolvent-trading
provisions had the potential to actually be beneficial for creditors, if directors were able
to preserve the value of an insolvent company and to keep the business trading.

“There’s an inherent conflict because the laws in Australia say, ‘Well, director,
you’re going to get pinged for insolvent trading,’ and they go, ‘Well, I’m
worried about myself first before I worry about the creditors.’ And so in other
jurisdictions I’ve worked in there is a lesser threshold…the director is willing to
take on the risk to keep the company going effectively to act in the best interest
of the creditors. So we need to really fix the laws, I think – to, say, loosen the
straps a little bit and allow directors to…as long as you’re acting in the best
interests of the company’s stakeholders then you should be fine. It’s a little bit of
a shame that we’ve got so focused on insolvent trading to the jeopardy of
actually getting the best return for creditors, and that’s what this game should
be about.” (Cameron)

Whilst participants acknowledged that lawyers had become more sophisticated in
providing insolvent-trading advice to directors of distressed companies, the letter of the
law continued to present underlying risks to directors operating outside the formal
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framework.

“We’ve had quite a bit of time now to become comfortable with the law, and
we’ve now got the benefit of experience and higher sophistication that I think is
permeating through the market, and also reflecting clients’ expectations as to
what lawyers ought to be delivering in that respect. I think by and large we have
learned to navigate insolvent-trading risk better, but that doesn’t diminish the
fact that it is a very real risk for directors notwithstanding, and I certainly
wouldn’t want to be the director who has to bear that risk.” (Chris)

Participants also identified the potential for shadow-director risk under the legislation as
an issue that needed to be addressed to ensure that advisors and financiers were not
inhibited from supporting a distressed company endeavouring to undertake an informal
restructure.

“Another downside that comes into the equation is the shadow-director risk,
which is there for those who lend a hand, and there is this risk that lenders and
professional advisors as well could be found to be, in effect, directors of the
distressed company. If the company was insolvent or becomes insolvent, it can
make a shadow director also liable for insolvent trading, and you don’t need to
be an individual to be a shadow director, as a company can be deemed to be a
shadow director as well. So that can obviously affect banks as an institution. I
think that’s probably the big one, and I think that is one where you could get
some changes made.” (Sam)
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“I do think they need to look at the shadow-directorship issues. That would
scare me if I was in the position of a corporate doctor. I don’t think there is a lot
of protection there for people who are in an advisory role outside a formal
appointment. I think that the propensity of the law is to become more
problematic, not less problematic, for those sort of people. So I think that getting
properly qualified [people] in, without the protection of a formal appointment, is
difficult in our regime and is probably one of the places to start.” (Alex)

Given the above, and following the Federal Government’s decision not to proceed with
their 2010 Safe Harbour reform initiatives, participants strongly advocated for the
consideration of a chief restructuring officer to better facilitate informal work-out.

“Like, a while back Treasury put out a paper which was looking at Safe
Harbour. They gave a few options as to how you might be able to effectively
trade insolvently whilst you are restructuring. So that was by virtue of telling the
market, or the other thing was not telling the market but having advisers there
that helped you do what you needed to do. Now if the legislators are not willing
to accept that, then I say bring in someone who is skilled in the area, like a chief
restructuring officer or turnaround manager, who is a ticketed person and has
the skills to bring to bear and pull the pin at the right time, not just because
they’re personally exposed for insolvent trading.” (Lee)
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The findings supported the insolvent-trading provisions as an effective deterrent to
directors - particularly of public companies - of trading whilst insolvent, and to provide
a catalyst for formal appointment to occur. Whilst it was acknowledged that the level of
successful prosecutions of company directors remained low, the s 588G provisions
provided an important balance between deterrence and prosecution. However, concerns
were raised surrounding the inflexibility of the provisions, in the context of bona fide
informal restructuring and the potential for shadow-director liability to affect advisors
and financiers seeking to assist the distressed company. There was consensus amongst
participants that Safe Harbour-type provisions or similar protections warranted further
consideration.

Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO)
Participants considered the concept of a chief restructuring officer with immunity from
insolvent trading worthy of consideration by legislators to address a key barrier to
further advisor engagement pre-appointment.

“One area that I would like to see in the legislation that would make it more
effective is if there could be legislative change for a chief restructuring officer.
But what would need to be changed in our laws to make that position tenable is
the personal liability for insolvent trading. At the moment you can’t really have
somebody that’s in charge of the company that’s in the twilight zone heading
into insolvency, unless you could free up that person from that personal liability
for insolvent trading. Because what I think is an ideal outcome would be to
have, say, certain accredited people to be able to go into corporations and have
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a shield from insolvent trading. That would be a good addendum, without
upsetting too much of our current regime, that would be sensible and
achievable.” (Evan)

This would address the reluctance of third parties to get involved and advise distressed
companies heading towards insolvency in an informal context because of potential
shadow-director liabilities under s 588.

“The reason we don’t do that is I am capital C conservative, I’m not going to
put my firm in jeopardy by taking a CRO unless I can control that [shadowdirector risk]. So it’s with great risk that you go in there, at the moment [you
are] exposed to insolvent-trading liability, you have no skin in the game except a
professional fee and you can’t necessarily move the board to a position…now
you might retire quickly in that scenario but what use is that? There’s got to be
a way we can get to these companies quicker and use the skills that I and my
guys have to change these companies.” (Cameron)

Participants commented that for the Australian market, the provision in the
Corporations Act for a chief restructuring officer would provide a valuable mechanism
to better facilitate informal restructure and enable advisors to proactively manage and
prioritise the rehabilitation process.

“I think a CRO absolutely would aid the informal restructuring process. To get
someone who is inside the company rather than an IA [Independent Accountant]
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who sits on the outside, someone with some degree of authority in terms of - they
don’t have to be the person who signs the cheque, like the administrator, but
they have some degree of authority to work with the board and stakeholders would absolutely increase the chance of that business remaining stable and
getting out the back end. It enables the management team to focus on looking
after their customers and managing…the business and get someone to the table
who can manage all the stakeholder issues around the restructure.” (Dale)

The scope of the CRO’s power and position in such a scenario was considered critical
for the role to be truly effective to bring about meaningful restructure, including
involvement in decision-making at the board level, to both contribute and preserve
value in distress.

“That’s the problem that I’ve experienced with informal CROs in Asia. You can
be injected but you can’t push a board to do what it needs to do. So you tick the
box in terms of you have the skills and the acumen to bring to bear in a
distressed environment. You are predominantly brought in by the syndicate, who
knows you and feels comfortable with you and will extend a standstill in the
work-out phase; tick the box. Can you make any meaningful changes? This
depends entirely on the culture of the board and whether it’s willing to accept
the feedback from the CRO. I think if we could find a way for there to be a
position for a chief restructuring officer where you still keep the board in place,
but the board must run its decision-making through and must be signed off by
the CRO.” (Cameron)
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There was recognition of the value that such a CRO would contribute to providing
leadership in an informal restructuring process, to giving direction and ongoing
momentum to the rehabilitation of the distressed company.

“The other risk in informal restructuring is [that] the risk of just getting bogged
down in a work-out and getting momentum can be an issue. Particularly where
there are a lot of stakeholders, there often needs to be a real leadership role,
which is often missing. You do see in these informal scenarios that the people
who have the potential to take on these leadership roles are often the advisors,
and that works best where the scope is very well thought through. To give the
appropriate authority and mandate to that advisor to do what needs to be
done…and what is the time horizon and appropriate incentive to make that
happen, and a CRO is well placed for that role.” (Sam)

Participants suggested that the best person to undertake a CRO-type role to facilitate
such immunity would be a registered or official liquidator, given that the insolvency
environment in Australia differs from court-focused frameworks such as that in the US.
It was acknowledged that such a change would be in favour of those participants who
suggested it.

“Obviously this is vested interests speaking here. We would say that it would be
ideally suited to those that currently practice as voluntary administrators,
receivers and registered liquidators. So we would say it is more from the
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advisors’ space, rather than from the legal space. Because it’s almost like a
chief operations officer/chief financial officer-style role in and around
operations and finance, and in terms of legal questions [they] would then be
empowered to obtain legal advice on particular issues. But I think it’s more a
position suited to the advisors’ space rather than the legal space.” (Jamie)

Whilst there was acknowledgement that the engagement of an insolvency practitioner as
CRO would likely prevent that person from being subsequently appointed as a
voluntary administrator, this was not seen as a disincentive for the creation of an
independent CRO role.

“I would imagine it would have to be prohibited for the CRO’s firm to be
appointed the subsequent administrator or liquidator of the company. I think
that could probably be the only way that would work commercially and legally
from that perspective. Potentially it would mean there would be a separate
market in terms of the practitioners who prefer to do the CRO-type role and may
not do other types of work. Whereas the insolvency practices with larger
structures would be available for more formal work, and the formal
appointments and the administration itself. I think that is a commercial issue for
the practitioners to work through.” (Shannon)

A number of participants identified the importance under a CRO-type scenario if
immunity from insolvent trading was given that caution was exercised as to the limit of
that freedom and the need for regulatory oversight and accountability.
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“I think it’s a good concept. But having said that I think that sort of person
would need to be licensed and there would need to be some form of regulatory
monitoring of them, because it would be very easy for things to get very out of
control. I think it must provide some level of comfort to people that, firstly,
they’ve got the right training; and secondly, that they’ve got the experience; and
thirdly, that someone’s looking at them and saying, ‘Yes, this is somebody who
can be trusted with that sort of thing.’ Because if they’re in there to do
something and they’ve got no, should I say, downside and minimum risk if it
doesn’t work, there’s no deterrent to push the envelope is there?” (Julian)

In that regard, any introduction of chief restructuring officer-type provisions would need
to address these risks within the legislative framework to ensure that such downside
issues were managed.

“Again the challenge is [that] there is a small number of what I would call
grubby practitioners who might then take advantage of those sort of provisions
and ruin it for all advisers who act with integrity, who actually want to
restructure things properly. So the real part that I then struggle with is the
potential for abuse by giving that person the immunity or protection from
personal liability. The fact [is] that they can then continue to run a company
further into trouble, rather than out of trouble, and do that with some sort of
immunity, which ultimately results in a worse position for creditors.” (Chris)
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The findings in this section provide support for the introduction of a chief restructuring
officer to better facilitate informal rehabilitation, who is protected from the risks
associated with insolvent trading. Participants identified such improved access to
restructuring specialists outside of a formal framework as conducive to achieving timely
assistance to distressed companies. The findings also suggested that the appointment of
a chief restructuring officer would provide restructuring expertise at the board level, as
well as leadership to drive the rehabilitation process and maintain traction. Given these
responsibilities and immunity protection, participants recognised that such a position
would need to be subject to appropriate qualifications and experience and strict
regulatory oversight.

CONCLUSION
This chapter outlined the findings from semi-structured interviews with insolvency
practitioners and lawyers. It presented findings in relation to the legislative aim of the
Part 5.3A framework and creditor outcome focus in practice, including implications of
the rehabilitation definition for interpretation of the success rate statistics. It then
presented findings surrounding the issue of appointment timing once a company
approaches insolvency, and the alternatives of formal and informal rehabilitation; these
findings showed the insolvent-trading legislation as being a key determinant. The next
chapter will discuss the findings from the perspective of legislative and practical
barriers to restructuring, cultural considerations surrounding the operation of the
framework and an ongoing transition towards a corporate-rescue culture.
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CHAPTER 5: REHABILITATION BARRIERS AND THE
PURSUIT OF A CORPORATE-RESCUE FRAMEWORK
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will expand on the findings from interviews with insolvency practitioners
to describe the identified barriers in practice to effectively using the Part 5.3A
voluntary-administration legislation. It will also examine the cultural context of the
Australian insolvency framework and how to better facilitate corporate rescue as a
matter of course.

BARRIERS TO THE SUCCESSFUL RESTRUCTURING OF
AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES
This section will outline the barriers to successfully restructuring Australian companies.
Study participants noted that while they were of the view that the Part 5.3A legislation
was an effective framework for rehabilitating insolvent Australian companies, they felt
that the legislation needed to continue evolving to ensure successful restructuring. Such
objectives were contingent on identifying the barriers that affected rescue in practice
and practitioners’ understanding of the significance of such barriers and how they could
be best addressed, including by drawing from frameworks overseas.

“Chapter 11, I mean everyone talks about Chapter 11 as the panacea. It’s not
the panacea, but there’s some fantastic aspects of it”. (Cameron)

131

This section will first consider legislative barriers, then go on to discuss findings
relating to practical barriers.

Legislative Barriers
The findings identified and discussed a number of key legislative barriers outlined in the
literature, which participants identified as important in determining the ability of the
Part 5.3A legislation to effectively facilitate the restructuring of insolvent Australian
companies. These barriers included the absence of protection from ipso facto clauses,
the conflict created by administrator liability, the influence of senior-lender priority and
enforcement, the effectiveness of the legislation with regard to company size and the
role of court intervention and direction within the framework.
Ipso Facto Clauses
There was consensus amongst participants that the absence of a moratorium under the
voluntary-administration legislation - preventing counterparties exercising ipso facto
rights to terminate contracts upon a company entering formal insolvency - was a major
barrier to restructuring under the regime.

“I think that ipso facto clauses are the single biggest issue. I’m sure there’s not
a practitioner in Australia that thinks that there aren’t contracts that won’t be
terminated on insolvency. If you took that away I think we’d all be using the
formal insolvency regime much more frequently to undertake these restructuring
exercises.” Shannon
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Ipso facto clauses were perceived as such a significant impediment to formal restructure
that they were reported as a key motivation for the increase in informal arrangements
and a key difference between major rehabilitation frameworks overseas.

“I think the big one is ipso facto clauses… I think that’s the elephant in the room
in the Australian legislation. This seems to be one of the key differences
legislation-wise to some of the foreign jurisdictions such as the UK and US. I
mean the whole purpose of the process is to preserve the business as a going
concern if that is an option, and that would be lost if the key contracts are
jeopardised. So the area is a big impediment to a lot of restructures I think.
That’s why often an informal arrangement would be agreed to.” (John)

Participants noted that the extent to which termination of contracts as a result of ipso
facto clauses affected the likelihood of rehabilitation was a function of the nature of the
underlying business and the reliance on major contracts that could be terminated.

“Different industries, it impacts on them differently, you know. In a number of
industries it is completely critical, and the business disintegrates or puts parties
in a position of strength very quickly once the trigger is pulled on the VA. Look,
it depends on the particular business, but for a lot of businesses their value is in
those rights that they have, to exercise whatever those rights are. You take that
away and that business is leased plant and equipment, people, desks, chairs,
whatever, so unless you’ve got that arrangement or that right to do whatever
that is, it’s worth nothing. So that’s a real problem.” (Jamie)
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Participants expressed frustration at the difficulty of bringing about change in this area
of the legislation despite several reforms over the years to the insolvency legislative
framework.

“Frustratingly, we’re looking at a whole reform bill at the moment. There is an
Exposure Draft out and again there’s no reform on ipso facto clauses.
Everybody keeps throwing it out, you need to look at that and there are other
things they need to look at, but it always tends to be, ‘Well this is the reform
we’re going to do’. I think there’s certainly more that could have been done
when they reviewed the Act in 2007 and ipso facto clauses were very hot on the
agenda. So definitely those things are problems.” (Lee)

Participants identified that the challenges to legislative reform in this area primarily
related to the issue of balancing the respective rights of contractual parties and policy
considerations as to whose interests were to be protected.

“The counter to that argument is that all parties should have the right to
determine their own destiny at that point in time. If the company fails should
they be forced to continue to honour contacts? Now whose interests are you
trying to protect, are you trying to protect the stakeholders of a failed business
or those people with contractual relationships with that business? The
legislation seems to protect the latter guys’ interests and enable people to
reconstruct their contractual relationships, terminate it, pull out of it or
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whatever, more so than the stakeholders. Look, I think it just comes back to a
simple proposition and that is that you’re interfering with people’s rights. And if
you’re trying to reform the law there might be some fairly serious submissions
being made by those parties against such changes.” (Dale)

However participants felt that the extent of value destruction, which affected goodwill,
and the value of the enterprise resulting from an absence of voluntary-administration
protection in relation to ipso facto clauses, was contradictory to what the regime was
seeking to achieve.

[Ipso facto clauses] can go to effectively destroying a contracts-based business
on day one, which goes against the intent of what voluntary-administration is all
about.” (Evan)

This risk of value destruction also resulted in an immediate time pressure upon the
appointment of an administrator to try to preserve those important contracts. In that
regard, practitioners felt that a moratorium period would provide additional time for a
company to communicate their restructure plan and reassure key counterparties.

“Ipso facto clauses are a big problem because they can make the entire process
unworkable, so you appoint an administrator and then ipso facto clauses are
exercised by counterparties and they all blow up. What generally happens is that
basically you have to get on your skates and get out there and speak to
everybody as quickly as possible, and reassure them the company’s going to
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continue to trade. Those can be very difficult conversations. I think if Part 5.3A
gave a moratorium in respect of ipso facto clauses, I think we would be in a
better place to try and rehabilitate and use the time effectively.” (Leslie)

Participants viewed ipso facto termination clauses as in the same class of issues that
arise under a landlords lease; effectively as a sub-set of that same issue requiring
protection during the restructuring process.

“So if there was protection from ipso facto clauses similar to the existing
protection from owners of third-party property already in place. For instance, a
moratorium period for ipso facto clauses I think would not significantly interfere
with the rights of counterparties in any way differently to the way it currently
interferes with the rights of landlords or other third-party property holders.”
(Adrian)

The introduction of a moratorium would thereby consist of the rights of counterparties
being preserved during the voluntary-administration period, with termination of any
contracts temporarily prohibited.

“If they could, for example, not necessarily be expunged, but let’s say delayed. I
guess the way I think about it is the way landlords are treated in voluntaryadministration. They are still the landlord, or leasehold interests (be it a
landlord or equipment leasehold interest) - they are suspended during the
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period. They are still entitled to their rent payments of whatever under those
agreements, but they can’t take enforcement action during the period.” (Evan)

This was the preferred protection mechanism from ipso facto clauses for a majority of
participants. A minority, however advocated for greater protection from ipso facto
clauses by prohibiting on a policy basis the termination of ipso facto clauses altogether,
both during and after the external administration process, subject to the company
continuing to meet ongoing contractual obligations.

“Well, my view would be that so long as you are performing your obligations
under the contract, whether they are in administration or not shouldn’t make a
difference. So I don’t think it should even be restricted to a 30-day moratorium,
as long as you continue to perform. Unless post-restructure you don’t have the
infrastructure or staff to perform your contractual obligations, well then parties
should have their contractual right for termination. However the appointment of
an administrator in itself shouldn’t trigger those rights and I don’t see why you
shouldn’t be able to continue.” (Julian)

However, most participants accepted that whilst moratoriums would provide an
insolvent company with breathing space for a short timeframe, at the end of that
moratorium the counterparty should not be prevented from terminating the contract.

“But at the end of the voluntary-administration period you still need to reach an
agreement or to strike a deal or accommodation with them, if you are going to
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proceed beyond the voluntary-administration period. Because the reality is, as is
currently the case with landlords, if the landlord says, ‘Look, I’m sorry we’re
not going to continue on with this, we’ve made up our mind, done and dusted’ –
well, there’s nothing you can do. You don’t have a sale of the business, so it can
dramatically affect the return to creditors, the return to employees, that sort of
stuff.” (Lee)

Participants recognised merit in the legislature limiting steps to interfere with freedom
of contractual arrangements post-moratorium, given the need to sustain commercial
relationships and the principle of freedom of contract between the parties.

“It is probably almost a greater policy consideration…you get into policy
considerations about how do you weigh freedom of contract against…creditor
interests in an insolvent estate. I think it would be a pretty bold legislature to
start chipping away at these long-term contractual rights. Because that’s the
thing, it is open-ended, because if you say you have got to keep supplying this
company, well, on what terms and for how long? There could be all sorts of
valid commercial reasons why one party might terminate the thing when a VA
intervenes.” (Chris)

Participants felt this risk was mitigated once the distressed company was able to
demonstrate a viable restructure plan to emerge from insolvency, due to the natural
tendency for counterparty suppliers to want to continue to trade.
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“You will get a key supplier and you need that key supplier. You know what, the
supplier is usually pretty happy to keep selling their product. Unless you’ve had
a great deal locked in, in which case they will re-trade you to market – but that
rarely happens – they are all there. So if, post-restructure, the company is able
to demonstrate it has a sustainable and viable business, whilst as a counterparty
you won’t be compelled onto the new business, the reality is people want to
keep selling you their products. As long as you’re going to pay them.” (Philip)

The fundamental challenge that participants identified in relation to ipso facto clauses
was the ability for counterparties to the insolvent company to opportunistically
terminate or take advantage of that ability to enhance their bargaining power under the
contract. There was unanimous consensus amongst participants that greater protection
from ipso facto clauses was needed to address a key barrier to the operation of the Part
5.3A legislation and facilitate increased use of the process and value preservation.
Participants advocated for voluntary-administration moratorium protection to be
extended to include ipso facto clauses, to provide time for a distressed company to
prepare and communicate a rehabilitation plan to contracted counterparties. They
recognised, however, that at the end of such a moratorium period, counterparties could
not and should not be compelled to maintain ongoing relationships between the parties
post-rehabilitation.

Administrator-Liability Conflict
This section will discuss the inherent conflict between administrators and their liability.
Participants acknowledged that - particularly where the viability of the business was
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marginal with borderline cashflow - the administrator’s liability presented an underlying
incentive to take the more cautious decision and close the business rather than trade on
once an appointment occurs.

“The other issue is this administrator trading-risk exposure, where you’ve got
administrators going into this business which loses money and needs funding. I
am on the hook from day one for a lot of stuff - personally liable. Indemnified
out of some assets, but I am not sure if they are worth anything. Forget it, I’m
shutting it down.” (Philip)

“I mean the personal liability in itself is something we think about every day. So
it must create that bias. Whether there is a better solution I don’t know. But it
certainly creates that bias. Of course, if the risk is greater then the likelihood of
going forward is reduced accordingly, particularly if resources are limited and
trading is unprofitable or marginal. We are not inclined to put ourselves in a
position of risk unless we have got someone else covering [us].” (Jamie)

This higher level of responsibility for administrators was considered warranted given
the level of expertise expected of a practitioner and the need for conservatism to prevent
unnecessary value destruction through the administration process.

“Yes, I think it puts a higher burden on the practitioner, but we are supposed
experts in the field and therefore we should have a higher burden. I don’t think
that it’s much more of a burden than the directors’ burden in terms of insolvent
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trading. Given that the thing is in 5.3A, by definition it’s insolvent, or likely to be
insolvent. So as an expert you should know better. So if it’s not there explicitly I
think it’s there by implication. In any event I don’t believe it would be in
anybody’s interest to absolve us of that responsibility. Because I think you’ve
still got to have that underlying conservatism for it to work properly.” (Julian)

Participants felt that this conservatism was not, however, a necessary inhibitor to
creativity and innovative thinking by administrators during the restructuring process.

“But at the end of the day if I’m personally liable, I just think you’ve just got to
think differently about how you skin the cat, so it ends in the right result. But I
also think it leads to, the conservatism leads to better, more creative thinking.
Honestly I don’t think we’ve shut down any good business that’s just not
performing. I would say it’s not the administrator’s liability to risk. Yes you’ve
got to be creative to come up with the right solutions, but you’ve got to have the
underlying conservatism so you can say yes on the balance of probabilities
[that] this will work.” (Taylor)

Participants highlighted the conflicting challenge for an administrator in working out
whether to take the risk of trading on the business with a view to restructuring or
realising a better creditor outcome.

“Look, there is definitely that tension. I guess that the classic one was [a
previous Australian airline], where you got two senior practitioners. The first
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set of practitioners saw too much risk and were moving to shut it down within
the first week. Another senior practitioner that had a look at it and said ‘Oh no,
we would look to continue to trade it on.’ What they had to do in stepping in was
to obtain a relevant line of finance secured against the assets of the company
such that they could protect themselves from their own insolvent-trading
liability, or potential for that, in trading it on. But at least they looked forward
to a solution.” (Evan)

Interestingly, participants who worked with larger distressed companies tended to have
a lower level of concern surrounding administrator-liability risk. This was attributable
to the importance of the distressed business to its market and often to the support of the
company’s senior lenders.

“Look, I have no issue with liability. Frankly that’s why I get paid what I get
paid, because I’m personally liable. Administrator trading risk is often quoted
as a serious factor, but…as VA I’ve been appointed to very large trading
businesses and we have managed to get our heads around the issues and trade
on the business. So is it a factor? Yes, it is. Is it a big factor for big substantial
businesses with real positions to play in the market and the support of their
syndicate of lenders? No, I don’t think so.” (Cameron)

Participants were also of the viewpoint that this tension with regard to administrator
trading risk formed a healthy balance in facilitating ongoing trading with a view to
restructure, whilst ensuring the management of value destruction for creditors.
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“Administrator trading risk, well, yes that’s a barrier; I think it’s a healthy one.
You are responsible for all debts incurred from the date of the appointment,
which does tend to focus the mind of voluntary-administrators and you are
watching every day - and in some cases several times a day - what the position
is with respect to the equity that is available in the company and what debts you
have incurred as administrator and making sure that headroom is still there and
you are not making the position worse.” (Leslie)

A challenge identified by participants was the inability for an administrator to plan for
an appointment, particularly in the case of larger more complex insolvencies, which
inhibited a coordinated and structured process to pursue a successful restructure.

“I think a big issue is some of the conflict legislation around your ability to preplan a lot of that stuff. I think that ideally you will have had an opportunity to
get in beforehand and do a lot of pre-planning, because if it is a genuine
restructure then it should be one of a number of options that are being
considered in parallel. And one that you get to is maybe Plan C and the time
that you try to implement Plan A being the sale process or something else, you
should be planning for Plan C and you should have a well-worked-up plan. To
me the constraint is[that] there is a lot around that whole independence piece in
advance of an appointment… particularly for large matters, the appropriate
pre-planning and engagement within the business so that you are completely
ready to step in as administrator and the acceptance that you can have a very
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clear plan to execute once you go into administration and for people to
recognise that that’s okay.” (Shannon)

The challenge raised by participants was in the absence of planning, the very short
period administrators have to really understand what they have got and the assets that
are indemnifying them. They felt that this challenge had the potential to often focus
administrators and staff too much on the day-to-day trading operations, which could
actually be left to management, and too little on the restructure.

“If there was better pre-planning, then I think a lot of those issues go away
because the potential administrator can educate themselves to a point where
they can put in place appropriate controls without needing to sit there and
eyeball every single creditor themselves. I actually think that that whole thing
has gone too far in the Part 5.3A space. Yes, the administrator has liability and
that is significant, but does that mean they need to have 500 staff doing the job
of the executive team? I don’t think that was ever the intent of the legislation. I
think it has gone there because there isn’t an opportunity to plan and prepare
appropriately for the administration of a large entity or enterprise.” (Dale)

Participants expressed concern that changes to how the administrator-liability
provisions operated, whilst likely to improve the potential to restructure and rescue
more companies, could also have a negative impact on creditors and, in particular,
suppliers.
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“I think a lot of care needs to be taken around any changes of that liability,
because the suppliers need to have some confidence that they’re going to get
paid, because they have already dumped a whole bunch of money. As a general
rule the practitioners all look to do the right thing. But it’s like anything: there
are some cowboys out there who just try to take advantage of it. Look, from my
personal point of view, if I didn’t have the personal liability I might be less
conservative about decisions to trade. But it does force you to balance both
sides of the ledger.” (Julian)

However, participants were also of the view that the combination of generational
change and shifts in how administrators assessed a business and the restructuring
process was changing the perceived risks associated with trading liability.

“I think maybe the way to look at it is a portfolio review of insolvency
practitioners, and there’s a mixed bag of those guys. In fact, even in the younger
generation coming through there’s a big changing of the guard happening now
[who] have been exposed to different things than the older, grey-haired
partners. So we’d be a lot more, I guess, sophisticated in our approach. The
older guys tend to rely on their guts a lot when they’re doing it. It’s just hard to
get insolvency practitioners that are a good combination of gut instinct and the
skills to bring it together. So I can easily see that some practitioners would go,
‘This is too hard’, over analyse it, ‘This is too hard for me to take on’. But you
know IP’s can smell a buck. We should be commercial men and women, so we
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should be able to say, ‘Right I can transform this business into a dollar, not least
because I’m trying to get my fees’. So we’re aligned there.” (Jamie)

Participants flagged the need for administrators to be given the flexibility to continue to
trade insolvent companies with a view to a successful restructure, whilst concurrently
being held to a higher account from both a registration and regulatory viewpoint.

“There’s some legislation that’s just not aligned to allow us to trade…I mean if
the VA is truly the flexible tool that it should be and you ticket people like me,
we should be held to the absolute highest level of accountability, but you should
have absolutely the best people to do the job. If you don’t cut it, and if at some
stage I don’t cut it, I expect the regulator to step in there and say, ‘Right you
cannot do this job anymore’, and to cut us out.” (Cameron)

To facilitate such flexibility, participants identified the value of further interaction with
the courts to seek directions to mitigate administrator-liability risk to achieve improved
outcomes.

“I think that’s an area where the courts may have some impact, and we’ve had a
recent experience with that where we have gone to the court and said that there
is a potential personal liability here – get us off the hook and we will play it
differently to how we would have otherwise…and the court was happy with that.
So in that particular case we were able to pursue the best outcome. I mean we
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did that with effectively the consent of the stakeholder who was exposed. If you
did not have that stakeholder’s consent it might have been different.” (Jamie)

This section has shown the importance of administrator trading liability in seeking to
balance the conflicting objectives of continuing to trade a distressed company during
restructure and the protection of stakeholders from further deterioration in their position.
By aligning the personal liability of practitioners with the decision to continue trading,
the framework has been reported to encourage administrators to exercise their
commercial judgement and expertise with greater creativity and innovation. However,
there was consensus from participants on the need for improved planning mechanisms,
particularly for larger, more complex restructures, to facilitate more efficient
administrator trading.

Senior-lender Enforcement
This section will discuss enforcement by senior lenders and how practitioners thought
the voluntary-administration regime has shaped the ways senior creditors interact with
the restructuring process of distressed companies.

“These days there are a lot of insolvency practitioners on secondments into
banks and closer working relationships, which at the end of the day has changed
the way that banks deal with their recoveries. I’ve always had a theory that the
driver for banks to adapt to a change in thinking was a result of the VA regime
coming in. When I first started in insolvency, the catch cry was ‘your first loss is
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your best loss’, and so once there was a default an appointment was made. I
think that banks have really looked at the VA regime and I think they’ve evolved
with the process, and feel comfortable with the process and they see some
savings in costs where they’re not having to pay for receivers even though their
rights are still being protected.” (Adrian)

Participants were of the view that particularly in the last few years, senior creditors have
increasingly sought to work collaboratively with companies seeking to restructure under
the voluntary-administration process.

“I think that the current balance is pretty good where it is, and I wouldn’t have
said that two or three years ago. Because I think the banks in particular and
more sophisticated lenders are aware of the benefits of the VA process, and are
(subject to a number of criteria) more than happy to leave a VA in control of
substantial assets. I think they realise there can be better outcomes achieved and
better cost control. However, it comes down to a lot of factors, such as the
integrity of the practitioner, the nature of the assets, the strength of their
security, the contractual obligations of the company.” (Jamie)

Indeed, participants recognised senior lenders’ increasing willingness to provide
flexibility in not only loan-repayment scheduling, but also the provision of standstill or
forbearance agreements to provide breathing space to the company.

148

“Senior lenders in Australia are increasingly willing to enter into standstill or
forbearance agreements, where under that arrangement lenders are agreeing to
not do things they are entitled to do because of the situation that has arisen. This
is usually for a short period, while a company does things that can lead to a
long-term solution and while independent accountants are working and other
exercises are being followed through. So it is a breathing space, to identify what
the immediate problem is, to sculpt a short-term solution to that problem while
the bigger piece of work is being done.” (Shannon)

Whilst senior lenders’ reluctance to pursue rehabilitation via the Part 5.3A process was
reportedly diminishing, the issue of a formal appointment, where the business was
highly reliant on contracts that could be terminated, remained a key deterrent.

“We do hear lenders say, ‘Well, actually you have a very real option here of
appointing, and we don’t think there’s going to be huge value destruction
because we think that it’s pretty well known in the market already that this
company has some difficulties.’ So that’s not of critical concern, but it’s
obviously an issue when…and certainly one which matters a lot, if you have
contracts where suppliers and others are going to terminate contracts the
second that VAs are appointed.” (Sam)

This general reluctance for senior creditors to inhibit restructure likely to benefit
broader stakeholders was further facilitated through the retention and protection of their
security-enforcement rights.
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“But look, I don’t think banks are necessarily a blocker to this sort of stuff, I
think they are open to restructure. I think that the views in recent times from
banks is that they prefer a company to move forward and solve its own problems
- if that is via a voluntary-administration with a plan that is discussed with them,
with a reputable firm of practitioners that financiers are comfortable with, and
further that [the] administrator proactively delivers the 440B notice waiving the
notice period, basically saying to them they can appoint at any time whilst
seeing what the outcomes are there.” (Evan)

Participants highlighted that the key to any restructure succeeding is the engagement of
the senior lender in the process and ongoing communication, irrespective of the
company’s size.

“So at the big end of the market, the starting point is to go through the senior
lenders anyway, so I don’t think it’s much of an issue. At the bottom end of the
market, or the smaller companies, it depends on who the practitioner is as to
whether or not the secured lender will get in there. As administrators, as long as
we’re open and honest and say this is what we’re doing, this is what’s being
proposed…usually they will go along with it and monitor it.” (Julian)

There was a view that this shift in senior lenders’ approach was also influenced by a
greater focus on their brand preservation and perception in the marketplace.
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“The banks for a number of reasons would prefer to be one step back, because I
guess one of the primary things that banks are managing [is] their brand names
and their reputation in the market, and those brand names are worth billions
and billions of dollars. They much prefer the perception of the boards doing
their own restructure rather than the perception of a bank-imposed restructure.
So as long as their security is being appropriately dealt with and the
administrator is maximising their return on their security, and they’ve got some
transparency and comfort around the administrator, my experience has been
that they view voluntary-administration with an appropriate plan attached to it
relatively favourably.” (Cameron)

Whilst participants acknowledged that there was theoretical scope within the existing
Part 5.3A regime to introduce a moratorium on senior creditors enforcing their security,
there was a strong view that in practice such a change would provide little value to the
overall rehabilitation framework.

“I believe the balance that we have currently got is a good one. Whilst there is
certainly scope for a stricter regime as against secured creditors, I think undue
prejudice would be occasioned to secured creditors in making it stricter, and
would have implications in the marketplace if securities weren’t as readily
enforceable as quickly and as easily as they presently are. I think banks are very
open to listening, and if they think that it is the way to go they won’t appoint
over the top, they won’t exercise that right to appoint a receiver. But I have to
say that you have to get agreement from secured creditors in order to make a
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restructure happen anyway, which I think you get in practice. So do you need
legislation for it? Probably not. It would not be my top pick for legislative
change.” (Adrian)

In fact, a number of participants raised concerns that the introduction of a moratorium
restricting enforcement rights of secured creditors may actually have an adverse impact
on the Australian rehabilitation framework, by encouraging earlier enforcement of
security.

“I think probably it would mean that we would go back to a scenario where
once there was a default and the bank gets a whiff of an administration, they’ll
appoint before the administrator goes in. So you’ll go back to the old regime
[that] they’ve got to get in quick and circumvent the ability then for an
administrator or a restructuring.” (Ben)

In fact, a number of participants suggested that achieving the support and sanction of
the secured creditor was a key driver to not only achieving a successful restructure, but
underpinning the credibility of a proposed plan.

“I think that any restructure is going to be driven by the secured creditors, and
is going to require the secured creditors’ cooperation, and it’s going to be
largely driven by the attitude of the secured creditor. But if the secured creditor
hasn’t appointed during the decision period, generally it is because the
administrator has been able to convince the secured creditor that there is some
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sort of credible plan that is being put forward. There is some kind of outcome
that is being worked towards. And I think that brings the secured creditor along
the journey and, to a degree, keeps the administrator honest.” (Leslie)

Indeed, if the proposed restructuring plan was not going to be supported by the
distressed company’s secured creditors, it was likely to be doomed from the start,
according to participants.

“There is no point, really, you are basically saying, ‘Well, here I am, here is
what I plan on doing. Does that work for you?’ Because the reality is if it
doesn’t work for them, ‘Oh, well, we don’t like it, so we are appointing a
receiver.’ It does influence, there is no doubt. Even if a moratorium period
sought to address this, I struggle to see a circumstance where you’d have a
moratorium period with a really unhappy and disengaged secured creditor
which could end happily, because at some point the moratorium period comes to
an end.” (Adrian)

Participants noted that in practice they were seeing an increasing reluctance by banks to
appoint receivers over the top of VAs, and an underlying focus on the preservation of
going-concern value.

“I mean part of that goes to the attitude of secured lenders, and their willingness
to appoint over the top is not something they enthusiastically do. Clearly, to
achieve stability and maximise going-concern value you need the support of the
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lenders. Prima facie, it probably makes sense that you get that moratorium as
well, but I don’t think necessarily banks having that right means that goingconcern value is undermined, because I don’t see them appointing very often. So
in practice…theoretically it should exist, but I don’t see in practice banks acting
against their own interests - that is, acting to undermine going-concern value. I
don’t see that.” (Shannon)

Participants indicated that the conflicting benefits for senior lenders of a receivership
vis-à-vis the VA process were also shifting due to the greater alignment of creditor
interests and no requirement to indemnify under the VA process; they noted that this
mitigated the traditional need for greater process control.

“You look at most appointments and the banks are reticent to put in a receiver
…you’ve got to put an indemnity in there. So why do they put a receiver in as
opposed to just a VA? Because they want to control it and there’s the potential
that they could - even if they put in a VA, that VA will get replaced by somebody
else, and all it takes, as you know, to get a VA replaced is to have a creditor
body stacked against them. So you know as a VA I’m acting in the best interests
of everybody; as a receiver I’ve only got one person to look after, or one entity,
but most of the time they’re aligned. But you know you can see the conflict there,
but the banks are more aligned now and they’re not making the appointments.
They’re happy to let them just pass through to administration.” (Dale)
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Notwithstanding, participants were of the view that even in circumstances where the
secured creditor did appoint a receiver, the likelihood of an outcome in the best interests
of unsecured creditors and the continuation of the underlying business was not felt to be
adversely affected.

“But at the end of the day if they don’t think it can be restructured, or sometimes
there can be issues with practitioners they’re not comfortable with for various
reasons, well, then, they’re going to appoint over the top. So the bank will
appoint a receiver and that gives the opportunity for the business to be sold. You
might say, ‘Well, okay, that’s not really in the interests of unsecured [creditors],
but at the end of the day it is in the sense that the business will move off, so it
will go from someone who can’t manage this business to someone that
potentially can. The employees will keep their job and the business will keep
going. So the receiver has gone in there, sold the business, then dealt with his
secure position. And if there’s surplus money involved, it can also facilitate a
fairly significant distribution to the unsecured creditors.” (Philip)

One fundamental shift identified by participants at the large end of the restructuring
market is banks becoming less reluctant to sell distressed debt to hedge funds and
alternative debt traders.

“There was traditionally a real paranoia about hedge funds and vulture funds
and all those sort of things, and banks really shied away from that as an exit
alternative. Then a few years ago something clicked and the hedge funds started
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to be seen as a viable exit alternative. I don’t know but I understand that it has
been driven a bit by the cost of capital for having impaired loans on the book
and that sort of stuff. Suddenly the cost of selling the debt for a discount seemed
like a pretty good option.” (Evan)

Participants also identified a greater market-capital flow with the growth in the
Australian secondary debt market, facilitated by a growth in market participants and the
increasing willingness of lenders to trade distressed debt and consider alternative exit
scenarios.

“[Hedge funds and distressed debt traders] don’t have the same things that
banks do in terms of BASEL and other restrictions. But you know it’s going to be
a slow thing, like the secondary debt market in Australia has been there latently
but it’s probably really only had a real spur on in the last four years. So it’s
about senior lenders identifying the right solution, and I say the right solution in
the market today is not necessarily receivership, it’s ‘let’s have a look at this
other capital’. Now it might be that you end up with a receivership, but let’s
really have a serious look at whether you can trade out and get it built into the
psyche that it’s an option. I mean in the US it happens all the time.” (Leslie)

Participants saw the emergence of the secondary debt market as an alternative tool in
the debt-restructuring framework, with loan-to-own mechanisms providing the potential
to efficiently redistribute capital.
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“But longer term it has got to be part of the furniture, it has got to be part of the
solution to the work-out. And those guys do think of the loan-to-own, and they
will try and transform the business and they will have completely different
mindsets to value. So is that a more efficient way to distribute capital into the
economy, by getting these guys in? Maybe. They might be taking advantage of us
but I don’t know – there has got to be money in it for them - there has got to be
money in it for everybody, otherwise there is no point.” (Philip)

This increased willingness of senior creditors to “mark to market” their debt, has
provided the opportunity for third parties to pursue alternative and non-conventional
restructures, including debt-for-equity swaps and credit bidding of assets, which
Australian banks have been reluctant to pursue.

“Where you have a big business obviously over-debted, where the debt is worth
more than the business and a consensual deal is done, right. Why does that
happen? Well, in part I think what helps that happen is that most of the trading
banks sold their debt at a discount. In other words, they were willing to take a
compromise that reflected value, rather than take a stand, if you like. The people
who were buying the debt, they were buying because they wanted to buy the
business. They wanted to avoid insolvency, but they wanted to end up owning the
business. If the discussion with equity hadn’t gone the right way, then they
would have put it into an insolvency process – a VA – and probably credit bid it
and owned the business.” (Shannon)

157

Participants identified that the different viewpoint brought into play by these secondary
debt traders created a dynamic shift; often through the use of the previously redundant
Part 5.1 Scheme of Arrangement provisions to rehabilitate and avoid insolvency.

“The other really interesting dynamic is [that] not only are hedge funds coming
in with a more flexible view on outcomes, the whole dynamic changes when they
buy into the debt in a syndicate. You don’t have a whole heap of tail enders
there looking at how much of a write-off they are going to take, but rather you
have got funds working bloody hard to optimise their outcome. They see it as
maximising a return, and the energy and creativity that goes into that is very
different to someone who is trying to mitigate a loss. It is a different mindset.
You need to balance the interests of stakeholders who have some sort of say or
consent right in the restructure – how much do you need to offer them to gather
their support? It leads to some interesting dynamics, you seeing where you have
got to get a scheme of arrangement across. You see mezzanine lenders who are
under water and equity getting some sort of return out of the restructure, just to
get their support.” (Cameron)

Participants also saw greater opportunities for mid-sized to large companies in distress
to restructure following a senior-lender selldown in the secondary market, particularly
as transparency around secondary debt pricing increases and schemes of arrangement
costs start to decrease.
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“What is interesting is that this is certainly not exclusively limited to the
syndicate space, where it is more publicly recognised. There is the potential for
a lot of debt-for-equity or quasi-equity-type structures to be put in place by a
range of banks on a bilateral basis, and I think there are a range of views across
lending institutions as to their appetite for that. But I think we have seen certain
institutions do really very well around doing things out of being a little bit
creative.” (Sam)

Part of the rationale for the reluctance to date for this secondary debt market to filter
down from the high-end institutional and syndicated debt space to the middle market, is
the different perspectives and approach taken by work-out bankers dealing in this midcap portfolio.

“The problem is that whilst the institutional guys do think about it, and they say,
‘Right, what’s the cost of my capital in the bank, what can I get on the market, is
it a good deal?’ – problem is that that’s not where it is in the mid-cap space in
the work-out part of the banks. They’re not thinking about these options. It
seems that some of the bankers don’t want to take a haircut. It’s like a binary…I
have got to do a receivership or I keep the file. You can do both, and it should
just be a decision: do you want the client or not? If you want the client you
should be trying to pass it back up to good side as quick as you can, and you
should be trying to minimise the bank’s losses on it. Now if that means that you
do have to take a haircut of 20% and you can introduce new capital into the
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structure, then I reckon that’s a far better outcome than paying me to do a
receivership and getting liquidation value on assets.” (Philip)

From the findings in this section, it became apparent that the attitude and engagement of
senior lenders in relation to the rehabilitation of distressed companies has become
increasingly supportive and accommodating. With security enforcement as a last resort,
participants noted that senior lenders had become more comfortable with the VA
process running its course, in pursuit of broader stakeholder outcomes. Participants saw
minimal value in practice in the introduction of a moratorium on senior-creditor
enforcement, and instead viewed lender support and engagement as critical to a
sustainable rehabilitation outcome. This section also discussed the increasing seniorlender participation in the secondary distressed debt market, particularly in relation to
larger companies and the re-emergence of the Scheme of Arrangement legislation to
achieve alternative non-conventional outcomes.

Company Size
There was consensus amongst participants that for the majority of Australian
companies, the Part 5.3A legislation was to an extent a scalable process that was able to
accommodate a range of mainstream corporate applications.

“It is scalable. That is one of the reasons why I think that the process works
well. On top of that, what makes it even more scalable is s 447A of the Act,
which enables the court to make any orders it sees fit in relation to the
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administration or its process. So if you had a voluntary-administration where
for whatever reason, because of the industry or because of the size of it, or
because of the scale, you needed more time between the first and second meeting
of creditors, you are able to go to the court and seek an order varying the
timetable or getting an extension of the adjournment period. So you are able to
flex the process.” (Leslie)

Participants were of the view that in the mainstream there was also cost flexibility in
trading under the 5.3A legislation, which worked well for a broad range of companies.

“The cost with a smaller company…a smaller company is easier to trace and to
monitor your liability position and trading. So you may find for a company that
has…the best books and records, you can have a straightforward spreadsheet
and a receipt book and a bank statement, then it is relatively straightforward to
monitor it and to trade it. And in that circumstance there may be only one
employee required working with the company’s staff, which means that the costs
are brought right down. With larger, more complicated businesses, where you
have a variety of moving parts, [that’s] really where the resources really need to
come in.” (Julian)

However, participants held the view that the structure of the legislation had a bias
towards facilitating restructure in the small-to-medium enterprise (SME) segment,
rather than the larger corporate area where most individually significant restructures
would likely occur.
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“I think it has a bias towards SME companies. I don’t think it often
contemplates what’s required for large companies, and frankly, your ability to
rehabilitate is really only going to happen in a meaningful way at the larger
end, in my view. Everything else is more or less either phoenixed or just closed
up very quickly, and that absolutely comes to directors coming at it too late.”
(Shannon)

Participants perceived greater inherent potential for larger businesses to restructure,
given their position in their respective markets, the impact of failure and the consensus
amongst stakeholders on the importance of these companies continuing to trade.

“I would come back to this concept of the size of the business, its relevance to its
market and materiality of the business to its market and its customers. I think
that’s the thing that holds the business together. So if they have got those
factors, there is a greater chance of achieving the restructure, whether it is
through formal or informal means. Larger matters also tend to have greater
lenders’ support behind them to put it all together, and they know that is just
what’s got to happen.” (Dale)

Participants who primarily operated in this larger segment were of the view that the
legislation’s existing timeframes should be better matched to facilitate restructures of
larger, more complex groups, or a mechanism provided to push the VA process more
towards the larger end.
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“So VAs I think are SME tools – I mean, for anything of size I’ve got to go to
court and I’ve got to extend the convening period and then I’ve got to have this
pointless meeting to start with where people are all pent up and angry and want
to ask questions. But there’s no benefit to the creditors except for a venting
opportunity. It’s just a long way to the second meeting of creditors. And yes,
there should be court oversight, I get that and I agree with that. But it’s just too
tight a timetable.” (Cameron)

“I think when you start to get some of the larger businesses, it doesn’t work
particularly well because of the timeframes, and there is an almost ongoing need
to approach the court to extend the convening period. To have to make the
application as a matter of practice just seems a little expensive and unnecessary
in terms of time and energy and effort, particularly if you have got some
prospect of genuinely restructuring something and are working through the
options. It would be great to see the VA legislation further develop to better
match its timeframes and requirements to larger companies in response to that.
Because I think some of the timeframes are just absurd when you’re dealing with
larger, complex groups.” (Lee)

The framework for large companies was also identified as requiring participants to
undertake a multitude of concurrent activities, creating an inability to focus on the tradeon of the underlying business with a view to restructure or sale.
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“If I’m trying to do a deal to get the business sold, then I’m going to be focused
on that, and I’ve got some other team in my business that’s preparing a report to
creditors. Well, to be honest, I’d rather say ‘Let’s go and work out what we’re
dealing with here first on the sale of business, get that nutted out and then we
can work out what to do.’ But the time pressure is immense. It’s not to say that
we’re scared of working hard, but what’s the utility of a VA report where you
say, ‘Look, I’ve just looked at this for a month, I’m going to caveat the hell out
of the thing, because how can I seriously look at insolvent trading after a month
of investigations?’ – during which time you are trying to run and trade on a
business and sell it.” (Cameron)

Participants identified that this posed constraints for large companies looking to
restructure under voluntary-administration, particularly where the debt to be
restructured exceeded $100 million.

“So I think Part 5.3A is a pretty good tool, but a tool up to a limit and in size.
Anything with debt over $100 million you’d probably say is starting to get to a
stage that there [are] just too many other variables, or stakeholders that need to
be sort of included in the work-out. I mean, the VA framework is a pretty
dynamic tool but it’s pretty blunt at the same time. So I think I see part 5.3A
more as a sub-$100 million, if I can call it that, SME space.” (Evan)

This was contrasted to the challenges for very small businesses at the other end of the
spectrum to recapitalise their balance sheet.
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“As you go into smaller, SME-style businesses, unless there is an ability to tap
into some equity pretty quickly to compromise creditors’ claims, like to get an
additional drawdown or mortgage on the family home and offer that to creditors
– you know, the prospects of getting to a successful result in smaller SMEs is
pretty poor. Particularly now that we are seeing less headroom in equity and
family homes and the bank’s LVR requirements are tightening up, that sort of
ability to tap that market for equity is reduced. Whereas, as you get into bigger
matters, I have seen the element of success increase dramatically.” (Jamie)

Participants also expressed concerns that at the very small end of the market the costs to
undertake a successful restructuring had the potential to be prohibitive under the
legislation.

“As far as cost is concerned, even in a fairly small organisation the costs
associated with a successful voluntary-administration are significant, and often
disproportionate to what is trying to be achieved. In a large organisation, whilst
costs are generally larger, they are still proportionate given the size of business
you are trying to save. But in a smaller organisation it’s certainly the case that
costs can be oppressive and of themselves cripple the ability of the regime to
reach a successful outcome. It is still generally seen as a terminal process, and
where deeds of company arrangement are used, they are really used to
effectively mop up the assets.” (Alex)

165

The extent of costs incurred even for these small-end companies related to not only the
marketing and documentation required for a sale or DOCA to be achieved, but also the
compliance and investigation reporting. Participants questioned the extent to which
value was added through this process.

“A lot of it’s around ensuring you have gone to the broadest market you can if
you’re looking to sell the stuff and that has a cost in itself. Others, it can be
around the documentation that’s required to pull a DOCA together or to pull a
sale together. And all of the stuff you have got to report. I don’t have a problem
with the issue about fully disclosing or fully investigating things, but I think that
some of the stuff that’s between ASIC, the IPA, and the Institute, and the various
regulators and things that are required to be in the reports to do it, doesn’t add
any value. I know that when I speak to creditors about how much of the report
they read and…all they read is when they are going to get their dividend. You
cut the amount of costs, which means theoretically much more money is
available for creditors and that can’t be a bad thing.” (Julian)

Participants raised concerns that the VA legislation was one piece of legislation that was
meant to fit all sizes, ranging from a family-controlled small business right through to
potentially multi-national corporations, with suggestions for a transition to a splitframework model.
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“I’ve never thought that a ‘one size fits all’ situation works. It’s like a suit that
you and I might wear, one size doesn’t fit all. I think it’s good to think about an
alternative regime for larger corporates, where it starts to struggle in its current
form, to facilitate large-scale restructurings – particularly if you are looking at
businesses that need to be maintained in the national interest or infrastructure
assets. Because I don’t think it is easy to come up with a legislative framework
that cuts the full scale of businesses. And so I think if we could then push VA
further towards the smaller end, that we might see it used as a more effective
restructuring tool over time.” (Taylor)

However, participants recognised the challenges of a transition to a split-process
framework that distinguished between small and large companies, and they emphasised
the need for flexibility in access.

“Look, I think the challenge is always going to be coming up with an
appropriate definition of large and small if you are going to have a split
framework. I think the only way I could see that working is if there was a small
and a large and quite a big overlap in the middle where you can pick and
choose depending on the circumstances to work out which is more suitable. So I
think you need some discretion and flexibility.” (Shanon)

An alternate recommendation from participants was for the retention of the existing Part
5.3A framework, with the provision of additional guidance on the quantum of work
required from practitioners for very small companies. This was advocated as giving the

167

ability to provide improved outcomes for the likelihood of rehabilitation and/or
improved creditor returns.

“If you’ve got a company that turned over half a million bucks and it’s got 150
or 200 thousand dollars in creditors, why am I required to write exactly the
same report as a company with revenue well into the hundreds of millions of
dollars? The actual requirements to write the reports are no different, so I think
there could be some potential guidance, if you like, under the legislation and
regulations and things like that about the amount of work that you should do.”
(Julian)

The findings recognised that whilst the current VA framework operated well in process
and cost scalability across a broad range of company sizes, improvements were needed
at the very small and very large ends of the corporate spectrum to improve the
framework’s effectiveness. Two alternatives were suggested as potential enhancements
to the existing “one size fits all” approach, including a split-framework model designed
to accommodate companies by size or the provision of additional guidance provisions
within the existing framework to provide greater process efficiency. With regard to the
latter proposal, participants saw an opportunity to shift the voluntary-administration
framework to address the somewhat cumbersome and challenging aspects of the
existing process, to become more user-friendly for large corporations. In conjunction
with these amendments, participants suggested the development of policy guidelines to
support scaling back the scope of work for small companies to provide enhanced
scalability, and thus contain costs.
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Court Power and Direction
The findings in this section recognise the potential in specific circumstances for the
improved use of provisions under the legislation to engage the courts as a mechanism to
achieve successful restructuring. Participants identified mechanisms to better engage
with and seek direction from the courts in Australia, potentially under the s 447A
general provisions contained in the legislation, to provide flexibility and meet companyspecific objectives under the Part 5.3A process. This included greater latitude to seek
court direction and facilitate outcomes where individuals or groups of stakeholders were
inhibiting a restructure outcome that was in the interests of broader stakeholders or the
rescue of a company.

“I note that under our legislation there are some general provisions that allow
you to seek direction of the court…. If you can put a cogent argument together,
you can achieve a hell of a lot just through those general provisions under the
VA regime – and in particular, to get the judge to make an order. So the reason
why things such as the cram-down are attractive is to prevent the potential to
have a relatively small stakeholder hold a lot of other stakeholders with a
materially bigger stake in the problem, holding them to ransom. Look, I think in
some respects we can deal with that in our current regime, if we can show a
particular class of creditors to be unreasonable.” (Evan)
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Particularly in relation to key suppliers, participants identified scope for the use of the
court to provide direction to the voluntary-administration process and to progress a
restructure proposal.

“In terms of suppliers, if they’re holding out for a higher return and being
unreasonable about it, as long as we can show that their return under the
proposal is superior to what their return would be under not having that
proposal (i.e. liquidation), they may be forced along by virtue of court order to
fall in line with everybody else. I mean the VA regime does talk to essential
service suppliers, and so there is also an argument that if you have got a key
supplier, you might be able to argue that for that particular business it is an
essential service, as without that essential supplier there is no business.” (Alex)

Participants further flagged scope within the existing legislation to seek court direction
on issues such as insolvent-trading risk for advisors, which in specific scenarios might
resolve some of the existing barriers relating to shadow-director risk under the current
legislation.

“It’s very, very common for an insolvency practitioner to work with the
company [and] provide the board with advice, and it’s up to the board whether
they take it or not. For the practitioners providing them with that advice, I
believe the issues surrounding shadow-director risk may be potentially mitigated
under Section 1317S of the Corporations Act, which in my view does provide
prospective relief. So I don’t see why you couldn’t make an application to the
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court and say, ‘This is my CV, [these are] my qualifications, this is what I’m
trying to achieve and this is my plan. I ought fairly to be excused from liability
for insolvent trading because one day this could go wrong but all I’m trying to
do is do my best,’ and see if the court will make an order excusing you from
personal liability for insolvent trading.” (Leslie)

In such matters as applying for extensions to moratorium periods under the Part 5.3A,
participants noted that Australian courts were generally forthcoming to assist
administrators in helping larger companies work within these timeframes.

“You get a moratorium, you get a period of time that the courts have been very
good around acknowledging too. For the sake of the legislation there are some
time periods, but if the shoe does not fit, the courts have been very good at
saying for big complicated business that we will give you more time. Even
recently, on [a large services-company matter], the administrators got an
extension on the period that they don’t have to pay rent. Which is a pretty big
call, right, when you are occupying their property and you don’t have to pay
them rent. So the courts have been really good”. (Philip)

Particularly with regard to more complicated or creative restructure-proposal scenarios,
participants felt that rehabilitation was potentially more achievable if administrators
sought greater interaction and direction from the courts.
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“For example, I think in the secondary debt market, the loan-to-own strategists
if you like, are very, very uncomfortable with the idea that the administrator has
control, having regard to all of the obligations that they have more broadly. I
think they would be more comfortable with a process that saw them running off
to court more, but without that vesting in an individual. Because the Part 5.3A
legislation essentially delegates a whole lot of quasi-judicial decision-making to
the administrator, and with that comes a whole lot of responsibility…what you
tend to find is [that] an administrator will always take a conservative approach
such that they are not criticised. That does not work very well for the hedge
funds, who are looking to be a bit cutting-edge and clever about how they go
about doing something, so the two don’t meet very neatly at the middle.”
(Shannon)

In fact, participants saw greater potential for the voluntary-administration process to
embrace increased court involvement where administrators had concerns in discharging
their delegated responsibilities, to facilitate corporate-rescue outcomes.

“Control is wrested out of the hands of directors and the executive, and placed
in the hands of one person, and it’s all well and good to say, ‘Well, the
administrator should be more commercial.’ But there is an awful lot of
delegated responsibility that comes with that role, so I think it is unrealistic to
expect [that] an administrator can always be as nimble as some would like them
to be. Although we have some examples of some very effective use of the court
system by the administrators so they can get on with doing their job. I think that
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is actually how it is meant to work, but we haven’t seen enough of that.”
(Taylor)

Instead, participants had the view that the Australian judiciary had a responsibility to
provide greater assistance and direction in applying the legislation and make the judges
more administrator-friendly to facilitate corporate restructure.

“Whilst the ability to make an application exists, a lot of times they go, ‘Well,
this is really a matter for you to decide,’ whereas if there’s some ability for a
court, whether it’s a specialist court or not, to review these things and go, ‘On
balance, you’ve satisfied these requirements and therefore we think it’s going to
be okay.’ Without going the whole hog to Chapter 11, give administrators the
ability to apply to the court for greater directions to facilitate improved nonconventional outcomes for stakeholders. The judiciary should be giving the
insolvency practitioners – who are, at the end of the day, officers of the court –
that is, official or registered liquidators, more assistance when they make
applications for directions.” (Adrian)

However, participants reported that whilst there should be more court involvement and
direction, there should be a limit to this involvement, which should fall short of
compelling contracted parties into ongoing relationships against their will.

“The fundamental problem for restructuring is [that] the legislation stops short
of compelling ongoing commercial relationships, and I think that in a way that
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is necessary. It is the same concept in law that we have that courts are reluctant
to make specific performance orders for Mareva-type injunctions that compel
people to go forward together. The law is reluctant to do that and so is the
legislature – because they are commercial rather than legal relationships that
you are binding people into, and you can’t fundamentally restrain people from
enforcing breach-of-contract rights, because freedom of contract underpins our
economy.” (Chris)

Participants also questioned the potential for court involvement to provide a mechanism
for the deliberation of social considerations and objectives in an administration
outcome.

“I certainly think that the courts have made it pretty clear they don’t want to
make commercial decisions. Whether they will make social decisions, I think
they are probably more likely to do that. But I think that it has to head that
way…it can’t be all creditor-focused, as the outcomes aren’t great. The
outcomes are very short-term focused and not long-term.” (Jamie)

More broadly, the view of participants was that a fundamental problem with a transition
to a court-driven framework (such as the US Chapter 11) for a reconsideration of Part
5.3A was the absence of a developed judiciary in Australia in this area, and the
frameworks likely focus on very large companies due to cost.
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“I am not hugely in favour of completely chucking out our legislation and going
for the US model, and one of the reasons I say that is it is very court facing…
and there is some benefit doing that. But I don’t think our courts are geared
towards that. We don’t have the expertise in the judicial system to get us to that
place. Chapter 11 is not some magic, simple, easy, cost-free process, where the
directors just keep going. There is court involvement, which the VA doesn’t
have, and that has cost. It is very much geared to the very large end of town in
the US, and I would query exactly how many of those very, very large-end
matters we would have in this country, [and] that we may find ourselves at risk
of never using it.” (John)

Participants felt that any move to a more Chapter 11-type mechanism for very largescale corporate collapses would be better facilitated by amendments to the scheme of
arrangement legislation for a process likely to have limited application in practice.

“Schemes of arrangement are to some extent already in that territory, because
they are hugely expensive, court-driven processes. I think if we are only talking
the restructuring of the very, very large end of town, it could be that we need
something like the scheme of arrangement regime for insolvent companies, to
effect a restructuring in that environment. I think if you were going to do that,
you would just tinker with the scheme provisions and have greater latitude
around the percentage and value that have to approve, and maybe leave it up to
the judge to decide on balance. For example, you would get to a Chapter 11
system pretty quickly if you just changed those, I think you are pretty close if you
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took out those very, very firm class requirements. So I think there are probably
better ways of getting there, rather than just re-writing the Part 5.3A
legislation.” (Shannon)

The above findings identified the scope for using existing provisions under the
Corporations Act to seek greater court involvement and direction where required. In
particular, participants recognised that the scope of delegated responsibilities placed on
administrators to facilitate restructure had the potential to benefit from greater court
direction in need, particularly for restructure outcomes that are more complex or
commercially challenging in nature. Whilst participants acknowledged that the design
of the VA procedure sought to minimise court involvement as a matter of course, scope
was identified under these broader Corporations Act provisions to facilitate restructure
outcomes, without the need to import wholesale change into the framework.

This section has shown the impact of a number of legislative barriers to the effective
operation of the Part 5.3A framework. Primary amongst these has been the lack of
moratorium protection against the operation of ipso facto clauses and the corresponding
value destruction that can occur upon appointment of a VA. This section also explored
the role of administrator trading risk exposure in effectively balancing the conflicting
interests in pursuit of restructure, and the need for improved mechanisms to facilitate
pre-appointment planning. The findings then examined the legislative impact of seniorlender priority and enforcement, and identified increasing support and cooperation of
senior lenders in seeking to achieve restructure outcomes, along with the emergence of
the secondary debt market as an alternative form of outcome to distress. The section
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then examined the role of company size and the “one size fits all” approach to
rehabilitation under the Part 5.3A legislation, its impact on restructure effectiveness and
potential alternatives for improvement to the framework. Finally, the section examined
possible improved outcomes and flexibility in the VA process through the potential for
administrators to seek court intervention and direction within the framework, and thus
successfully achieve company-specific and bespoke company-restructuring outcomes.

Practical Barriers
This section will discuss findings relating to the practical barriers inhibiting the
successful restructuring of insolvent companies outside of legislative considerations.
These have been identified to primarily relate to i) the quality of directors,
communication and trust; ii) the viability of the underlying business; iii) the company’s
books and records and reporting systems; iv) the impact of employee entitlements; and
v) the role of the practitioner-in-possession model.

Quality of Directors, Communication and Trust
Participants flagged that the quality of directors was a key driver of whether a company
would identify distress and signs of insolvency, and seek external advice in a timely
manner.

“I think a lot of directors have a basic understanding of P&Ls, balance sheets
and equity, but often don’t understand insolvent trading and what that means,
and what the signs of it might be and how you might start to react. Often a
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board of directors will accept the advice of the CFO, ‘No, everything’s fine,’
whereas there are some warning signs that are showing up.” (Lee)

Participants experienced a broad range in the quality of company directors and their
understanding of the state of affairs in their company, particularly approaching
insolvency.

“I mean there is a whole spectrum of variances. Some directors are in complete
denial and have their heads in the sand and will simply just say, ‘Everything is
fine and everything seems to be okay, but I think I have a problem.’ Others have
bad information or simply don’t have or don’t understand the financial
information, and don’t understand the financial position. Then, others I have
spoken to have been aware to four decimal places.” (Leslie)

There was a significant negative impact on the likelihood of companies successfully
restructuring if the directors had displayed poor conduct in their dealings with
stakeholders.

“I have seen circumstances where directors have maliciously misled employees
and creditors and deliberately not paid, for example, superannuation payments,
but told employees they’ve been paid and given stories to trade creditors or
what have you to string them along. Thinking that somewhere along the line
there was going to be an exit for shareholders. And those circumstances – they
do occur, and a restructure under those circumstances is very, very difficult. If
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the creditors or the employees appear to be so against or non-supportive, in fact
in some cases actually antagonistic towards the company, then I will actually
say, ‘Don’t pursue the voluntary-administration process.’” (Jamie)

Honesty in directors’ dealings with stakeholders was seen as a key catalyst for marginal
restructuring plans being successfully implemented.

“Usually I find it’s about the director or the company’s relationship with the
bunch of creditors: if they’ve been honest with them and upfront and haven’t
dragged them on and told them a whole lot of rubbish. It’s about how honest
they’ve been.” (Julian)

The ability of directors to develop and maintain trust with stakeholders was also seen as
a key factor for a successful work-out.

“There are a lot of stakeholders in these matters, and those include lenders,
directors, shareholders and management. And one of the very important
dynamics in these things is how much of the situation of distress that has arisen
results in trust being lost between different stakeholders, particularly between
lenders and management. And if you want to identify one factor that more often
than not will be fatal to a successful work-out, it’s probably the loss of trust
between lenders and the people they are dealing with.” (Shannon)
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The director behaviour that presented the greatest barrier to restructuring was where
equity had been eroded and directors had moved onto trading with the risk primarily
being borne by creditors. This was particularly the case where directors had risked
employee creditor funds without their consent or knowledge.

“Directors who have never paid PAYG, haven’t paid super, effectively have
borrowed from employees without their knowledge. Free funding from parties
who hadn’t agreed to lend them money. I am sure that if the business had done
well, they wouldn’t have paid them a cent more than what they were owed and
kept all of the profits. I don’t think that is right. I am pleased with the changes
made around personal liability now extending to super as well as PAYG. In this
certain context that is a good thing because we very regularly see that super
does not get paid for a very long period of time and you have got people who are
salary sacrificing super, so they have effectively not been paid their wages.”
(Philip)

However, the general consensus amongst participants was that directors often did not
intentionally mislead or display malice in their dealings with stakeholders leading up to
insolvency.

“But generally on the whole most company directors are just trying to do the
best they can. Some of these are people who have started the business
themselves from scratch and built it up to a certain size, and due to
circumstances outside their control they’ve ended up in a position where they
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might be insolvent. Others are people who have inherited companies or they are
working on boards, and broadly, there is usually not malice involved in trying to
get in that position.” (Jamie)

Instead, participants viewed director’s reluctance to recognise and acknowledge the
state of the company’s operations and level of distress as the inhibitor to seeking a
timely solution.

“I think that part of the problem is just human nature of people not wanting to
‘fess up to problems and people not wanting to lose control. I just think it’s the
way the directors have got the blinkers on. I call it ‘they hear but they just don’t
listen’. People think they are better than they are and I think that’s a
fundamental problem. I don’t think you will ever have a perfect system of
intervention. I think that generally directors need to be made to do it [appoint an
administrator], quite frankly.” (Chris)

Participants were of the view that directors, in smaller companies particularly, were not
adequately aware of their directors duties, which was a concern not only for directors
but also broader stakeholders.

“The quality and experience varies dramatically, but the majority by volume in
smaller companies are not adequately aware of their obligations as directors, or
of the financial consequences of their actions. This could be improved by
requiring a formal and measured level of competency for all persons seeking to
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be appointed as company directors. This helps to protect the individuals as
directors, and also those that they deal with in the business community. It may
also result in a reluctance to enter into a business arrangement without proper
consideration and preparation." (Alex)

Participants identified a greater need for education of directors around their
responsibilities and duties as a director, to provide them with the tools needed as
companies grew in size and complexity.

“So I think insolvency, and how you react to insolvency, is not well understood
by directors, and I think there needs to be perhaps a better education of
directors around insolvent trading and those sorts of things. Because at the end
of the day there are no restrictions on becoming a director and opening up a
one-dollar company and then growing that company to have revenue of a
million or a hundred million dollars. There’s no course that directors go
through, there’s no requirement to put a deposit down when you become a
director, so in other words they are potentially responsible for all these
creditors being incurred by a company, often with no capital base behind them
whatsoever." (Lee)

Participants felt that training to provide a basic level of understanding around directors’
obligations and duties was advocated as beneficial to directors of companies across the
company-size spectrum.
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“I tend to think that if people and the accounting advisers say that you need to
set up a company, but before you set up a company you need to do a weekend
course or something about directorships and their obligations – I’m not saying
you need to go off and do a company secretaries and directors organisation-type
course, but just something basic, even if ASIC ran it for example, a basic ‘do’s
and don’ts’ of being a company director – I think that would help people
understand what their obligations are.” (Adrian)

This was also perceived as an opportunity to focus directors’ minds on the importance
of seeking assistance and advice earlier, and to remove the stigma of failure often
associated with seeking this type of help.

“So I think the only way we can improve that sort of corporate-rescue based
culture is to provide an education for the directors that says, look, if you think
your company is in trouble – to try to get them to get advisers to act for them
sooner rather than later. There’s got to be a way that if you get advice you make
it sound like the directors are not a failure by getting that advice.” (Chris)

This section has outlined the challenges associated with the failure of directors to
identify and act on distress in a timely manner, which was often attributed to a lack of
financial understanding by directors, shortcomings in reporting and an inadequate
understanding of their broader obligations. There was consensus amongst participants of
the importance of ongoing communication and trust between directors and stakeholders
in seeking successful outcomes, particularly where the rationale for restructure was
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marginal. Participants advocated for improved education requirements for company
directors as key to addressing the impact of corporate failure and distress, and
improving the likelihood of rehabilitation.

Viability of Business

In addition to the importance of communication and trust with key stakeholders,
participants identified the importance of an underlying viable business.

“What are the key ingredients to a successful restructure? For me, they include
good communication and trust. You need a plan that is worth working towards,
a company that deserves to be saved and an ability to get on with it.” (Sam)

Participants stated that the potential for profitable and sustainable cash flow was
essential under any rehabilitation regime.

“There will always be companies that have reached the point where neither the
Part 5.3A regime nor anything else will be effective to save them. They are
unsalvageable no matter what you do. But insofar as those companies in the
middle, I suppose, who do have prospects of salvation, I think the regime is a
good way in which there is a mechanism available to achieve that.” (Alex)

“Usually the reason the business does not rehabilitate is not a failure of the
process, but that it does not make any money. If it’s not a viable business, a VA
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can’t fix it, a receivership can’t fix it, a debtor in possession can’t fix it. If a
business loses money and keeps losing money, it doesn’t matter what the process
is.” (Philip)

Fundamental to this assessment of whether a business is viable is the early assessment
by an administrator of the business’s financial and operational trading position. This
includes the potential for capital to be injected into the business, in the form of either
additional debt by supportive financiers or shareholder’s equity.

That sometimes involves a conversation with the external accountant or the
CFO, and that’s how we start to formulate a picture. And industry experience
comes into this as well. Running through things like what debtors do you have to
collect and what do your cash receipts look like over the next month and what
payments need to be made for fuel, for wages, for rent, what are all the different
expenses that are coming up –and when you look at that on a piece of paper you
can see quite clearly that there is a million-dollar gap here. There isn’t enough
money to pay for all these things, so where is that money going to come from?
Will the directors put that money forward or will their financier or their bank
put that money forward? And if the answer to that is no, then it is not viable.”
(Leslie)

Even with a business with prospects of salvation, for a restructure to successfully occur
within the existing corporate structure, participants asserted that the potential for
injecting additional equity or recapitalisation was a key success determinant.
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“But generally the sort of things that you’re looking for to determine whether
there can be a successful voluntary-administration are whether there is an
additional source of funds to be injected beyond the assets that would be
available to a liquidator; [or] alternatively, a prospect that certain unsecured
creditors in a liquidation are willing to step aside or compromise their position,
producing a bigger return to other creditors. Or a delayed realisation or
continued trading of a particular asset that would result in a greater sale price
or continued profit stream than would be available in a liquidation. I think that
the usefulness of the regime will come down to whether you can identify one or
more of those factors.” (Jamie)

Once again participants identified the catastrophic implications for some viable
businesses to disintegrate as a result of the ipso facto clause barrier to using the formal
appointment process.

“Factors which will affect the viability of a business and the likelihood of
rehabilitation can be varied. However, ipso facto clauses in my experience are a
really significant issue because you will frequently encounter in practice many
of the company’s key assets tied to the continued availability of supply, or
otherwise the enforceability of contracts that can be terminated as of right if an
insolvency event, including a voluntary-administration, were to occur. So in my
view it is a real issue in potentially retarding the viability of a business that is
available for use in a voluntary-administration, or something in which reform
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may certainly be justified. Because to me it represents a real impediment to the
successful utilisation of the regime in certain cases.” (Alex)

Even more detrimental for business viability and underlying value in a restructure
scenario is the absence of long-term contractual commitments with counterparties.

“The barriers with ipso facto clauses sort of assume that you have committed
contracts with people. I mean often one of the barriers we often encounter is that
you don’t actually have long-term commitments, in which case there is probably
nothing you can do about that, it is just an inherent weakness in the business.
We have seen a number of businesses that rely heavily on contracts with
businesses such as [the major supermarkets] who don’t commit to any volume
arrangements – you are just grateful they buy anything from you, in which case
there is nothing to preserve. In those instances, those businesses are potentially
worth nothing at the end of the day because there is no underlying value in those
contracts other than the hope that they will continue to buy off you.” (John)

Participants saw a number of contributing factors or characteristics of a viable business
that were essential for a successful restructure of a company, including market share,
position and relevance.

“You need to have a business that has some significance within its market and
relevance within its market. If it is a really insignificant business and of no
relevance within its market, then the pressures that that business comes under
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through an insolvency generally mean that people can drift away when it comes
down to it. So I suppose if I had to sort of conclude on that, the keys are a
material business with reasonable market share, significance within its markets,
strength of relationship with its customers, reasonable management team.”
(Dale)

The absence of these key characteristics was reportedly a significant inhibitor to the
percentage of businesses that come into that framework with the potential to be
restructured.

“Probably 20 to 25% are viable businesses, would be my guess. If you have a
business with very small market share, narrower customer base, less engaged
management team, it is a business which can easily just…customers can go
elsewhere and it will not survive the strain of insolvency. You need a range of
things that creates the glue to hold the thing together, to deal with the stresses of
insolvency on businesses. And the less they have, the greater the chance that the
business falls away. In terms of practical barriers, you just get one of two things.
One is nobody’s got the money to spend to invest in it and the other is the
operators are just tired.” (Julian)

In an insolvent-company scenario where a recapitalisation or DOCA was not feasible,
participants reiterated the importance of a viable business to facilitate a successful
outcome.
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“A successful outcome fundamentally comes down to the business. What a
DOCA does is provide an opportunity for equity to be introduced in a context
where someone would not put equity in, or alternatively it needs to be
recapitalised. But that pretty rarely happens, particularly at the smaller end of
town. Does this decrease the likelihood of the business continuing on – i.e.,
employees still employed, customers still serviced, suppliers still supplying? I
don’t think so if there is an underlying viable business. It just means often you
are running a sales process and getting value for creditors that way.” (Dale)

Alternatively, where businesses were not viable as a whole, participants saw value in
the VA process to provide an opportunity to identify segments within the business that
might be salvageable.

“What is great about the VA process is that you can pick and choose and you
can say, ‘Well, that bit of the business isn’t [salvageable] but this bit is,’ and we
can restructure around that, so that works.” (Philip)

In the larger corporate space where there was a strong viable business and where
corporate distress was more a function of gearing levels than underlying business
profitability, participants saw opportunities for schemes of arrangement to restructure
and avoid formal insolvency.

“The ones we worked successfully on a scheme [with] or something like that has
been worthwhile, because there was a very viable business which was just over-
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levered. Often great businesses making lots of money, good cashflow coming out
of it, with just too much debt they can’t sustain. It is just about how you re-stripe
the balance sheet to properly recapitalise it, what’s otherwise a good business.”
(John)

Participants saw less applicability of the scheme of arrangements for SMEs seeking to
restructure, in the absence of a very significant business upside. This was due to the
significant time and cost of the process, which distressed companies often don’t have.

“I think it is a challenge for companies in the mid-to lower end of the market,
where there is perhaps not a hugely valuable role, you need a lot of upside to
bother going through that process. So it needs to be a very strong underlying
business, and the ones where we have seen some potential for it to happen have
had very good cashflows and very good profiles as a business, and just needs the
re-cutting of its balance sheet.” (Shannon)

The findings reinforced the critical importance for a viable business to underpin a
distressed company for it to have any prospect of success under the framework.
Whether the existence of such a viable business resulted in the restructure of the
company or the sale of the business, was identified as being contingent on effective
balance-sheet recapitalisation and the best form of realisation to benefit creditors. The
likelihood of businesses surviving the stresses of insolvency were highlighted as
depending on the broader strength of the business, including underlying contracts,
market share and position and customer base.
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Books and Records and Reporting Systems
A number of participants were critical in their assessment of the books and records and
reporting systems maintained by companies they had encountered.

“Ninety percent of the time [books and records are] absolutely appalling, even
companies that are listed are appalling. It’s unbelievable the amount of things
that just slip through and I don’t understand it. Even most of the public
companies that I’ve looked at have had deficiencies. And it’s not to say public
companies should be perfect. Of course we should all strive for perfection, but
you’re listed – it should be fully transparent what you’re doing, and your shop’s
in a complete disarray behind the scenes.” (Cameron)

Participants flagged concern about poor reporting systems and books and records
resulting in directors making decisions based on gut instinct rather than timely
information reporting, particularly among SMEs.

“I think if you look at where the market is going now, it’s going more to the
SME space, which is made up, I guess, of a large number of family-owned
companies, and they’re making strategic decisions on their gut. They often come
undone with that, and when you start to build size, as you can appreciate, you
need to actually get the info. How do you make decisions without knowing that
information? You know you’re getting P&Ls that are produced two or three
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months too late, what’s the point? If you’ve got a seasonal business, the ship’s
gone.” (Dale)

This lack of financial information and record-keeping often meant a failure to recognise
problems in the business in a timely manner, before a company became insolvent and a
formal appointment was required.

“Look, I think typically in Australia we find that a lot of our businesses don’t
have good record-keeping and they don’t have good forecasting and budgeting.
So often you find that if something had been done to recognise what was
happening in their business and what the drivers of their business [were], that if
you could have restructured or done something at that point, you wouldn’t have
got to the VA point; you would have been able to restructure it. We have gone
into major companies and sometimes you are just knocked over by how little and
how inaccurate the stuff is.” (Lee)

Indeed, many participants noted that company size was not an accurate indicator of the
likely quality of accounting and reporting/record-keeping systems, reporting
deficiencies across the size spectrum.

“Having got to the point now where you’ve got size of the company, [that]
doesn’t necessarily change the quality of record-keeping, behaviour and culture
of those organisations. A large company should…by definition have better
systems. So I think in theory it should be easier for the practitioner to get
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information to review it. In practice, however, that doesn’t always work. Then in
the SME space, quality and completeness also varies considerably, with
businesses that are deficient in their record-keeping, usually due to a lack of
knowledge, lack of prioritising or for cost issues.” (Taylor)

Participants noted that this presented a challenge to administrators upon appointment,
where poor or missing financial records and reporting inhibited the likelihood of trading
on the business, particularly given the short time administrators had to get their head
around things, as well as the issue of personal liability.

“The risk is where the company’s internal financial reporting systems are so
poor that it doesn’t eventuate until one or two weeks after the administrator has
been appointed that the company is actually trading at a loss, every single day.
Where this is the case, we find ourselves in the position where we need to almost
recreate the profit and loss account to figure that out after we have been
appointed. So there is little else that can be done other than to shut the business
down pretty quickly, because quite simply we aren’t able to sustain the
fundamental business.” (Leslie)

Participants also noted that inadequate record-keeping and reporting significantly
increased the difficulty for an administrator to recommend a DOCA proposal or
restructure.
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“To recommend a proposal, an administrator has to have some comfort in the
reported financial position and the performance of the business [as] evidenced
by its records. If the same parties are going to control the business going
forward, there needs to be a recognition of the importance of good and accurate
records to measure performance and address issues relatively quickly, rather
than waiting for significant periods of time for issues to become apparent.”
(Sam)

Participants also identified a greater role and level of accountability that auditors should
be held to in ensuring that companies had adequate books and records and quality of
financial reporting.

“But it’s to the point in Australia that I do see that, that there’s been things
[about which] I’ve said, ‘Well, how does that work, how did you get that
through the auditors?’ So whether the auditors need to be held to a higher test
…I always sort of start with the scratch test. If I find out something in a couple
of weeks, then that just tells me the auditors haven’t done a good enough job…
there’s still big gaps in reporting, I think, that they need to improve.”
(Cameron)

The findings in this section have shown that the impact of inadequate books and records
and reporting systems have presented a far greater and broader barrier to corporate
management and sustainability than suggested in the literature – transcending corporate
size and any distinction between public and private companies. Particularly for
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distressed and insolvent companies, the absence of accurate and timely reporting and
records significantly decreased the likelihood of business survival and rehabilitation.

Employee Entitlements
Most participants raised the issue of employee entitlements as a barrier to corporate
restructuring. In particular, they emphasised the quantum of those entitlements and the
inability to compromise those entitlements to facilitate a restructure or sale of business.

“Employee entitlements are very important, but when selling a business, the
various categories of leave and other entitlements that they might have accrued
often result in quite significant liabilities on the balance sheet, which I have seen
destroy business sales. So the business simply cannot be sold because the
purchaser cannot take those liabilities onto their balance sheet. Nor can they
employ those employees separately – i.e., try to buy the shell and employ the
employees separately because they still have to take on the entitlements within a
three-month window, or something along those lines. So the employeeentitlements issue is one that would be worthy of attention, particularly if there
was scope to have employees agree to compromise their entitlements in some
way, shape or form, then that should be up to them.” (Leslie)

Participants felt that the addition of flexibility of employee entitlements within the
Australian restructuring framework was a worthwhile consideration to ensure that
businesses burdened by legacy entitlements remained viable.
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“I think employee entitlements are an issue, in terms of that’s probably the one
we would encounter the most in practice. My personal view there is that change
would be a healthy thing for businesses that are strangled by that sort of
overhead, and are badly hindered by legacy employee arrangements which are
going to make it hard [for the business] to survive in its current form.” (John)

The Part 5.3A regime’s inability to restructure priority employee entitlements to
facilitate restructure was contrasted with frameworks in other jurisdictions.

“But, you know, one of the differences between Australia and the US is that you
can crunch down the employees, and that’s in fact what the airlines have done.
You look at [an Australian airline], for instance, and you say, ‘Well, what is the
real problem here?’ I have been looking at them for a while and thinking, how
do you reengineer those contracts? Well, if I was in the US jurisdiction I would
use Chapter 11 and I would crunch the employee entitlements and start again.
But you can’t do that under the Part 5.3A legislation.” (Cameron)

Some participants discussed the need for greater flexibility with employee entitlement
priority where external funds were being injected into an insolvent company, to enable a
return to broader creditors, which would help secure support under a DOCA scenario.

“One issue in practice is that if the funds from a proposal are coming from a
third party and not from the company’s assets, then it is sometimes impossible
with the size of the employee entitlements to get a return to the creditors,
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because you can’t vary that proposal. I think the priority, it’s reasonable that
you can’t vary the priority out of the pool of assets the company itself would
have generated. But I don’t think it is reasonable when the funds are coming
from someone else, to then take that flexibility out of the proposal you might put
up, which is still genuinely in the interests of creditors, which would allow you
to bypass some or all of the employee entitlements.” (Dale)

However, participants felt that the right to compromise or cram down employee
entitlements should be with the agreement of the employees themselves and not by the
order of a court.

“I think it should reside with the employees personally. And I think that if you
tried to get a court order on something like that, the court would take a similar
view because they are accorded priority, and I think that notion is attractive to
the court”. (Jamie)

This protection was largely driven by an underlying concern that employees often were
not informed of the financial state of their employer, particularly in relation to the state
of their entitlements.

“Employees often get very little information about the creditworthiness of their
employer, so they accrue these entitlements in an open contract that the
company gives them. They have no visibility of the credit they are taking on, and
I think they should be protected. I think particularly at the smaller end of the

197

market, there is a lot of abuse of process by small businesses, who find it hard to
get by. I think we miss this, working for a large institution, working in the city.
Every now and then we see a small business and, you know, the people who are
working for small businesses are generally relatively disadvantaged
people…and I think they deserve some protection.” (Philip)

In this regard, it was clear that participants’ political ideologies influenced their position
towards employee entitlements, which will be discussed further in the section on
culture.

Participants also flagged concerns that employees would be reluctant to compromise
their creditor entitlement claim under a deed of company arrangement, because of
concerns for the sustainability of the restructured company or new business owner.

“There is a barrier, because in reality the idea that you’re going to put a DOCA
up that covers all those employee entitlements…you’ve got no chance. Because
people will go, ‘Okay, great, so you have cut off part of my entitlements, the
business lost money for the last five years – why is it going to make money next
year? So I have cut down my entitlements and I probably have still got the same
risk of this thing falling over again anyway, or alternatively they’ve been
transmitted through a business sale to someone who may be as insecure as the
company they’ve come from. Why should I take that risk when I can get my
entitlements and go and get a job elsewhere?’” (Evan)
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Significantly, another barrier that participants identified was the incentive for
employees to lose their jobs and be guaranteed a majority of their entitlements through
the government’s General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme (GEERS),
rather than to support a proposed restructure or sale of business.

“I guess in terms of adding to the list [of barriers], one you might want to
contemplate is, funnily enough, the government safety net GEERS, because it is
one that cannot be utilised for restructuring. Employees – and through their
unions in particular – now look at GEERS, which has got vastly improved
entitlement parts to it since the beginning of this year. So unless your deed
proposal is superior to that in terms of employee entitlements, employees would
prefer to be made redundant. When we are talking with highly unionised
environments such as building construction and manufacturing, they’re going,
‘Oh well, that deal, whilst it squares everyone else away, it’s not as attractive as
triggering our redundancy entitlements and holding our hand out in six weeks
time for a GEERS payment.’ So whilst it is there for all the right reasons, it
actually can be a major hurdle to overcome to get what would otherwise be a
commercial deal across the line.” (Taylor)

Participants identified this inflexibility around compromising employee entitlements as
not only affecting the potential for retaining employment through the restructure of
distressed companies, but potentially also the returns to unsecured creditors.
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“So here’s a company we took through the voluntary-administration, and we
were trying to do a genuine restructure, and that restructure was paying
employees 50 cents in the dollar for those that we terminated. Those that we kept
on, we paid them as normal under the award, kept their entitlements going. But
then we had to get the trade creditors on side so we gave 10 cents in the dollar
or something like that. The whole deed was destroyed because the community
said, ‘No, you have to pay employees 100%, you cannot get out of an employee
entitlement.’ So I understand the theory, but when you compare it to the
alternative, which was liquidation, which was employees claiming under
GEERS, trade creditors get nothing, all employees get terminated and we’ve lost
the business. I always treat insolvency as common sense and that just strikes me
as nonsensical. The whole thing gets torn down because we’ve got to pay
employees 100 cents." (Cameron)

It was also felt that employee entitlements as a barrier to restructuring had been
compounded in recent years due to the rise in quantum of entitlements, which burdened
distressed companies.

“The other thing is just with the creeping entitlements over the years, the
amount that an average employee is entitled to has become so large,
collectively, with a number of staff it has become a major piece of the liabilities
of a company.” (Julian)
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This was attributed in part to the substitution of increased redundancy entitlements for
pay rises in some unionised industry sectors, where employers sought to defer the
cashflow impact of short term wage-expense rises.

“You know, what’s tended to happen is unions, particularly in certain sectors
where they have struggled to get pay increases, what the company will always
give away is a bigger redundancy. I can’t pay them more now, but I will give
them a few weeks extra redundancy, fine. That’s become, in a lot of,
particularly, older industries, where there has been structural change like, say,
the automotive-components industry, and where there is a bit of insolvency,
that’s starting to become an issue. You get some big number because there have
been guys that have been there a long time and the unions negotiated up and up
and up. So employee statutory entitlements is a barrier.” (Chris)

Participants also felt there was a misconception in the public arena as to what had
happened to funds that should have been available for employee entitlements of an
insolvent company.

“I also think that the public notion, if you like, that employees entitlements are
sitting magically in insolvent companies in some slush fund somewhere, that has
been siphoned up or given to somebody else, when the reality in pretty much all
insolvency situations is that the company never had the money to pay those
entitlements in the first place. Not that they put them somewhere, or stashed
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them or have stolen them or whatever, that perception fuels the hysteria around
employee entitlements which makes that very inflexible.” (Alex)

The findings in this section outlined the barriers to restructuring as a result of an
inability to compromise employee-entitlement claims under the existing legislation, and
highlighted the challenges this created for companies and businesses with large legacy
entitlements. Participants advocated for greater flexibility surrounding this class of
entitlements, and flagged the potential for employees themselves to determine whether a
compromise was acceptable under a restructure to facilitate ongoing employment and
the sustainability of the business.

Practitioner in Possession (PIP)
One of the key barriers participants raised in relation to the practitioner-in-possession
model, such as voluntary-administration, was the challenge of obtaining additional
finance funding during the formal restructuring period, particularly given the
administrator’s liability around incurring such debts.

“Look, I think it’s a bit of a problem, because if you’re a voluntaryadministrator you’ve got to sign up completely. In other words you’re
personally liable for any facility you get from the bank, and you can’t offer the
assets of the company effectively if there’s another bank in there with security.
That makes it difficult to do that, and a VA is personally liable for any debts that
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they incur, so we’ve got very tight constraints around those sorts of things.”
(Lee)

The limited availability of administrator funding was contrasted with the situation in
some overseas jurisdictions where debt funding appeared somewhat more attainable,
whether it be on a priority basis or provided by the incumbent financier.

“The other key tool that I think we need to take out of the US market is the
debtor-in-possession funding. I think that is something the Australian market
hasn’t got its head around. Where used it can be very productive, so a company
goes into a process, and there is funding given to the company with a second
priority. And whether that priority sits above or next to or below the secured
creditor, that’s going to depend on circumstances. But I think there needs to be
a way to get fresh capital, for an administrator to get fresh capital and fresh
funding into a business, especially a trading business, quickly, so that they can
maintain value without a ‘tying up assets’ strategy. That’s what happens in the
US and it’s very difficult to do here.” (Jamie)

Participants did acknowledge that some progress had been made to facilitate finance
funding for companies in administration. This included such funding receiving priority
recourse as a cost of the administration, and potential limited liability recourse by the
financiers to the administrator. However, participants observed that the prevalence of
such funding in practice was uncommon.
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“There have been some tweaks that have been of assistance to administrators to
allow us to minimise risks relating to how we can get finance to fund the
administration. In particular, the financier can have comfort that will be deemed
to be a cost of the administration, and therefore have priority in terms of the
waterfall that comes out of the eventual proceeds or the sale of the business or
assets. Also, you can engineer it such that the administrator has limited recourse
in terms of that loan, such that the only recourse against the administrator in
terms of the repayment of that loan is to the extent that there are assets available
within the company to pay it. So if you can find a financier and deal with that
financial risk, then you can pretty much do most things between the parties
funding the administrator. However, the provision of such funding remains an
infrequent occurrence.” (Evan)

Notwithstanding the limitations of obtaining additional funding, in an Australian
context participants identified substitute challenges in adopting the debtor-in-possession
model (DIP) scenario. This included the risk of the company further damaging the
position of creditors by incurring additional losses during the trading restructure period,
and the likelihood of that risk being adequately tracked and contained.

“The problem with the alternative of debtor in possession is the same guys who
have got the business into trouble, usually in our experience are not very good
in tracking how their business is actually going. All of a sudden the business
loses another few million dollars, and you have effectively got insolvent trading
in a debtor-in-possession context. And I think that would happen a lot. Whereas
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administrators are much more focused on: ‘I am personally liable, there is no
corporate veil for me. I want to understand the numbers quickly because I am
new to this, got no baggage. Either someone is on the hook to fund me and it’s
not the suppliers, or I’m shutting it down.’” (Philip)

This was identified as particularly relevant in any further consideration of an informal
restructure framework, including in the context of the introduction of a chief
restructuring officer, which would likely constitute a quasi-DIP model.

I mean the protection is that I’d assume you would have a registered
practitioner as CRO with all the requisite experience and qualifications. So
you’d have that there as a protection to make sure that the situation didn’t
deteriorate. So I think there is an opportunity to do that, or even to go that next
step and have someone appointed by a court to do the things they’ve got to do
and report back to the court. I think that could be another way of doing it.”
(Lee)

Participants raised concerns over the probability of ongoing supply in the Australian
context, where previous amounts owing were put on hold and suppliers were expected
to continue trading during the restructure under a DIP model.

“I think that in Australia one good thing is that if you go in as a VA, you almost
always get continuing supply. You’re saying to suppliers, you’re an unsecured
creditor, open a new account and you’re guaranteed payment. And it is very
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rare that someone says, ‘Nah, stuff you,’ which is a bit surprising. I am not sure
in the Australian market, if you said it’s debtor in possession, here’s the same
guy that’s running the business…who says, ‘G’day, can you just pause that
account and open a new one for me.’ I am not sure how that really plays out. I
don’t think that would work very well.” (Philip)

Participants also questioned the premise of how much the debtor really stays in control
of the company in DIP-type models such as the US Chapter 11, with the role of the
advisors and courts there to try to protect stakeholders’ positions from further
deterioration.

“In Chapter 11, everyone goes, ‘Oh but the directors are still holding the reigns
of the company.’ Well, that is not really true. The truth is, okay, yes, they have
got all these advisors sitting over the top and they don’t do anything other than
what they are told to do by people like me, so that is something we have got to
change [in] peoples’ understanding of

Chapter 11. There is a real

misconception…. Some of the things are quite appealing in the way they go
about it. But I think we can achieve these changes without a full move to
Chapter 11.” (Cameron)

With the practitioner-in-possession model, historically participants identified challenges
for administrators wanting to understand a company’s operations in the tight timeframe
required, particularly for larger corporate collapses. However, participants reported that
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alternate approaches were increasingly being developed and applied to overcome these
constraints.

“We are working towards a model where we try to very much keep management
in place. Look, our approach to that as insolvency practitioners - in that
situation, we should be project managers and effectively take the position of the
Board or the CEO, and not necessarily try to be the management. I would say it
is very rare that an insolvency firm in any industry could argue that they are
better operators or in a better position in an industry than existing management.
You know, putting aside fraud or clear management problems.” (Jamie)

There was increasing recognition of the benefits of retaining the management team from
an operational perspective under a practitioner-in-possession model, along with the
ability for cost containment of the administrator’s professional fees during the
restructure period.

“It takes time to learn the dynamics of the business and the relationships within
the industry. So I think that’s one of the things that is changing in the insolvency
industry. The industry, especially on the larger files, is more [often] taking that
approach and keeping management in situ. And you’ve seen in some of the
larger ones, and certainly in the retail sector, there is no way that an
administrator or a firm of administrators can deal with thousands of retail
outlets scattered around the world. The only way to deal with those is to rely on
the existing management and infrastructure, to get a better commercial
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outcome, as well as from a cost-management perspective of the administration.”
(Dale)

Participants also flagged the potential for administrators to successfully operate a
business during a restructuring period through other creative mechanisms, such as
running businesses under license by third parties to capture the benefits traditionally
reserved for a DIP-type structure.

“Where the practitioner-in-possession model comes under the most strain is
where there are large VAs with, for example, a geographically diversified
presence around Australia. And that obviously takes a lot of time and resources.
I think in these circumstances the administrator model can still work effectively
by utilising - if people are willing to be flexible in how an operating framework
can work during a restructure. In fact I am currently advising a job where the
VAs have engaged someone to operate in there under a license to run the
business… as long as the administrators have strict requirements and reporting
from whoever they have as a licensee. I think that approach makes a lot of sense
and saves a lot of cost. Because they can set a framework as to what they want
them to do and how they want them to do it, which can be audited. They should
be able to protect the company and the creditors by putting those things in.”
(Adrian)

There was also perceived value under the practitioner-in-possession (PIP) model to take
the business out of the hands of the directors to facilitate a restructure. Some
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participants were of the view that the need for restructure should necessarily preclude
directors from maintaining control of the distressed company.

“I think taking it out of the director’s hands for a period and being able to have
an objective view…because as I understand Chapter 11, the directors still
operate the business to an extent even if it goes into Chapter 11. So I think that’s
like leaving a fat kid in front of a candy store. If they didn’t need Chapter 11
protection they wouldn’t be there. So why are they being left in charge? Give it
to someone else to rehabilitate then hand it back to them. But I just think our
system is actually quite good and I’d be loath to go more towards that Chapter
11 framework.” (Alex)

Participants acknowledged that the PIP model presented a number of traditional barriers
to efficient restructuring, including access to funding, failure to effectively use
management and lack of industry and operational understanding. Notwithstanding, there
was broad support for the PIP model to deliver independent and objective restructure
outcomes, with the findings advocating for the integration of a number of DIP model
characteristics into the existing framework. This included structural change to
incorporate greater retention of management in situ, and the operation of businesses
under license where required, to facilitate cost and resource containment whilst allowing
administrators to better focus on the strategic restructure and rehabilitation of the
insolvent company.
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This section has discussed the impact of the key practical barriers identified in the
research findings for the effective rehabilitation of insolvent Australian companies. The
findings highlighted the issue of director quality and failure to detect early signs of
distress and take timely action, as well as the importance of maintaining communication
and trust with stakeholders through the restructuring process. The underlying viability
of businesses was then examined as a major inhibitor of insolvent-company restructure,
along with the characteristics critical for survival of the Part 5.3A process. The section
then proceeded to report on the barriers created by inadequate books and records and
reporting systems, the prevalence of this issue across a broad range of company sizes
and its impact on achieving a successful outcome. The issue of employee entitlements
and the inability to compromise claims was identified as a key challenge, particularly
with the trend toward an increasing quantum of legacy liabilities. Finally, the section
highlighted the challenges associated with the practitioner-in-possession model and
advocated for enhancements to this approach to provide greater efficiencies in
restructuring and focus practitioner resources where most required. Barriers were thus
identified as being both legislative and practical in nature. The next section will go on to
consider the cultural factors influencing corporate restructuring in Australia.

CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
The restructuring and rehabilitation of insolvent Australian companies occurs within a
context unique to Australia; this context is intrinsically linked to cultural values. This
section will report findings relating to the insolvency environment and, more
specifically, the operation of the Part 5.3A framework, with regard to the cultural
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drivers for corporate failure responsibility, accountability and blame. The findings will
then examine the role of culture and Australian industrial-relations policy, to consider
the issue of compromise in employee entitlements as a creditor class in restructurings,
in line with overseas jurisdictions.

Focus on Accountability and Blame
Participants reported that formal insolvency in Australia was tainted by the perception
of corporate demise and collapse, with this stigma attaching not only to the company
itself, but also the directors and management.

“There is undoubtedly an inherent stain of failure which companies are tainted
with in Australia…there is definitely a stigma that attaches to and does damage
to stakeholders’ reputation in the market, particularly relating to the directors
and senior management of failed companies. That is a powerful motivator for
directors to avoid formal insolvency at all costs, notwithstanding the potential
downside that this brings.” (Cameron)

This stain of failure was contrasted to overseas jurisdictions where corporate restructure
is a prioritised objective and, if successfully achieved, is considered a testimonial to the
company’s robustness and corporate track record.

“I think of big US companies like American Airlines, JAL, Chrysler, General
Motors - no stigma there. It’s kind of like par for the course of just getting the
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capital to take a hit and then we just move on with the new. But we don’t kind of
have that here, we haven’t really gone to that ‘keep the business going’ type of
culture, and I don’t know why that is.” (Evan)

Many participants felt that this cultural stigma of insolvency was a key driver for the
preference for and increasing prevalence of informal restructuring within the Australian
market.

“One of the advantages of an informal work-out is it can operate below the
radar screen, so you don’t get the headlines on breakfast TV, but you do get a
successful result, so you don’t get some of the damage that can happen to a
business through a formal insolvency process. I think that really is a sleeping
issue and it can do great damage to a work-out process for things to suddenly be
on the front page, particularly when they are taken out of context, which tends
not to be a great experience for directors.” (Cameron)

This stigma was extended to the role played by senior creditors as the catalyst for
corporate insolvency and formal appointment, which has seen a trend to sell down highprofile exposures rather than risk being tainted through the insolvency restructuring
process.

“I think this is a fallout from the recent culture of bank bashing which we have
seen in the Australian market, which is obviously a factor for lenders. There will
be some situations and some particular industries where it is sufficiently high-
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profile that a lender will not want to necessarily be the one to appoint due to
reputational factors. We have seen banks selling out of their debt to avoid being
in the position to have to take that action, to leave that to those nasty debt
traders.” (Adrian)

The negativity surrounding corporate insolvency in the Australian market, often
perpetuated by the media, was identified as unique compared to that experienced in
other overseas jurisdictions.

“The attitude in Australia is [that] failures in Australia get a lot of press and a
lot of negativity, and there is a lot of blame to it. That attitude does not prevail
anywhere near as much in the UK or the US as it does here.” (Philip)

Participants viewed this blame culture as something that permeated all sectors of
Australian society; this, in turn, underpinned the need for administrators to investigate
the conduct of a company and its directors while trying to rehabilitate the company.

“Everybody wants somebody to blame in our culture, and the tone is set in all
sorts of different ways, from the law to the parliament. Even public liability and
OHS and all of those things are all based on ‘somebody gets hurt, somebody
must be at fault, and it’s not the person who has been hurt’. So our whole
society is based around a system to protect people from loss and injury, and
that’s a lot of work to try to change that and unwind that sort of system. I don’t
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know whether business is the place to start – it’s only about money rather than
health or crime I suppose.” (Taylor)

Participants described preoccupation with the prosecution, prevention and blame for
insolvent trading as a key characteristic of the Australian insolvency framework. In that
regard, an analysis of the likelihood of successfully recovering funds and prosecuting
directors for conduct such as insolvent trading became a pertinent consideration for
creditors in voting to place the company in liquidation.

“Look, I think one of the things that is different about Australia and the US is
that in Australia we’re obsessed with insolvent trading, we’re obsessed with
prosecuting directors and laying the blame and stopping an insolvent-trading
company continuing to trade whilst insolvent. So as a consequence of that we’ve
gone to this VA process, and the VA process can result in – if it goes into
liquidation – those directors being prosecuted in that context. Now if you look at
the US system, it’s more about, well, let’s not obsess about whether the company
has been trading whilst insolvent. In fact they don’t really go into those issues
very much at all, particularly in the early stages. So what they’re looking at
doing is saying, ‘Okay, we want to make sure the business continues and
employees keep their jobs, we are prepared to overlook some of those issues.’
But culturally in Australia, we’re not prepared to overlook these things in the
context of keeping this business going.” (Lee)
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It was perceived that this focus on responsibility rather than business rehabilitation has
developed in the Australian context through the policy focus of regulators on
enforcement and director accountability.

“Well, I suppose we follow the British more than we do the Americans. But I
think we’ve sort of developed our own little obsession. I mean I don’t think the
British are as obsessed with blame and that type of thing as much as we are, and
certainly not the Americans. So I think, yes, it’s something that we’ve inherited the basic tenants of our law - from the British, and then we’ve developed it a
little bit more, particularly by the regulators. They are really concerned that
things be dealt with properly.” (Lee)

Participants noted that this regulatory focus on enforcement and the cultural stigma of
failure for directors of insolvent companies presented conflicting objectives, which
often resulted in a desperate pursuit of alternatives to insolvency.

“It is our regulatory environment and the position regulators take on
prosecution, but also we don’t have a business culture where directors are
rewarded for seeing a company through a difficult period and a restructuring.
And I think it’s very much seen as…‘it’s insolvent and you’ve failed’, and
therefore you can see why in desperation directors hold on and on and on, in the
hope that they can find a different alternative to that route, and it’s only there as
a last option.” (Shannon)
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Practitioners noted that for administrators pursuing preferences or insolvent-trading
actions, this focus on regulatory enforcement raised a challenge to administrators as to
whether to continue an action, if the funds recovered from such action were unlikely to
benefit creditors.

“There is an interesting dilemma with preferences and with insolvent trading. If,
with any of those kind of insolvent transactions, a liquidator is contemplating
taking on those actions, there are two schools of thought. One is that if you are
not going to pay a dividend, or if you don’t see there is going to be a dividend
payable, then you shouldn’t actually start it, because all you’re going to do is
increase the loss to all the people involved, if everything you’re going to recover
is going to be absorbed in costs. The other school of thought is that you should
really pursue those actions regardless…from a social responsibility point of
view to teach people a lesson.” (Leslie)

The subordinate priority placed on corporate rescue is also reflected in the reportedly
“despondent” attitude towards restructure by Australian boards. Whilst the director’s
control of the company is suspended during the administration period, participants
noted that the involvement of boards in the planning, development and execution of
restructure plans, particularly for large companies, was rare.

“I think one other key difference when considering alternatives such as those in
the US is that the Chapter 11 framework’s first criterion is asking the question,
is this company really salvageable…can it be rescued? Then the decision is

216

made to throw all the resources into getting the company rescued. Whereas in
Australia, particularly the boards of large companies, rather than planning and
putting together an appropriate proposal to restructure and utilise the
voluntary-administration and/or DOCA process to execute that, VA is seen more
as director’s throwing their hands up in the air and saying, ‘This is no longer
our responsibility, we’re out of here.’ This is the type of approach which we
often see insolvent companies reverting to. And at the large end in particular,
that is something we should be working on reversing.” (Shannon)

In that regard, a number of participants were of the viewpoint that the ability of the Part
5.3A legislation to successfully restructure companies as a matter of course was
hindered in practice by the underlying cultural and regulatory policy impacts of its
operation.

“I think if the framework could in fact be used as a genuine restructuring tool…I
think it has all the legislative capability, but perhaps not the cultural willpower
at the moment to use it for that purpose. But the problem is [that] it is a cultural
change which is a reflection of society, not just a reflection of business practice
or a sub-section of the economy. I mean, so there is a need for some sort of
explicit policy mandate that actually positively encourages cultural change
around its use, which would give the voluntary-administration the potential to
achieve its objectives.” (Dale)
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This section of the findings outlined the culture of corporate-failure responsibility,
accountability and blame, rather than a focus on restructure in the Australian context
and the stigma of corporate failure that has attached to the VA process. There was
consensus amongst participants that the policy focus of regulators on the investigation
of corporate insolvency concurrently with the pursuit of rehabilitation inhibited the
likelihood of corporate rescue as a matter of course.

Industrial Relations Policy and Employees
Participants reported that industrial-relations policy had a significant impact on the
framework within which distressed companies are handled. They were of the view that
Australian culture limits the likelihood of legislative change to compromise employee
entitlements to facilitate greater corporate rehabilitation in Australia, particularly with
regard to the treatment of employee priorities.

“Well, employee entitlements and how you deal with them is always a big
consideration, but in terms of cramming them down, I think culturally in
Australia it’s not feasible to expect that you will ever be able to. I think we are
culturally too entrenched in a place where the rights of employees are
sacrosanct. I think it would be really helpful if there was some ability to
acknowledge that, but still have some flexibility in terms of timing and
crystallisation and dealing with the issues around that. I think culturally we are
too far gone in Australia to ever get to a place where we are going to be
cramming employees down.” (Shannon)
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There was agreement amongst participants that employees and their entitlements should
receive special protection in any restructure of a company’s creditors.

“I think employee entitlements are sacrosanct. I don’t think there should be
anything done to in any way disenfranchise any employee in relation to their
entitlements. I don’t like any concept that goes to that issue. I find it hard to
think of anything that I’d be comfortable with in diminishing that. I mean
sometimes the ideas that the employees put their entitlements in, you know like
capital or something like that to change the capital structure, I don’t know that
works, because the employees just can’t be properly informed. So I think that in
the employee situation, they’ve got to be taken care of whichever way it’s done."
(Lee)

In fact, participants thought any policy attempt to amend the current priority and
protections around employee entitlements would be political suicide for a government
in Australia.

“Yes, I think that the challenge is [that] no government is going to change the
legislation to do away with any sort of employee entitlements. That’s just going
to be like, you may as well not even turn up on election day.” (Adrian)

Participants attributed the rationale for this perspective and special treatment to the
historical underpinnings and framework of the Australian industrial-relations system,
which was differentiated from that of overseas jurisdictions. Even for participants who
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appeared not to have an ideology that prioritised the protection of employee
entitlements, they still acknowledged the cultural force of such policies.

“Compromising employee entitlements might be great, but it’s not going to fly in
this country. If you just look at our industrial-relations history, to me that is just
incongruous to where we have got to as a country. So yes, we can look at the US
and say, ‘Isn’t it great that that’s doable’…. We all know that in the US that has
become an industrial-relations negotiating table. For better or for worse I think
we are in really different territory…. If we’d try to do that in Australia I think
we’d come at industrial relations from fundamentally different perspectives, and
I just can’t see us getting anywhere near the US in that regard.” (Alex)

Participants distinguished the position of employees from other creditor classes whose
positions could be compromised under a restructure, and noted the cultural factors, such
as trade unions and the political ideology in Australia, that influenced such protection.

“I think that it works off the principle that suppliers are more sophisticated and
have an opportunity to do credit checks, and they make profit out of the
relationship, whereas employees just trust that they are going to get their wage.
I think you would struggle with change in Australia because we are a bit more
left-wing than those other overseas jurisdictions. There are cultural factors in
Australia where there is a union movement and we protect our employees. I
think that is the right thing, quite frankly. I don’t think employees should be left
out in the cold.” (Chris)
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A number of participants questioned the premise of whether the cram-down of
entitlements, particularly in larger company restructurings, would actually materially
enhance the likelihood of restructure anyway. This was compared to the cultural
implications that such an ideological change would require.

“But the reality for large restructurings is that they really should be about
financial sponsors and the equity more than they are about the people who sit in
the middle. So, it’s all well and good to say we want priority to cram various
people down, but the reality is they’re very rarely about employee entitlements
to get the deal across the line. I think they are ‘nice to haves’ from other
people’s legislation, but not necessarily ‘need to haves’, particularly given the
cultural standpoint around employee entitlements in this country.” (Philip)

Participants reported concern that the current policies that drive legislation like GEERS
almost provide an incentive for a company to go into liquidation to guarantee employee
entitlements. Further, participants reported that resources are wasted designing schemes
that enable those employees to get through to GEERS.

“The employee position is further clouded by the existence of the government
GEERS scheme. I think [GEERS] has been a big distraction in lots of ways, and
I think if we could get rid of it as a distraction, because it really isn’t intended to
be that, then well and good. The employees’ legal position is not just what they
are entitled to as a preferential creditor, but if the company follows a certain
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path through insolvency into liquidation, they get to get 100 cents in the dollar
by payment through GEERS. So to counter that impact from government policy,
you are often forced to craft a restructure that enables employees to drop
through into the GEERS scheme, which means the legal entity has got to get into
liquidation.” (Dale)

However, a majority of participants felt that the underlying preference for employees
was the retention of their employment, particularly for those who were older or had
less-transferable skill sets, and that there were worthwhile social considerations that
dovetailed into saving employment.

“Practically what actually happens is that people want to keep their job; there’s
only been really a handful of people that have tried to ostensibly screw the
company for a redundancy. Pretty much everybody I speak to is shattered that
they’ve lost their job, and they would be jumping over themselves to keep their
job - it feels like they’re on board that they want to keep their job. Whereas if
you lose your job, it becomes, ‘Well, what am I going to do now?’ and it’s hard
to remain optimistic that you’re going to get a job. I guess it depends on your
skills, but you know the people this really hurts is the people that are over, say,
40 years of age, or skills may not be quite in demand…you can sort of see how
they might see things differently from, say, a young person.” (Cameron)

Participants questioned the potential of the GEERS legislation to provide greater scope
under a VA restructuring scenario, given the potential to use the government safety net
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to protect employee entitlements that had been crammed down in conjunction with a
DOCA.

“But my understanding is that the GEERS payments are always discretionary
anyway, so you can apply, but whether you get it in a DOCA scenario I think
would be unlikely. If you want to be certain of an outcome, you have got to drop
the company through liquidation. I know that it’s ideologically driven, this
concept of employees, and that we have to look after their interests and all the
rest of it. Now whether perhaps the government should step in and fill the gap
for lost entitlements in a restructure scenario? I mean maybe economically the
cost of that is much less than the cost of having these zombie companies
pregnant with employee entitlements that simply aren’t viable or competitive.”
(John)

Participants acknowledged the important role of culture and industrial-relations policy
had on the protection of employee entitlement claims under the Part 5.3A legislation
and the limited likelihood for change that facilitated compromises of claims or priority
ranking of entitlements. However, they recognised the scope for enhancements to the
GEERS framework to provide safety-net entitlement assistance to companies looking to
restructure. They also highlighted economic and structural cost benefits in pursuing
such initiatives.
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TRANSITION TOWARDS A CORPORATE-RESCUE CULTURE
Participants expressed concern that the focus of the VA has evolved into a comparative
exercise between executing a DOCA or liquidation, rather than on its primary objective
of maximising the chances of the company, or as much as possible of its business,
continuing.

“In the 1980s we recognised that we needed something between a liquidation
and a receivership, and so we’ve come up with the VA. And sometimes the
obsession with the VA – is it a liquidation or is it a restructure within the VA, in
other words a DOCA – people look at it and say, ‘Okay, let’s compare the two.’
So there’s this obsession with ‘can we get enough for creditors, you know what
is it worth if we sue the directors, what is it worth if we pursue preferences’. So
that comes to a figure and then you compare that figure with, okay, how does it
look on a VA side – so, the DOCA versus liquidation. So it’s kind of a situation
where you’re still weighing up the liquidation approach against a restructure,
effectively, which is in contrast with Chapter 11. They’re more looking at ‘okay,
we’re not worried about some downside, we’re worried about whether you can
keep employees in jobs, the business can continue, etc.’” (Lee)

This led participants to question the prevalence of true company restructures within the
voluntary-administration framework, given anecdotal evidence of the low number of
successful DOCAs.
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“It is not restructuring in Australia. Using the VA and saying ‘I’m restructuring’
is not a restructure, I don’t think, it’s sort of…just running through a sale
process. Yes, it’s dealing with the problem, but it’s just an ordinary liquidation
with the protections of some moratoriums, and that’s what tends to happen. I
mean, look at the very low rate of successful DOCAs that have been true deeds.
True restructures of the business and trade on cash flows - come in, pay the
creditors out up to a cap - I’m thinking very few. So all the others have been a
sale of the business and the creditors take a hair-cut, or an orderly liquidation,
so the deeds aren’t the magic tool.” (Cameron)

Some participants felt a baseline minimum percentage return to creditors was a key
determinant of a successful deed with a meaningful outcome for creditors, and should
be required under a DOCA.

“It is also troubling where you get some really marginal DOCAs put through
where it is five cents in a dollar or something, that’s troubling. Should there be a
minimum, a statutory minimum by which you can’t put it through unless you get
some minimum meaningful return? Because that also makes an awful lot of
creditors sceptical…an awful lot of cynicism out there by everybody, including
creditors, and that sort of defeats it. Because when you get someone who’s been
burned a couple of times, either on the directors side or the creditors side, they
tend not to support the process going forward next time, and that all feeds itself.
I can think of examples of DOCAs where people have offered one cent in a
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dollar and it got up because of friendly creditors. That sort of return, I would
think, even if a DOCA was agreed to, that is not a successful outcome. So a
company that’s viable at the end but also where creditors have not been
completely stripped of a return.” (Chris)

Participants recognised stakeholders’ underlying aspiration for a robust economy, and
that an effective corporate-rescue framework was critical for ensuring the efficient
operation of corporate Australia through the economic cycle.

“So I think that there is a desire from everybody, from insolvency accountants
right through to bankers, for a preference to have a strong economy. And these
sort of cleansing things that will happen are also part of that market cycle.
Rather than what seems to happen now in the economy [is] that we’ve got the
position where everyone’s reluctant to get the adviser in, but then they sit there
dormant because no one’s willing to do anything about it and they become like
zombie companies sitting there. At some point in time there’s going to be a
market downturn. Things have to be cleaned up, and unfortunately people don’t
plan for the rainy season. They just think it’s going to go on forever.” (Adrian)

In particular, participants identified the impact of distressed Australian companies’
inefficient capital use on the spread of capital, particularly where capital constraints
were evident in a market.
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“If you look economically, Australia’s got this massive shortage of capital and
capital’s being deployed to these businesses that just aren’t working properly.
They’re not efficient, and so we need to redeploy the capital. Otherwise, if we
don’t redeploy the capital, we’ve got to keep looking overseas for it, and that
can’t continue forever. So how do we grow our economy unless we’re efficiently
managing our economy and the capital that’s deployed down here? So to some
extent a business that doesn’t have a long-term future should just be wound up
and resources allocated elsewhere where it’s more productive. So I think
structurally we’ve got an economic problem: that the insolvency laws don’t
alleviate the hiatus that we’ve currently got in the market and a lot of that might
have to do with, say, insolvent trading and the blunt tool of the VA.” (Cameron)

Participants identified capital restructure as pivotal to executing a successful overall
restructure, with the operational component running secondary to or in parallel with the
balance-sheet rehabilitation.

“I guess I tend to think of sustainable restructure as initially more of a balancesheet exercise than P&L or whole-of-company, depending on how you think
about that. So what initially is set out to be remedied is the balance-sheet bit;
the operational piece can run in parallel and is often integrally linked,
particularly in the planning phase. But more often than not, the operational
component of the turnaround really doesn’t kick in in a material way until a
balance sheet piece is finished. But often that bit needs money, or at least has to
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have cash flow freed up for something other than debt service, and often it
follows a capital restructure.” (Sam)

To ensure the effective use of formal insolvency mechanisms such as Part 5.3A in a
corporate-rescue culture, participants felt it was critical that directors saw value in the
framework and perceived the timely focus on restructure as pivotal in the discharge of
their duties.

“I think there is an enormous amount of benefit from fostering an environment
where directors feel not only confident in using the administration regime to do
the right thing by their stakeholders within a company. But it should go further
than that; they should feel duty-bound to do that, and be very heavily criticised
for not doing that in circumstances where there was an opportunity to
restructure and they’ve failed to do so. So culturally I think we have got a long
way to go, and it absolutely needs to be the direction that we move in.”
(Shannon)

Key to facilitating change towards a corporate-rescue culture included the need for
reversing the negative dialogue and prosecution-driven impetus towards formal
appointment, and a recognition of the commercial rationale to facilitate restructure in
the interests of stakeholders.

“So, how do you achieve [a rescue culture]? I think the sooner we get away
from practitioners and the practice being that directors are told that…they will

228

be sued under 588 unless they put their company into VA, the better, because
that sort of language is really unhelpful, and I think that happens all too often in
terms of the sales pitch, if you like. So there [have] to be more compelling
commercial reasons to do that and I think directors need an incentive and a
disincentive to find that balance. And I think that at the moment they have got an
enormous disincentive to go down that path…it’s just too terrible and too great
a stain on their name.” (Jamie)

Participants noted that the challenge to greater director initiative as part of a corporaterescue culture was the prevailing cultural reluctance to provide directors with flexibility
and autonomy in the restructuring process.

“At least in terms of the system we have in Australia, whether it’s company
insolvency or personal insolvency, I’ve accepted, I guess, ethically that people
should not be allowed much freedom when they can no longer pay their debts.
Because they are playing with somebody else’s money and not their own...and
we don’t generally allow those people to put assets in that situation beyond the
reach of their creditors. So, unless philosophically we change dramatically from
that position, then it will be quite hard to move to a more debtor-based system of
allowing them to control their own future and be more involved in their
restructuring.” (Taylor)
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Participants identified further policy challenges in the Australian market for the
compromise of creditors’ claims forming a pivotal driver for the recapitalisation of the
distressed business.

“Well, I think that clearly if you can more easily cram down creditors,
effectively what you are doing is recapitalising the business. Theoretically you
are increasing the likelihood of it rehabilitating. Whether it then goes on and
makes the same losses again and burns that capital up, who knows? If we call
rehabilitation effectively recapitalising and going again, sure, it makes it
harder. The fact that you have got to get the people that you are cramming down
to, at some level, accept that, makes it harder. Again, in Australia for example
we have a government scheme that pays employee entitlements if there is a
shortfall. Nothing like that exists anywhere else, really - certainly not in the US.
So the idea that you can cram creditors down is pretty contra with government
policy.” (Shannon)

Participants challenged the proposition that insolvency practitioners inhibited corporate
rescue because of an underlying focus on liquidation as the default outcome, instead
advocating for their role in the rehabilitation framework as providing the most complete
tool set to achieve outcomes.

“I think there is sometimes a perception that insolvency practitioners aren’t
great at turning around companies or being part of this rescue culture, because
all we are interested in is liquidation. And just nothing is further from the truth.
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In fact, to create a rescue culture you really need insolvency practitioners,
because trying to do a restructuring or a rehabilitation with a person who isn’t
a registered liquidator, and can’t access those tools such as voluntaryadministration and liquidation, is basically like going into a boxing ring with
your hands tied behind your back. The protective provisions under voluntaryadministration give everyone an opportunity to take a step back and work out
what the plan is going to be and the best way forward.” (Leslie)

Participants felt that for a robust corporate-rescue culture to prevail, insolvency
practitioners needed to be provided with greater flexibility and autonomy in the
restructuring process, even if it meant holding registered practitioners to a higher
regulatory standard.

“But it’s kind of like, well, you know I’m happy to hold myself to a higher
standard. I’m going to have all these controls behind me and you can vet
everything that you like, and because I’m willing to go and hold myself to a
higher standard of accountability, then I should get the leashes pulled off me a
little bit. You should allow me to go in and rely on me as a professional who has
particular skills to go and do a particular job.” (Leslie)

However, participants expressed concern around the credibility of the VA process in the
market and the role of practitioners contributing to this perspective, particularly with
regard to the provision of advice and costs.

231

“I think there is a credibility problem around VA, particularly around the costs
of administrators, around administrators making promises that often aren’t
adhered to. We have a situation where the VA was probably more likely to be
used more quickly in the early days – ironically, because people weren’t as
burnt. It is a very competitive industry in a way that it never used to be, and I
think that can compromise some of the advice that is provided up front… they
are not putting the time in pre-appointment. That is the first point, because why
should they if they are not going to get the gig? Secondly, you get some people
who might be trying to undercut the competition, lowball it, then they get in
there and the fees are a bit higher than expected, then that person is forever is
burnt on the VA process. So the next time they come back they leave it until
further down the track, rather than jumping in earlier.” (Chris)

Another challenge to a rescue culture was the increasing competitiveness in the
insolvency field, with directors seeking to “shop the job” on cost, rather than the
selection of the best skill set.

“They say, “I want you to quote for the VA,” and you say you’re going to do it
for ten grand, and then Billy Bloggs over there says it’s going to cost two
hundred grand. Billy Bloggs is actually right, it will cost two hundred grand.
The directors are essentially choosing and shopping with the creditors’ money,
and if I was a director trying to hide everything, I would, one, remove all the
assets I could out of the company to leave the administrator with nothing, pay a
really ordinary administrator 10 grand into his trust account and say good luck,
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batten the hatches down and just try and get away with it. So if I was a creditor
I’d say, well, I want the best guys doing this job because the best guys are going
to have the systems, the procedures, the accountability to get the job done
right.” (Cameron)

This commodification of the voluntary-administration process also presented a
challenge to attracting the best practitioners to achieve successful restructure.

“I think the culture’s starting to come in, but still has a long way to go, because
I see VAs as the commodity product, and there’s massive price pressure on that.
We’ve got to get more efficient, reduce the price, and it’s not going to keep my
best guys interested. No one wants to be an executioner, everyone wants to be in
the planning stage. Somebody used to say to me, ‘You’re cooking fish and chips’
the way the insolvency market’s moving, it’s like I’m wrapping up with
yesterday’s newspaper something that you cooked ages ago, and that’s not
going to keep my guys busy and interested and focused. What keeps the smartest
guys - and that’s what you’ve got to get, the smartest guys, in this space - what
keeps them focused is creating things, working out how to go and improve the
business.” (Cameron)

The issue of insolvency-practitioner fees was tied to the need to attract the best people
and to reflect the risk they undertake in terms of liability. There was the view that more
work needed to be done to communicate this fee structure and justification.
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“But you look at, say, the US. What happened was that they paid them really
well. Really good people doing it and then they went, ‘Jeez, time out here, these
guys are earning too much money.’ And so they went and really clamped down,
and then they went and got shit people in, getting really bad results. So then
they’re back to the style they are now, attracting good people. I entirely get the
fee-pressure point, no issues with that. In fact, I think we need to improve how
we communicate our fees and how we earn our fees, but I’m a bit of a soft
target. You look at some of the fees that these investment bankers earn on deals,
it’s massive. It’d blow your mind.” (Julian)

There was a reported shift over the past decade from a primary focus on formal
restructuring mechanisms like Part 5.3A for restructure to more-flexible informal tools.

“Yes, there is an increasing tendency by both sides of the divide, whether it’s the
bank moving through their distressed customers without effecting formal
insolvency appointments, or, alternatively, distressed enterprises retaining a
team of professionals to assist them to trade through their difficulties and
implement restructuring techniques that do not necessitate a formal insolvency
appointment. I think one of the features of this recent economic downturn has
been the prevalence of these informal arrangements, with the preference being
to other, more creative things that often involve insolvency practitioners
providing advice, but not to take a formal appointment.” (Alex)
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There was support for the greater role of informal and turnaround advisory in Australia
to better facilitate this idea of a corporate-rescue-based culture, which was thought to
bring the potential of greater creativity and flexibility to a rehabilitation outcome.

“Turnaround advisory is a developing cottage industry where people who are
experienced in insolvency concepts, but not insolvency practitioners, are taking
on advisory roles for organisations with a view to implementing a turnaround
strategy. In a way that would be more effective than would be the case in simply
seeking advice from an insolvency lawyer or insolvency practitioner. Taking on
a role acting as project managers and being in a position to implement more
creative solutions, both insofar as their own professional costs are concerned
and the skills they can bring to the table than would your rank-and-file
insolvency accountant or insolvency lawyer.” (Adrian)

Rather than any sort of wholesale change, participants suggested some refinements to
the existing Part 5.3A framework, complimented by these informal restructuring tools to
assist corporate rescue.

“I think our existing legislation is pretty good. I think in a lot of respects we’ve
got the balance right, and that time and experience [have] refined our regime to
the point where it does work reasonably well. And I can’t see that it’s - at this
stage - problematic enough to consider wholesale reform; that would warrant a
complete change of focus such as a Chapter 11 type of arrangement. But the
question of should we pick up on some of the concepts that exist in the US,
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concepts around facilitating greater informal restructuring, concepts that limit
the ipso facto clauses…is a sensible thing for us to consider because it will
enable us to maximise enterprise value, absolutely.” (Alex)

Participants expressed concern about the reluctance to change and evolve in the
Australian context, including the failure of the federal government’s Safe Harbour
discussion paper in 2010.

“I fear that Australia’s slipping here. You look at Chapter 11, it’s been evolving
constantly. I think for some reason Australia seems to be, whether it’s just the
political environment is not right…we’ve got to change. I think there is some
room in here without too much tweaking of the legislation and without tossing
out the baby with the bath water. Because in terms of legislative change, getting
what you need with minimum impact on other key bits of legislation is more
what the lawmakers prefer to see. There’s really smart guys in Treasury and the
Treasury guys know that an efficient economy has businesses fallout, and we’ve
got a capital problem, so I would have thought it would be patently obvious that
one of the areas we can fix the economy up is improving the efficiency of the
distress base.” (Cameron)

Some participants had reservations about the DIP model and key aspects of the Chapter
11 process for a reassessment of the Australian Part 5.3A legislation, which they
considered the most suitable framework for the cultural and judicial system in Australia.
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“My observation of Chapter 11 indicates that that is the corporate-rescue
culture on steroids. To see the incumbent management continuing to be paid
bonuses and keeping their jobs whilst employees lose their entitlements and
creditors are basically forced to continue to support the business, which I
struggle with. So there aren’t a whole lot of aspects of the Chapter 11 regime
that I personally can see would improve our system and warrant wholesale
change. I think our system is different. The Australian insolvency system and to
a lesser degree the UK system obviously, have evolved over a long period of
time out of Common Law principles and legal principles that apply culturally to
our country. So we’ve got a system that suits us, and I think that if you tried to
graft the Chapter 11 regime onto the Australian regime I don’t think [that]
would present a good solution.” (Leslie)

Participants flagged the risk of an overly debtor-friendly rescue culture creating
anomalies in the market that could actually be counterproductive to broader corporate
health.

“I also think that the ability of the Chapter 11 administration to create or to
distort markets…and it’s the classic case of, you appoint under Chapter 11, say
an airline goes into Chapter 11, suddenly because they don’t have to pay for
their legacy debts and they’ve got their secured creditor locked in to some kind
of low interest rate because of a court order, they can now fly people at cheaper
prices, which then puts one of their other competitors into Chapter 11. I struggle
with that too.” (Lee)
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A consequence of the debtor-based model was the limited applicability of the process to
the SME market, which represents the majority of distressed companies in the
Australian context. Due to the cost and the requirement for court oversight, this left
informal restructuring as the only viable option.

“The real problem that we would have with a debtor-based culture, as opposed
to a creditor-based culture, where the creditors hold the power, is that Chapter
11 is exceedingly expensive. And consequently in the US you will only find that
the very big companies actually do Chapter 11, and it actually locks out the
middle market. Consequently they don’t have a mini, cheap version of Chapter
11, so if you are not big enough to pay all the lawyer’s fees to do Chapter 11
because it’s debtor-based and court-based…very expensive…your only real
option is hopefully to do an informal restructure. If you can’t afford to do an
informal or Chapter 11, you need to do a Chapter 7, which is just the wind-up.
So that, to me, can actually destroy the ability to restructure, particularly in the
middle market. It is an entirely different way of thinking about things.” (Evan)

In fact some participants felt that the real success of the Chapter 11 regime in practice
has been the threat of the bankruptcy process to provide a catalyst to informally
restructure insolvent companies, rather than pre-package a restructure in a formal
environment.
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“In the US they definitely do a lot more informal work, and I do not know if they
use the threat of the Chapter 11 as the real knife to their throat, and so they
seem to get a lot more things done informally from what I understand, speaking
to those people over there. But if you look at Chapter 11, Chapter 11 is not
successful as a work-out other than at the very big end of town. What’s the
useful tool is the informal work, the work beforehand. So my view is that prepacks are a tool, but it’s not the tool, it is a bit of a red herring in a sense. We
should actually be trying to get these things done informally and deal with them
even before we ever get to a formal process.” (Cameron)

The success of a corporate-rescue culture was also considered to rely heavily on the
timing of the decision to restructure, with the formal process often forming the catalyst
for real change.

“I can probably count on my hand the number of times that you’ve been truly
approached at the right time, so you can actually properly engage with the
creditor body and strike up a deal. So, that’s the problem and that’s why you
need to get in early. And I don’t know if they get the warning signs early enough
or their head is in the sand, but by the time the VA hits, predominantly it’s too
late. So I think there is more scope to start to move towards more an American
philosophy of trying to save the business.” (Lee)

“I mean, you crawl these companies because of our costs. So it’s often been
said, clichéd style, that but for the administrator’s fees these companies are
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actually not too bad. The fact is that you actually need a catalyst to change and
[the voluntary-administrator] is, unfortunately, the catalyst.” (Julian)

This issue of timing and the correlation with corporate-rescue success was particularly
prevalent for SMEs.

“Particularly with the mid-market SME companies, directors have usually
drawn down all the equity in their home loan, they have borrowed from their
parents and their friends and everybody that they can find, tipped all their
money into the business and it’s gone, and they have run out of resources and
run out of ideas. That is where they are at when they have come to that process.
Whereas, if they had embarked on the VA process sooner and had those assets
available - for example to fund a recapitalisation or to fund a deed of company
arrangement, it would have been a better story.” (Leslie)

Further clarity and flexibility around the independence guidelines for insolvency
practitioners was seen as an important step to more seamless corporate rescue,
particularly for restructures of size, and seen as key to any amendments to the informal
restructure mechanisms being contemplated.

“So if you have a look at the independence guidelines of the IPAA, which
absolutely will be enforced by ASIC and the courts and so forth, there is the
ability to be engaged…. You have to give a very detailed statement of what you
have done in advance, which I have no problem with. I think there should be
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complete disclosure around that. Where it gets tricky is when you have a very
large group and you may have been involved for a very long period of time
working through all of the various scenarios. There is a grey area in my view
about whether the independence guideline around IA language is sufficiently
broad to encompass all of the things that you might be doing to try and work
through a restructuring of the business. I think there should be a debate and
clarity around those issues and a clear course of practice.” (Shannon)

Participants felt that for larger matters the existing independence framework failed to
address the requirement for the often-significant participation required in the lead-up to
formal appointment.

“I think the focus on independence is principally for the small matters where the
problems arise. And the ‘one size fits all’ approach to that is rather un-helpful
for the larger matters, because the wording doesn’t contemplate the expansive
role that you might very legitimately play trying to get to the place [where] you
are planning for an administration that leads to a restructuring. What is
unhelpful for everybody in the insolvency community, and stakeholders in the
wider sense, is this narrow challenge of independence that you need to loop
through for major and large restructurings. I think if we can do away with that,
then we would be in a much better place to work through using VA as the
primary restructuring tool.” (Evan)

241

When questioned about the concept of corporate rescue and the role played by
financiers in shaping that culture, participants felt that formal insolvency was no longer
the preferred option, and recognised a shift in the market, including increased distressed
debt trading at the very large end.

“I think that the banks who generally are owed a reasonable amount of capital
have a corporate-rescue culture by and large. Insolvency is not their solution to
the problem, and I think Australian banks have moved far closer to a corporaterescue culture than in the past. And I think the increasing prevalence of debt
trading has sort of moved the market. Because those guys who buy that debt
clearly come with that objective, so they come with a loan-to-own objective. So
the Australian banks’ willingness to accept a discount works…the fact that the
money is there to buy the debt works.” (Dale)

“I think the financier’s role in corporate-rescue culture has come a long way in
Australia in the last five years. Really, on stuff of size, insolvency has become
the last option, right? People are looking at, ‘Well, can I sell my debt?’
People are looking at, ‘Well, can we do a stand still, can we do a pay-if-youcan, can we re-tranche, can we do a forced term out? Okay, none of those.’ We
had an appointment recently on a big asset worth hundreds of millions of
dollars, where what ended up needing to happen for the appointment to occur
was when the director finally abandoned the company. So I think the culture is
emerging.” (Philip)

242

Participants also identified the challenge for the Australian market around the creditbidding concept prevalent in other markets such as the US, which has been an
influencing factor for the use of schemes by debt traders with a loan-to-own strategy.

“So we do run things a bit differently here. It is a bit like credit bidding in the
US. Credit bidding is normal, accepted practice for a distressed asset and its
secured lender to come in. We do not get that down here, and why don’t we get
that down here is because we do not have the culture of the bank [being able to]
buy the asset itself. Secured creditor comes in, tries to sell it to itself and it just
does not come off because culturally people can’t accept that. They want to see
somebody independent come in and sure, okay, ultimately it might get sold to the
secured creditor, but there’s a process…there is an independent person who is
not a puppet of the bank or the financier.” (Cameron)

Participants saw relevance for the use of the scheme of arrangement legislation to
restructure very large insolvent companies, primarily because the insolvent-trading
provisions were mitigated by greater access to liquidity, and thereby significantly
reduced likelihood of liquidation.

“My perspective on that [588 provisions] is that the deeper the secondary debt
market becomes and the more options for liquidity people have, the less likely
the company will ever end up in liquidation. And therefore commercially the
more comfortable all of the parties can be that trading-whilst-insolvent is no
longer a factor. If you are confident that a restructure will ultimately occur and
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there is a viable business to be saved and salvaged out of a restructure, then I
think it is less of an issue than if you are continuing to trade something with very
low prospects.” (Leslie)

Participants identified the potential for the transferability and expansion of this
secondary debt market, and for it to generate liquidity and creative value realisation in
the middle-market bilateral loan space, whilst acknowledging the distinct characteristics
that posed challenges for expansion into this market.

“So I think definitely liquidity in the syndicated loan market has materially
enhanced going-concern capacity of a number of stressed corporations. How
can you create loan liquidity in the bilateral space? Because I think that would
likely lead to the same outcome: very engaged people picking up bilateral loans
and being less constrained around what a bank should or shouldn’t do in a
certain culture or business environment, trying to maximise value. I think the
reasons banks find it more difficult to sell in a bilateral space has got to do with
bank relationship issues as opposed to anything to do with regulatory regimes.
Then there is the challenge of funds getting the visibility to put an offer on the
table…[that]becomes more difficult, I think to do that deal without finding some
process that validates the trade price. So you almost need a three-way
[cooperation] between the bank, [the] borrower and the acquirer, with the
borrower’s consent presumably.” (Dale)

This has facilitated the ability for traditional banks and financiers who would prefer to
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pursue a conventional exit the ability to “trade out” and pass the debt to specialist debt
traders.

“I think what’s helped [a rescue culture] happen a bit is the attraction of hedge
funds into the market and the secondary debt trading, and people running loanto-own strategies. I think that people have seen that there is liquidity, so people
who don’t have that culture, who just want out on a certain file, they can hit a
bid and get out. And the guy who is buying in does have the culture because he
has bought in deliberately to do it, and that’s helped a lot.” (Philip)

Schemes of Arrangements
Participants questioned the extent to which the scheme of arrangement legislation plays
a role in restructuring distressed companies, and viewed the re-emergence of this
process as more about pursuing the specific agenda of hedge funds or debt traders.

“The [scheme of arrangement legislation] seems to be mainly around trying to
force an issue at the end of the day, whether it be via a hedge fund’s loan-to-own
strategy or what have you.

The process takes a long time to get to that

restructure point, and it is a very expensive, drawn-out process, which I think
really only lends itself to an insolvency scenario where it is apparent pretty
early on that equity is under water and the lenders are calling the shots. But the
reason that they’re going back to that is because [of] the surgical ability that it
offers, debt-for-equity swaps and all those sorts of things.” (Lee)
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In that regard, the Part 5.1 scheme process was seen as having very little applicability to
a typical insolvent company trying to restructure. Instead, schemes of arrangement
provided a mechanism to facilitate back-door acquisitions and enable well-resourced
third parties to pursue their own objectives of achieving leveraged returns on discounted
distressed debt purchased on the secondary debt market.

“You need to have the patience and have the funds to execute a [scheme of
arrangement] strategy. It is an interesting combination of patience, being well
funded and having a pretty sophisticated tool kit, in terms of being able to
financially analyse the situation to make sure it is actually worth doing. You
need some pretty experienced advisors, too, because you are talking about
getting into some pretty technical areas where you want experience.” (Adrian)

“I think it’s driven a fair bit by the hedge funds and the distressed secondary
debt market trade. You’ve got people coming in buying up debt from lenders
with loan-to-own purposes, and they’ve got a far more flexible view of the
outcomes. They have got flexible capital; banks don’t usually want to end up
buying companies, which is not their desired outcome. Whereas hedge funds
come in with that exact purpose: it’s a back-door way of acquiring the company.
So one of the few ways you can do that is through a scheme of arrangement.”
(Philip)

Participants also identified that the extended time period required to successfully
complete a scheme was a further deterrent to the process being used as a traditional
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restructuring tool, given the time-criticality for most distressed companies.

“It is a pretty tough process. I mean if you want to do a debt-for-equity swap,
which is what a lot of the distressed debt investors are looking for, you have got
two schemes. Typically you are going to have the shareholders and creditors
schemes, and you’ve got the court process to run in parallel with that. In our
experience, getting to the point where stakeholders are on board with agreeing
[to] a structure to put a scheme in place takes a long time, and with the court
timetable the scheme itself takes many, many months. You have got to balance
that against the need to protect peoples’ interests and make sure they aren’t
unfairly prejudiced by those sorts of processes, but it does seem to be a slow,
expensive process. So it does rule that out as an option for 99% of distressed
transactions, I think." (Leslie)

Participants reported that the challenge to achieving a successful outcome under a
scheme of arrangement included the involvement and oversight of the court in the
restructuring process. Court involvement reportedly not only resulted in increased time
and cost, but also greater outcome uncertainty.

“We recently did a scheme of arrangement, a members and creditors scheme,
and that was a successful restructure. But it was very hard to get in place, very
expensive, and it’s a process which has got a lot of steps to it where you don’t
have much control of outcomes in getting court approvals. So maybe that is an
appropriate check and balance to what went on there: it was a debt-for-equity
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swap that was very successful for the hedge funds who bought into the debt
there, with the equity changing into the hands of the lenders.” (John)

One of the key benefits to this court involvement was reportedly the ability to bind
classes of non-complying members to the arrangement by court order.

“There are a couple of structural advantages that attach to schemes of
arrangement from a compliance-cost point of view. But it also becomes relevant
now because if you have got a large syndicate you can scheme a non-complying
member of the syndicate and a particular asset class, and you might have forty
stakeholders and you don’t want one to hold out as objecting to a particular
strategy…so a scheme can bring those guys to the table.” (Dale)

Additionally, the significant cost associated with bringing together a successful scheme
of arrangement restricted the applicability of the regime to only the largest distressed
companies.

“What struck me was that it was really only a viable option given the size of the
deal – a smaller deal would be very hard to effect that sort of restructure. Most
recently I worked on a big matter, $800 million worth of debt, senior and
mezzanine, and that justified the process and expense. But I think that for a
smaller work-out it would not be a very viable option. It was a few million in
legal fees alone. So I think it’s top-end stuff. Because it’s not cheap to do a
scheme and it’s a big process for sure.” (John)
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Participants noted, however, that as more people became experienced and familiar with
the scheme process and precedents begin to emerge, there was potential for this
framework to have some further applicability to the medium to large market segment.

“There is talk that [schemes of arrangement] are going to migrate further down
the market. So maybe they will start to look at trading those exposures, and we
will see the hedge funds come in and get creative with those…because the last
few we have done have been breaking new ground, certainly in our experience. I
mean these things have happened, but not many people have seen them. I think
that as more people get familiar with the concepts and how you go about it and
the outcomes you can get, you might see the process get much more efficiently
executed in terms of people going, ‘Okay, we know how to achieve this,’ getting
everyone on board to support that outcome and execute to become a bit more
efficient. Then maybe it will lend itself further down the market.” (Dale)

This section has discussed the re-emergence of schemes of arrangement related to hedge
funds and distressed-debt traders participating in the secondary debt market, seeking to
use the tool to pursue specific objectives, particularly a loan-to-own strategy.
Participants reported that schemes of arrangement had very limited application to
rehabilitating traditional insolvent companies, with relevance limited to very large
companies due to the duration, cost and uncertainty of the process resulting from
significant court involvement. The findings noted however, that the applicability of
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schemes had the potential to increase as people became more familiar and experienced
with the process, in turn lowering the costs and improving certainty.

CONCLUSION
This chapter presented findings surrounding perceived legislative and practical barriers
to restructure, which included themes such as ipso facto clauses and the underlying
viability of a business, and identified the impact in practice and, where appropriate,
alternatives to address such barriers within the insolvency framework. It then examined
the cultural considerations surrounding the operation of the Part 5.3A framework,
including a focus on accountability and blame, the role of industrial relations policy and
identified initiatives for a transition towards a corporate-rescue culture. The next chapter
will discuss the meaning and relevance of these findings for the practice and policies of
corporate restructuring in Australia.
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CHAPTER 6: Discussion
INTRODUCTION
The present research sought to identify the perspectives of insolvency experts on the
ways Australian companies are currently being rehabilitated, with a focus on the Part
5.3A voluntary-administration legislation. The specific research questions were:1) How do insolvency practitioners in Australia perceive the Part 5.3A legislation,
and what are their views on its effectiveness?
2) What factors account for the relative decrease in voluntary-administration as a
means of handling insolvent companies?
3) What are the barriers in practice to the effective rehabilitation of insolvent
Australian companies as a matter of course?
4) How can we improve the mechanisms and effectiveness for insolvent companies
to be restored to financial health, and what value might this have for a
reconsideration of the Australian framework?

These research questions were answered using a qualitative methodology that
thematically analysed the data from semi-structured interviews. Such a methodological
approach allowed for the capturing of rich contextual information from experts in the
field. Further, participants came from varied perspectives on the topic, including
voluntary-administration, liquidation, receivership, bankruptcy, advisory and the
practice of insolvency and bankruptcy law.
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The extent to which a company can be successfully restructured has important
implications for the economy, and the findings have shed light on potential ways in
which the health of the Australian economy could be better guarded through insolvency
practice. The present research has shown that there are a number of important ways in
which the current insolvency framework affects the restructuring of Australian
companies.

This chapter will discuss the legislative objectives and operation of the Part 5.3A
legislation, outline what happens when a company gets into trouble, review the
legislative and practical barriers to restructuring and identify the impact of cultural
considerations on the Australian insolvency framework. The chapter will then consider
the findings surrounding a transition to a corporate-rescue culture and the research
recommendations to facilitate structural and legislative improvements to the existing
framework for improved insolvency and corporate-rehabilitation outcomes.

OPERATION OF THE PART 5.3A FRAMEWORK
To gain an understanding of the effectiveness of the Part 5.3A legislation, one must first
examine the key objectives that underpin the framework. The objectives are to
rehabilitate the company, or as much of the business as possible, followed by a better
return to creditors. Findings from the present research questioned the primary objective
of the Part 5.3A legislation to pursue the rehabilitation of the corporate entity itself, and
in particular the appropriateness of equity recapitalising primarily by way of
compromise of creditor claims. This was argued as being inconsistent with the hierarchy
of risks and rewards borne by stakeholders in the economy, particularly for the
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rehabilitation of an insolvent company, which, by definition, often no longer possessed
equity value. In practice, however, and consistent with Anderson (2001), the present
findings concluded that because of the role of creditor participation in determining the
administration outcome, this ensured an overriding focus on achieving the best likely
creditor returns. This practice was the subject of criticism outlined in the literature (e.g.,
Broude, 2003), where concerns were highlighted that this default position failed to
prioritise the objective to rehabilitate the insolvent company itself under such creditordriven process, without due regard for other stakeholders. The present research adds to
this, with acknowledgement that such creditor focus was often short-term, with a
preference for conversion to cash, rather than for flexibility to pursue longer-term
realisations to maximise the quantum of return, such as an extended deed of company
arrangement or a converted equity interest. This, in turn, relegates the likelihood of the
company itself being rehabilitated, and with it, the resultant total economic loss for
equity holders, who range from small-business owners through to institutional investors
on behalf of “mum and dad” investors and self-funded retirees.

Significantly, however, participants also reported a transition to growing commerciality
in creditor behaviour, proactivity and appetite for alternative restructure proposals in the
Australian market. This shift was driven by increasing recognition of the potential for
ongoing relationships and trade, greater understanding of the insolvency process and
outcomes and sympathy for the debtor’s predicament. The implications for this shift in
creditor behaviour, however, did not extend to the recognition of the value of broader
community and knowledge/innovation considerations, which Merrett (2003) advocated
should not be underestimated.
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The research findings support empirical evidence that a very low number of companies
successfully rehabilitate and emerge from the voluntary-administration process
(Routledge, 1998), with anecdotal evidence from participants suggesting this rate could
be as low as 5%. However, the findings also suggested that these statistics did not
support criticism of the framework’s effectiveness; instead, they supported a broader
definition of rehabilitation that incorporated the survival of the underlying business
together with improved creditor returns. Such a definition was postulated to reflect an
improved statistical success rate. Participants flagged a misguided public perception of
the relevance of the final fate of the corporate shell to the achievement of these
outcomes, and raised concerns surrounding the failure to recognise the benefits achieved
through the voluntary-administration process. Where companies entering voluntaryadministration were unsuccessful in achieving improved stakeholder outcomes,
participants agreed that there was a need for improved filtering of companies entering
into external administration. Similar to Bickerdyke and Ors (2000), the present research
highlighted the need for effective screening and appointment advice in selecting the
appropriate insolvency procedure from the outset. This was regarded as important for
not only the efficient use of the Part 5.3A process, but also management of the costs of
insolvency.

Despite the insolvency statistics in Australia over the past decade indicating a doubling
of companies entering into some form of formal appointment (ASIC, 2014), a review of
official statistics revealed a significant decrease in the relative popularity of the
voluntary-administration process (ASIC, 2014). The present findings identified that a
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distortive impact on the statistical decline in the popularity of Part 5.3A was legislative
efforts to address historical levels of unmeritorious use of the process as a default or
gateway appointment, facilitated by its relative simplicity of commencement (Anderson,
2001). The findings indicate that this issue was substantially addressed by the 2007
amendments improving the ease with which insolvent companies without prospect of
rehabilitation could directly pursue the creditors’ voluntary-liquidation process; this is
consistent with the subsequent decline in the popularity of voluntary-administration in
the ASIC statistics. The present findings also tell us that in particular, the effective
appointment selection between voluntary-administration and creditors’ voluntary
liquidation is essential for smaller companies, where most failures occur and volume is
highest. Participants felt this was critical for the efficient operation of the Australian
insolvency framework, due to these businesses’ minimal assets and likelihood of
sustaining a successful restructure, and thereby facilitating further improvement in the
success rate. Participants attributed a significant proportion of the growth in insolvency
statistics since the turn of the century to the increasing prevalence of small personalservice and phoenix-type companies. This, in turn, had implications for understanding
the declining rates in the use of the voluntary-administration process relative to such
growth in corporate-insolvency volume. In addition to this structural shift in legislation,
participants also flagged a perception of voluntary-administration as a terminal process
tainted by the potential of damage to reputation and media negativity, as previously
discussed by Hale (1999).
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CORPORATE DISTRESS AND THE REHABILITATION PROCESS
This section will discuss the importance of formal appointment timing for a company
approaching insolvency, the valuable role of greater outcome planning to pursue
improved outcomes and consider the implications surrounding informal restructuring.
The present findings were consistent with Milman et al. (2004), which highlighted the
role of appointment timing and preparation as determinants to the likelihood of success
for companies entering into voluntary-administration. These were shown to be key
drivers of the low success rate of companies rehabilitating. This was attributed to the
ongoing erosion of equity and depletion of previously available external capital, which,
if injected in conjunction with a well thought out restructure plan, was found to
materially increase the likelihood of success. Similar to Frisby (2004), the present
research identified that timely appointment of an external administrator could ensure
that the underlying company had not reached the point of distress where it was unable to
endure the strains of formal restructure, both from an operational viewpoint and a stage
of diminished stakeholder support. The findings identified that for earlier appointment
to occur, there needed to be a change in company director’s perception that voluntaryadministration was a terminal process with a highly uncertain upside, particularly for
shareholders of the company. This finding was part of a broader one outlined later in
this chapter that highlighted the imperative need for improved director education,
including surrounding the insolvency and restructuring process.

The role of planning and a pre-defined strategy to rehabilitate the company prior to the
appointment of an administrator - with the availability of fresh capital and support of
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the company’s banker - were identified as key in mitigating uncertainty and the
likelihood of a negative outcome. This planning had implications for the development
of concepts such as the pre-packaging of deeds of company arrangement or asset sale
plans. These implications primarily related to meeting the tight statutory timelines the
process required. Participants recognised in principle the potential for greater
appointment preparation and pre-pack type arrangements as a tool to preserve the
underlying business and assets, minimising the value destruction associated with a
prolonged formal administration process. This concept under a deed of company
arrangement format was also recognised as having the ability to preserve value for
existing shareholders by providing an improved likelihood of meeting the tight statutory
timeframes and realising stakeholder support. Similar to Walton and Wellard (2012),
the findings identified the potential for improved preservation of such business and
asset value, either through a related party pre-pack or a third-party sale, with
corresponding improved outcomes for all stakeholders.

However, findings suggest that pre-pack restructurings in Australia were not prevalent
in practice, and whilst acknowledging that they were possible, and potentially provided
timely outcomes to corporate restructuring (as suggested by Lloyd, O’Brien and
Robertson, 2009), they had not received acceptance in the Australian market. This lack
of acceptance was largely attributed to an inherent conflict of pre-pack arrangements
with the underlying Australian procedural principles of independence and objectivity of
the administrator. The findings were clear that given these issues of administrator
independence and objectivity, market-value realisation and cultural expectations, there
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were significant challenges to replicating the success of the UK model of pre-packs in
an Australian context without a clear legislative mandate.

Whilst the timing of a distressed company seeking formal external assistance was a
determinant of successful restructuring (Milman, 2004), timing also had implications
for the operation and effectiveness of the company’s informal restructuring. This was
particularly relevant given the reported increase in trends towards more informal
mechanisms in Australia to facilitate restructure and work through liquidity issues,
outside the spotlight of external administration. Whilst the basic premise of voluntaryadministration focus on addressing the looming prospect of insolvency, findings
indicated that Australian companies viewed the process with fear, in contrast to
jurisdictions such as the US where entering Chapter 11 was the first step to
accomplishing a rehabilitation. Participants identified the benefits of timely and wellstructured reorganisation as a valuable tool to minimise enterprise-value destruction,
consistent with the findings of Hahn (2004). The present research further highlighted
that distressed companies that pursued informal rehabilitation also had the potential to
benefit from greater creativity and flexibility and lower costs. The value of such an
informal work-out for a distressed company was particularly evident where they held
significant intangible assets or were exposed to contracts containing ipso facto clauses,
or where customers were sensitive to counterparty risk. However, findings relating to
this preference for informal restructuring also brought with it the challenge of focusing
stakeholders on the risk of insolvency and failure to recognise the need to transition to
external administration where required, due to directors’ underlying reluctance to cede
control. Findings suggest this increases risk and incites value destruction, which
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informal rehabilitation seeks to avoid, with the additional potential consequences of
freefall unplanned insolvency.

INSOLVENT TRADING PROVISIONS AND RESTRUCTURE
Despite the extensive criticism of the s 588G insolvent trading provisions in the
literature, and complexity surrounding the conflict of interest in directors avoiding
personal liability versus their duty to the company and stakeholders (D’Angelo, 2006),
the findings were generally supportive of the provisions operation and policy objectives.
There was majority consensus that whilst the deterrence presented by insolvent-trading
provisions did potentially create a misalignment between directors and the interests of
company shareholders - particularly for public companies - this was seen as an
appropriate balance for the protection of broader stakeholders. Significantly, findings
did not support assertions that the legislation caused directors to become unduly adverse
to risk (James, Ramsay and Siva, 2004), with the framing of improved legal advice to
directors on their insolvent-trading obligations providing assistance in this regard. The
findings also reported that the balance in practice between the provision’s deterrent
effect, as contrasted with the level of prosecutions for insolvent trading, provided an
appropriate context to ensure that directors exercised the requisite level of professional
judgement, proactivity and responsibility. There was recognition that the policy value of
the insolvent-trading objectives were worth pursuing in relation to directors’ propriety,
conduct and obligations under the Corporations Act and at common law. However,
participants acknowledged the need to improve the operation of the s 588G legislation
to accommodate the trend towards informal rehabilitation.
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As suggested by Robinson (2009), this was particularly the case where bona fide
restructuring was being pursued. Participants identified the potential for a greater role
for a company’s directors, who were often well placed to exercise their skill and
commercial acumen to facilitate a successful corporate restructure. This in turn had
implications for improved informal corporate rehabilitation mechanisms to address the
risk of insolvent-trading liability and encourage competent directors to remain engaged
in the process and contribute to the solution. The present findings suggest that
legislators had missed an opportunity (Safe Harbour, 2010) to evolve legislation that
would have addressed these insolvent-trading issues, including the two proposed
alternatives of a business-judgement rule or a moratorium on insolvent trading. In
conjunction with such changes for greater flexibility, the findings advocated for greater
impetus for directors of distressed companies to seek and consider professional
assistance in pursuit of an informal restructure. With the emergence of turnaround
specialists there has come a need for greater protection of such advisors from exposure
to prosecution for insolvent trading as a shadow director in a work-out process
(Routledge & McNamara, 2005), which the current research supports. One potential
solution advocated in the findings was the introduction of a chief restructuring officer,
to ensure company directors maintained a responsible level of risk engagement and
conduct whilst maintaining flexibility in the informal work-out framework.

The establishment of a chief restructuring officer in an informal rehabilitation as
discussed in the literature by Sloan (2008b), was supported in the findings as a third
option to mitigating the issues and risks surrounding insolvent trading. In the context of
this research, only the chief restructuring officer role would have insolvent-trading
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immunity, with the expectation that such an appointment would help company directors
proactively monitor the ongoing issue of insolvency and focus resources on the
rehabilitation process itself. Whilst such engagement would not provide direct safeharbour protection for directors during a work-out, the present research suggested that
this legislative change would provide additional protection in conjunction with the
existing defences and statutory mechanisms to excuse a director from insolvent-trading
liability. Participants emphasised, however, the importance of such a mandate for a
chief restructuring officer including the requirement of a demonstrated nexus between
the advice provided by the chief restructuring officer and the board’s actions. This
would ensure that the chief restructuring officer would be able to exercise their
expertise, knowledge and commercial judgement to provide leadership and guide the
rehabilitation of the distressed company at the board level whilst monitoring the
ongoing insolvency position. The findings suggested that this would strike the right
balance between the benefits of informal rehabilitation, with the need for control and
oversight to ensure the interests of all stakeholders were protected. However, the
findings indicated the need for caution surrounding the chief restructuring officer role,
given this shield from insolvent trading, suggesting that the chief restructuring officer
should be licensed and under strict supervision of the regulators. Whilst acknowledging
the potential for self-interest, participants felt that registered or official liquidators
would be best placed to undertake this role; they noted, however, that such an
appointment would subsequently conflict out that practitioner from being appointed as a
voluntary-administrator.

261

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND RESTRUCTURING
This section will discuss the key barriers that the Part 5.3A legislation was shown to
exercise over the effective rehabilitation of insolvent Australian companies. These
barriers included the issue of moratorium protection from ipso facto clauses, the impact
of administrator trading-liability provisions, Part 5.3A framework scalability for
company size and the legislative potential for administrators to seek greater court
direction and guidance.

Ipso Facto Clauses
The present findings reinforced the need for greater protection around ipso facto clauses
and the catastrophic results from voiding of contracts (Parbery, 2008), with unanimous
consensus on this issue being one of the most fundamental and urgent barriers under the
voluntary-administration framework requiring attention. Participants identified the
absence of such protections as a key inconsistency with restructuring legislation
overseas, including in the US and UK, and the lack of attention by legislators was stated
as a key source of frustration for practitioners. The findings reported that the exercise of
ipso facto clauses was a key deterrent for distressed companies using the voluntaryadministration process, particularly where key contracts would be jeopardised. Such
value destruction was identified as counterintuitive to the objectives of the Part 5.3A
legislation, which participants advocated could be addressed by extending moratorium
protection to the enforcement of ipso facto clauses. The findings indicated that the
extension of the moratorium to ipso facto clauses would not unreasonably interfere with
the rights of contracted counterparties. Whilst rights to terminate would be suspended
during such a period, the requirement for ongoing contractual obligations and payments
to be met as specified under the contract would remain. The findings recognised the

262

need for balancing such policy considerations with the question of whether contracting
parties should be required to honour contracts with insolvent companies seeking
external administration. In that regard, ipso facto clauses were viewed as a sub-set of
landlord or leasehold interests, which were subject to a temporary suspension of rights
under a moratorium, rather than a reconstruction of the contractual relationship itself.

This approach had implications for an inability to compel counterparties to maintain
ongoing contractual relationships post-moratorium, when the right to terminate would
resume; thus remaining consistent with the greater policy consideration of ensuring
freedom of contract between parties. This approach was found to provide the right
balance between the need to protect the interests of stakeholders in an insolvent
company, and a recognition of the long-held policy position that “the courts have not
sought a power to destroy the rights and obligations which the parties to a contract
create” (Stern v McArthur (1988) 165 CLR 489, Brennan J at 514). The findings
suggested that this extension of the voluntary-administration moratorium would
increase companies’ use of the process, due to the attractiveness of broader statutory
protections compared to an informal restructure.

Administrator Trading Risk Exposure
Another issue identified in the findings related to administrator trading risk exposure as
a barrier to effective restructure under Part 5.3A, with the research supporting existing
literature that the threat of personal liability did create an inherent conservative bias in
the decision-making and restructuring process (Frisby, 2004). Significantly, findings
suggested that this higher burden played a critical role under the legislation to achieve
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conservative judgement, which helped the insolvency framework to work equitably and
consistent with the need for safeguards advocated by Fridman (2003). The present
research found that the administrator trading risk exposure led to practitioners focusing
on improved creative thinking to achieve trading and operational outcomes. Facilitating
such creative thinking to successfully achieve ongoing trading was identified as pivotal
to promoting restructuring outcomes whilst minimising the risk of ongoing creditor
value destruction.

The findings, however, identified specific challenges around planning and the issue of
administrator conflict and independence leading up to appointment. These challenges
were a key inhibitor of efficient post-appointment trading and restructure. Particularly
for more complex restructures, this was highlighted as exposing practitioners to
unnecessary trading-exposure risk, and resulted in the need for significant day-to-day
focus on monitoring the company’s cashflow and trading operational position. Such
oversight had the impact of often requiring significant administrator staffing. This was
contrasted to the execution of a well-planned restructure, which had the potential to
include the implementation of controls and structures that could delegate these
operating activities to existing management and significantly enhance an administrator’s
ability to focus on implementing the company’s restructure plan and undertake the
strategic role of the executive. Consistent with research outlined by Poulos and McCunn
(2011), the findings suggested that it was in this area of pre-appointment planning that
most efficiency gains could be achieved. This was highlighted as preferable to
alternatives such as the reduction of trading-risk exposure, which participants felt
provided an important incentive for administrators to balance both sides of the ledger.
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Senior-Lender Enforcement
Previous literature has suggested that the absence of a moratorium or protection under
the legislation surrounding senior-lender enforcement was a barrier to restructuring
(Merrett, 2003). The present research, however, did not support the need for such a
moratorium.

Participants reported that there had been improvements in the

relationships and integration between bankers and insolvency practitioners, with an
improved underlying focus on restructuring companies as a going concern. This had
formed the basis for a cultural shift whereby senior lenders recognised value and
demonstrated greater awareness of the need to work constructively with distressed
companies with a view to restructure. These findings were also in contrast to research
undertaken by Fridman (2003), which flagged the barrier of senior lenders enforcing
security precipitously to frustrate rehabilitation. Where directors sought formal
mechanisms to restructure, such as voluntary-administration, the likelihood of secured
creditors seeking the appointment of receivers to protect their own interests was
increasingly seen as unusual. This approach was particularly apparent where senior
creditors felt their security rights were well protected and would not be prejudiced by
pursuing restructure outcomes under VA. Subject to emphasising the need for strong
communication and transparency with the senior lenders throughout the restructuring
process, participants recognised a growing emphasis on brand protection of senior
lenders in the market as a contributing rationale for this trend.

The findings did not support the adoption in Australia of measures in other overseas
jurisdictions for a moratorium on senior-creditor enforcement, to replace the current
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ability to enforce their charge within an extendable “decision period” of 10 days from
the administrator’s appointment. Instead, the research suggested that such restrictions
on senior-lender rights had the potential to inhibit the Australian rehabilitation
framework by encouraging banks to formally appoint earlier upon identifying distress.
An explanation for the extent of this conflict between the literature and the present
findings includes the potential for practitioner bias against legislating to constrain
secured creditor rights raised by Davies (2002), given the reality that insolvency
practitioners often depend on banks for repeat insolvency work. Participants also
identified the ongoing importance for a company pursuing restructure of gaining the
support and cooperation of their secured lenders to achieve a successful and sustainable
outcome. Without such senior-lender support, and even with moratorium protection to
prevent enforcement, the findings concluded that a company with an unsupportive
senior lender would likely fail through the rehabilitation process, particularly once the
moratorium came to an end. This was consistent with the findings of Day and Taylor
(2001), who acknowledged that the need for ongoing funding by senior lenders postrestructure resulted in their considerable influence in ensuring this transition occurred
under acceptable terms.

One fundamental shift in senior-lender behaviour outlined in the findings related to the
newfound willingness of traditional lenders to sell down distressed debt into the
secondary debt market, often at below par. The emergence of this secondary debt
market - primarily consisting of hedge funds and alternative debt traders - provided an
alternative exit scenario for these mainstream lenders and has seen a transition in how
distress is handled and the form restructure takes. This willingness for mainstream
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banks to accept a compromise that better reflects mark-to-market value has brought into
play the differing perspectives and objectives of these secondary debt traders.
Participants observed that often such debt traders had brought to the table more flexible
views of rehabilitation outcomes, ranging from the pursuit of loan-to-own strategies to
innovative debt restructures or other forms of impairment mitigation. The emergence of
this secondary debt market was also identified as the catalyst for the re-emergence of
the largely redundant scheme of arrangement provisions. However, the pursuit of
alternative and non-conventional restructuring, including the pursuit of debt-for-equity
swaps and potential for creditor class cram-down using the scheme of arrangement
framework, have largely been restricted to very large companies due to the prohibitive
costs of this court-driven process. The findings also identified broader implications of
this secondary debt trading for a reconsideration of the role played by senior lenders
operating in the mid-to-large company segment. In that regard, the findings outlined
scope for the potential of this secondary debt market to provide grounds for a
reconsideration for mid-market companies in distress, particularly as greater pricing
transparency developed and the significant court costs relating to scheme of
arrangements fell.

Framework Scalability and Company Size
The findings showed that in practice, the Part 5.3A legislation provided a scalable
framework for the restructure of Australian companies across a broad spectrum, with
further flexibility in the process achievable by application to the courts. Participants
identified that the “sweet spot” in the Part 5.3A process was in the small to medium-
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sized company segment, rather than the accommodation of larger-scale restructurings,
where the research concurred with challenges identified elsewhere (Anderson, 2008).
Whilst not representing the greatest number of restructures, the large corporate segment
was identified as of critical importance due to the impact of the failure of large
companies upon the economy. It became apparent from the findings that practitioners in
this larger segment found the prescriptive timeframes under Part 5.3A unrealistic, with
the resultant ongoing need to seek court approval costly and distracting to the
restructuring process. Participants stated that for these very large companies, with
anecdotal reference to debt restructures exceeding $100 million, practitioners
experienced a transition from the operation of the Part 5.3A process as a dynamic
restructuring tool to a blunt and cumbersome one. To facilitate a rescue culture, it may
then be best to place primacy on achieving rehabilitation and relegate the timing of
investigation and accountability to a secondary position.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, in the case of very small distressed companies, the
findings reported that the already-challenging need to recapitalise their balance sheet
and restructure was further complicated by costs disproportionate to their size, which
made the VA process prohibitive. At this very small end, the findings queried the scope
of work required under Part 5.3A and the extent of value really added by such
procedures. Instead, the findings advocated a reconsideration of the “one size fits all”
approach under Part 5.3A. Participants made two alternative recommendations to
address the issue of company size in the framework: consideration of a split-process
framework, or refinements to the existing Part 5.3A framework to reflect a focus on
medium-sized to larger companies, with additional guidance on scope-of-work
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requirements for very small companies. Findings suggest the economic significance of
an effective framework for the larger corporate segment, emphasising that a realignment
of focus under Part 5.3A to accommodate complexity and scale was considered critical.
Given this hierarchy of needs, participants expressed preference for refinements to the
Part 5.3A framework to better align with the requirements of larger-scale restructurings,
whilst achieving ongoing relevance to small-company restructurings by including scaleback guidance in policy objectives.

Court Direction and Guidance
It has been established that an effective feature of the design and operation of the Part
5.3A framework has been its ability to minimise the need for court involvement and
direction as a matter of course (Collins, 2004). This study’s participants agreed that the
current Part 5.3A design was effective in streamlining the cost and efficiency of the
procedure in practice. However, the present findings identified wide-ranging scope for
invoking the court’s supervisory role during the procedure to overcome barriers to
restructuring in need. Through existing legislative provisions, the research supported the
interpreted scope under s 447A as providing the courts with a valuable tool to facilitate
flexibility, thereby enabling administrators to seek court direction to facilitate bespoke
restructure outcomes (Barrett, 2003). Whilst there was recognition that court
engagement in some areas of the Part 5.3A process had been forthcoming, including
moratorium periods and other timeframe/reporting extensions, the findings suggested
greater scope for administrators to use these existing provisions to address broader
restructuring barriers. Additionally, the present findings also suggested that provisions
such as s 1317S of the Corporations Act, relating to the provision of relief from director
liability for contravening civil-penalty provisions, provided proactive opportunities to
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seek court direction on the applicability of insolvent-trading liability during an informal
work-out. In particular, findings suggest that under s 1317S(4) an avenue exists for
advisors to seek court relief for prospective immunity on the basis of a well-structured
and feasible recovery plan, to address shadow director provisions outside the formal
insolvency framework.

The findings identified further untested potential for greater judicial interaction and
direction on more complicated or creative restructures, which would avoid
administrators taking a default conservative position in discharging their delegated
decision-making responsibilities. Inhibiting this potential for greater judicial
involvement, however, was the established reluctance of the Australian judiciary to
make decisions for administrators, particularly where commercial judgement was
involved (Swain, 2003). Participants viewed this shortcoming as more structural than
legislative, and flagged the potential for a specialist court to provide greater judicial
support in facilitating improved non-conventional restructure outcomes. This would
represent an important tool for administrators to not only challenge the status quo on
restructure outcomes, but also provide the ability to pursue broader social
considerations

such

as

ongoing

employment,

community sustainability

and

environmental consideration. Findings thereby suggested the potential for improved
restructure flexibility through taking advantage of existing legislative provisions for the
exercise of judicial discretion, rather than the need for a wholesale transition to a US
Chapter 11-style framework.
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UNDERLYING BUSINESS VIABILITY
This section will discuss the determinants and criticality of underlying business viability
for successful restructuring and outline the importance of accurately identifying such
viability for the effective operation of a rehabilitation framework. It will then consider
the impact of issues such as quality of directors, poor books and records and reporting
systems and the priority and quantum of employee entitlements, on a viable businesses’
ability to restructure.

It is firmly established that an effective insolvency framework and operation of the Part
5.3A framework needs an underlying viable business (White, 1994), which the current
research supports. Participants pointed out that the assessment and identification of a
viable business was critical early in the VA process to safeguard the prospects of
salvation and as an early predictor of success. They reported that this assessment needed
to include both the underlying financial and operating positions and, in particular, the
sustainability of cash flow. For rehabilitation to be successful using the existing
corporate structure, the presence of a viable business was also required to overcome the
hurdle of securing balance-sheet recapitalisation. The findings showed that the
effectiveness of the Part 5.3A framework outside a “sale of business” outcome was
primarily contingent on recapitalisation through the injection of equity, creditor-claim
compromise, delayed realisation of creditor claims or a combination of these. Again, the
absence of ipso facto clause protection within the framework appeared as a key issue, as
identified in the literature (Eyers, 2009). In conjunction with the potential catastrophic
value destruction these terminations can inflict on business viability, the findings
highlighted the equally significant challenges posed by the total absence of long-term
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counterparty contracts, representing an inherent weakness of the business. The findings
highlighted the minimal underlying value associated with businesses underpinned by
such contractual arrangements from inception, which render them unlikely to benefit
from any restructuring framework. It is thus essential to consider the viability of a
business at the outset, before pursuing any rehabilitation process.

The findings identified that key characteristics of a business likely to sustain
rehabilitation under Part 5.3A included clear market position and significance, strong
management and relevance to its customers. Anecdotal evidence from the findings
suggested that these characteristics were present in 20-25% of businesses entering into
the framework, providing the potential to survive the strains of insolvency. Even where
there was no potential for a corporate entity to be salvaged, the identification of a viable
business (or segments of a business) provided an opportunity under VA to run a sale
process for the business as a whole or in part, to maximise creditors’ realisations. The
findings also highlighted the recent trend for very large distressed companies with
strong viable businesses undermined by structural factors, such as overly high gearing
levels, to engage the scheme of arrangement legislation to rehabilitate and avoid formal
insolvency. However, this had limited application in the majority of rehabilitation
efforts to salvage distressed businesses, given the onerously high costs and extended
timeframe requirements, making it a realistic option for only the very largest Australian
companies.

The findings confirmed that the quality of directors is a key determinant of early
intervention and the commencement of an action plan to address distress and
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insolvency, as outlined by Finch (2002). This was identified in the current study as
being related to a number of factors, including poor reporting and information,
excessive reliance on management and inadequate understanding of the company’s
financial position, particularly relating to cash flow. Directors’ conduct towards
stakeholders was also flagged as an important determinant of the likelihood of a
successful restructure. This included issues of honesty, proactive communication and
the ongoing maintenance of trust with stakeholders, which the present research found
was critical in securing support, particularly for marginal restructuring proposals.
Significantly, the findings observed that most directors of insolvent companies did not
seek to engage in deception or misleading conduct in their dealings with shareholders.
Instead, failure for timely rehabilitation mainly resulted from the inability of directors to
identify and acknowledge the extent and immediacy of distress. Particularly in smaller
companies, the quality of director skill sets and awareness of their duties was
experienced as inadequate, and this was often further compounded by an inability to
separately deal with corporate and personal interests. To address this issue, higher
thresholds and education levels for company directors were advocated, to improve
awareness of these responsibilities and the financial consequences of their actions.

It became apparent from the present findings that poor books and records and reporting
systems was far more widespread than suggested in the literature (e.g., Fernandez,
2002), representing a further systemic barrier to restructure. Practitioners reported that
the records of insolvent companies were consistently incomplete and unreliable. The
findings also reported that these barriers were not limited to smaller private companies,
but transcended size, and were also evident in listed companies. These weaknesses in
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reporting systems and poor record-keeping formed key barriers to the timely
identification of distress and companies’ ability to address insolvency and restructure.
Poor financial reporting was also identified as responsible for critical decision-making
on “gut instinct” by management and directors and a failure to genuinely understand the
viability of business segments and overall financial performance. Participants
highlighted the need to rethink the value of timely information and reporting to facilitate
an understanding of business drivers and assess performance against KPIs and improved
forecasting and budgets. Once a distressed company has undergone formal appointment,
poor books and records and reporting systems significantly affected practitioners’
ability to assess business viability in a timely manner. This was reported as a real threat
to the likelihood of rehabilitation, not only with regard to the issues of ongoing trade,
but also an administrator’s ability to recommend a DOCA or execute a sale of business,
as outlined by Routledge and Gadenne (2000). The findings also raised the need for
greater auditor accountability and proactivity, with ongoing shortcomings identified
around solvency and going concern in financial reporting and the quality of recordkeeping of audited Australian companies. Improved record-keeping and reporting
systems may therefore bring about not only an increased likelihood of insolvent
companies rehabilitating, but also reduce the likelihood of viable companies becoming
distressed in the first instance.

The findings on employee entitlements were consistent with the literature, with
consensus amongst participants that the quantum and inability to compromise this class
of creditors represented a key barrier to restructure (Sloan, 2008b). The findings
advocated for flexibility in the treatment of legacy employee entitlements, with
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viewpoints ranging from allowing cram-down of entitlements through to the ability to
compromise priority where external funding was being injected to facilitate restructure.
It became apparent, however, that participants felt that the ultimate decision to
compromise employee entitlements or priority should reside with employees
themselves. This provided these creditors with the opportunity to weigh up the benefits
of ongoing employment following a compromise of their claims, with the risk of a
rehabilitated company failing post-restructure. Significantly, the findings highlighted
the underlying incentive that the introduction of the GEERS program had inadvertently
created for the insolvent company to proceed to liquidation rather than restructure or
achieve transition of entitlements through a business sale. This was a function of the
crystallisation of employee entitlements and the guarantee of payments made under the
GEERS safety net (Whelan & Zwier, 2005). The findings noted that with the ongoing
creep in the quantum of employee entitlements, this creditor class now represented a
major component of a company’s liabilities. This had increasing implications for the
restructuring process, which were further compounded by the reportedly common
perception by employees that such employee entitlement funds had been
misappropriated. Instead, participants reported in a majority of cases, the reality was
that such funds were never available in the first instance. Furthermore, under a business
sale or rehabilitation process, the transfer of employee entitlements in full as required
under the existing legislation, simply represented the often untenable replication of this
burden post-restructure.
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CULTURAL
CONSIDERATIONS
RESTRUCTURE

FOR

CORPORATE

The present findings highlight the impact of culture on how the Part 5.3A legislation
operates to facilitate corporate restructure, a notion underestimated in the literature. The
findings contrasted this culture of corporate failure responsibility, accountability and
blame, in the Australian context to other foreign jurisdictions such as the US and UK,
which were perceived to have a more positive and constructive view of corporate workout (Crutchfield, 2003). Participants highlighted the role of culture in reinforcing the
stigma associated with formal restructuring in Australia, and the perception of failure
and the damage to brand and reputation associated with voluntary-administration. This
was found to extend not only to the insolvent company, but to directors and
management. Previous research has shown this reputational impact and damage
associated with corporate insolvency in Australia as facilitating an often self-fulfilling
path to corporate collapse (Hale, 1999). The present research adds to this and identifies
culture as a key driver underlying preferences to pursue restructure informally.
Participants reported that this negativity surrounding formal insolvency was also a key
factor behind the preference shift for senior lenders to exhaust all avenues of financial
accommodation and flexibility prior to enforcement, including the recent trend to sell
down high-profile distressed exposures in the secondary debt market. The findings
reported that the manner in which insolvency was reported by the media and how those
associated with insolvency were portrayed reflected the broader entrenched culture of
blame within Australian society.

Furthermore, participants considered that the policy focus on investigation and
accountability for corporate insolvency was responsible for the significant post-
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appointment pressure on practitioners, who were simultaneously trying to keep the
business alive. This focus on accountability under voluntary-administration made
prosecution of directors and funds recovery from insolvent trading and unfair
preferences more likely, which influenced whether liquidation or corporate rescue
should be pursued. This culture was also identified to have permeated the attitudes and
priorities of administrators, influenced by the focus of regulators on holding directors of
insolvent

companies

accountable

for

failure.

Participants

highlighted

the

counterproductive impact of this perception of voluntary-administration, the stigma of
failure and the broader enforcement focus, on directors pursuing a “business rescue”
culture and pursuing timely appointment under Part 5.3A. This was identified as
responsible for company directors perceiving VA as an “option of last resort” whereby
formal appointment often coincided with directors abandoning their proactive pursuit of
restructure. The present findings suggest that the ability of the VA legislation to operate
as an effective regulatory mechanism is thereby constrained by the country and cultural
framework (Hofstede et al., 2007), in conjunction with barriers created by legislative
capability. In that regard, whilst such policy framework had been influenced by
underlying cultural values in Australia, participants identified policy shift as a key
mechanism for achieving an improved restructuring framework.

The present findings also suggest the important role of culture and social considerations
in the issue of employee entitlements. Whilst acknowledging the negative impact of
employee entitlements on the likelihood of restructure for Australian companies,
participants clearly articulated the limited cultural appetite in Australia for change in
this area. There was consensus that employee entitlements were sacrosanct, and that any
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shift in policy that was inconsistent with this position would be politically untenable.
This is underpinned by the Australian industrial-relations framework, which from a
historical perspective has taken a fundamentally different approach to that in other
jurisdictions. The strength of the trade-union movement and the political ideology that
forms the foundation for the protection of this category of creditors suggest that a shift
to a US-style cram-down of employee entitlements is unacceptable from a social
viewpoint and highly unlikely to succeed. Where participants flagged concern and scope
for improvement surrounding employee-entitlement policy was in relation to the
application of initiatives under the GEERS program. Given that the findings highlighted
a perceived underlying preference for employees to retain ongoing employment,
participants identified an opportunity for improvements to the GEERS legislation to
provide greater scope for safety-net entitlement support under a restructure scenario
such as a DOCA. Findings highlight that the economic cost of expanding GEERS to
assist in covering entitlements under a DOCA restructure has the potential to offset the
economic and structural cost of unsustainable zombie companies re-emerging burdened
with significant legacy entitlements, in addition to yielding valuable social outcomes.
These potential social outcomes would go beyond ongoing employment to include
sustainability of the employer and restored confidence in the company’s viability from
the perspective of employees, unions and their families.

TRANSITION TO A CORPORATE-RESCUE CULTURE
This section will discuss the benefits of pursuing a corporate rescue culture and the
ways in which the findings suggest a corporate-rescue culture can be achieved. The
findings highlighted that the focus of the Part 5.3A legislation has evolved into a
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comparative exercise between executing a DOCA and liquidation, rather than
facilitating corporate rescue as a matter of course where appropriate. This position was
supported by the anecdotally low levels of successful DOCAs, and in particular fewer
outcomes that had achieved a meaningful percentage return to creditors. Furthermore,
participants reported that liquidation under the existing Australian legislation, rather
than the development of rescue alternatives to the rejected proposed plan, had become
the default position for creditors. There was support in the findings to address
limitations of the Part 5.3A framework raised by Anderson (2008) in seeking specific
alternatives for creditors to vote on a time extension to compile and consider a revised
rehabilitation plan. The findings also recognised the need for an effective corporaterescue framework for the Australian economy to perform throughout the economic
cycle and avoid the systemic burden of non-performing companies treading water
endlessly whilst experiencing distress. Such inefficient use of capital in the Australian
economy was recognised as inhibiting growth and productivity, given the existing
capital constraints. In that regard, findings identified the sustainability of corporate
restructure that was contingent on an appropriate capital restructure as the foundation to
any operational turnaround. Furthermore, the criticality of a culture of director
recognition for using the framework in a timely manner (Fridman, 2003), and a broader
responsibility to stakeholders to pursue opportunities for restructure was seen as a
further key ingredient. Achievement of the latter was seen as contingent on addressing
the negative perceptions, and revising prosecution-driven policies around accountability
for corporate failure and insolvent trading being the impetus for formal appointment
(Sloan, 2008b). Participants favoured a proactive approach to engaging directors and
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realising the commercial rationale behind applying the Part 5.3A voluntaryadministration framework for corporate rescue.

Findings did not support a wholesale transition towards a US Chapter 11-style
framework, despite acknowledgement in the literature that this framework was regarded
as an effective debtor-friendly restructuring tool (Lewis, 2001) particularly for large
companies. Whilst the present research recognised the value of elements of an
alternative DIP model, the benefits were outweighed by significant risks. Such risks
included ongoing losses and erosion of available assets in the hands of the debtor and
the burden of significant costs associated with the requisite advisor and court oversight.
In the Australian context, participants highlighted challenges in continuing supply
whilst freezing creditor accounts, with the debtor remaining in possession and the
existing management team in control. Instead, the findings advocated for the retention
and development of the PIP model which benefited from the suspension of director
control acting as a catalyst for an independent practitioner to objectively assess and
pursue the most appropriate outcome. It was beyond the scope of the present research to
consider the degree to which support for this model was unanimous outside of the
research sample. Given the range of operational, industry and board-level factors and
the associated resources required for administrators to get their minds across companies
in a very short period of time, merit was recognised for the improved utilisation of
management in situ. Particularly for larger, more complex companies, the findings
identified the potential for operational change, where appropriate and within a control
framework. This would more effectively use existing management and other innovative
mechanisms such as engaging third parties to run businesses under license to capture the
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potential benefits under a DIP model (Westbrook, 2004). This, in turn, was recognised
to have the potential to address a number of challenges associated with the PIP model,
and enable practitioners to focus on the strategic and cost-efficient restructure and
rehabilitation of the company.

The findings did not support assertions in the literature that practitioners’ approach to
insolvency, including the preservation of assets and creditor return maximisation
(Agardy, 2002) resulted in a default liquidation bias. Instead, the findings depict the VA
process as an effective mechanism for protecting an insolvent company with tools best
placed to execute a rescue outcome. Participants in this study identified the lack of
credibility around the VA process in part as reflecting perceived high practitioner costs,
poor communication of fee structure and unrealistic practitioner advice around
outcomes, often driven by industry competitiveness. This had increasingly seen the
commoditisation of the insolvency industry, compounded by directors’ attempts to
“shop the job” on price of voluntary-administration, rather than seeking to identify the
appropriate skill set and strategic approach required. The present findings identified that
whilst legislative changes in 2007 around the insolvency framework had facilitated a
sharp decline in unmeritorious use of VA, ongoing ease of access warranted further
review given the high economic cost to achieve greater efficiency in the insolvency
process. The findings also identified concerns in the trend to informal insolvency
following the failure of the recent Safe Harbour (2010) initiatives to gain traction and
facilitate ongoing improvement. The findings highlighted the role of the political
environment in determining the appetite for legislative change, given the criticality of
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improving efficiencies in the economy that are affected by the distress base of
Australian corporates.

Secondary Distressed Debt Market
An evolving trend highlighted in the present research was the development of the
secondary distressed debt market over the last few years for very large companies.
Concurrent with this was the reported re-emergence of the scheme of arrangement
provisions. The potential for scheme of arrangement legislation to facilitate restructures
such as debt-to-equity swaps has opened the door to a new class of investors, such as
hedge funds and distressed debt funds, to invest money into a distressed company.
Whilst this legislation was not specifically targeted at insolvent companies and does not
provide protection from the s 588G insolvent trading provisions, this exposure is often
mitigated by greater access to liquidity through the debt acquirer. The issues
surrounding shadow-director liability of third parties, including bankers (Brown, 2009),
were considered to have limited application in the findings, further assisted by the
strong likelihood of rehabilitation. Although at present this distressed-debt market
represents a tiny portion of distressed corporate debt, with a strong high-end focus on
companies with significant market positions hampered by over-leveraged balance
sheets, participants identified that the deepening of the secondary debt market could
offer improved opportunities for debt liquidity. The findings further raised implications
for the currently untested expansion of this secondary debt market to extend liquidity
into the mid-large size loan market segment. Together with a mindset change by banks,
which were often concerned about damaging the direct customer relationships in this
segment as opposed to the larger syndicated loans, participants noted prima facie
potential for three-way cooperation between borrower, bank and debt trader. The
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potential to achieve this outcome in the mid-market segment would provide the
opportunity for not only greater debt-trading liquidity to allow senior lenders to “trade
out” of their distressed debt position, but also the substitution of trading banks with
distressed-debt specialists actively focused on achieving a return on their investment
through restructure.

Whilst such secondary debt trading represented an innovative and ground-breaking
approach to facilitating the rescue of distressed companies in Australia, the findings
highlighted reservations about the extent to which the scheme of arrangement
provisions really represented a broader corporate rescue rehabilitation mechanism. The
strong preference for retention of control by distressed-debt traders - usually hedge
funds - has seen the restructuring process for these companies primarily occur through
such schemes or informally, rather than through the Part 5.3A process. In particular,
participants reported that debt traders looking to force an issue, such as a loan-to-own
strategy, had driven the re-emergence of the scheme of arrangement legislation because
of its surgical ability to achieve specific agenda outcomes like debt-to-equity swaps and
specific creditor-class cram-downs. Inevitably, and consistent with Harmer (1988),
participants recognised that the successful execution of a scheme of arrangement was a
tough process that occurred over a long time, and that this was inconsistent with the
time criticality for most insolvent companies. Furthermore, the significant court
involvement and associated prohibitive cost requirements and outcome uncertainty were
reported to rule out this option for most distressed companies.

283

STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A strength of this research was the qualitative approach that captured the perceptions
and experiences of insolvency practitioners to gain a first-hand practical insight into the
operating effectiveness of the Part 5.3A legislation in Australia. This understanding of
participants’ views is significant in that insolvency practitioners not only have the
responsibility and expertise to administer companies under the Part 5.3A framework,
but are also independent of key stakeholders, and can thus provide objective and
relevant feedback. However, they also have the potential for bias and self-interest
surrounding these responsibilities, which include the independent assessment and
judgement powers pivotal to the current legislation’s operation. As reported in Chapter
4, practitioners who agreed to participate expressed a strong interest in the research
topic, which raises the potential issue of skewed data as a result of a “reformist” bias in
the study population. The findings were also limited by the extent of participants’
working knowledge of frameworks in other jurisdictions. Qualitative research is
inherently limited in its generalizability, and this is a result of the ‘human’ data collector
as well as the inability to randomly sample in the present research. Lastly, my
background as a banker may have biased participants in their responses, as bankers
usually oversee the referral of distressed companies to insolvency firms.

Further research may do well to test some of the relevant assertions in this thesis using
deductive means, which was beyond the scope of the present study. Future research
should develop a greater statistical understanding of the insolvency framework,
including under Part 5.3A and the surrounding restructuring outcomes post-
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appointment. This statistical understanding would capture the quantum of companies
entering into and completing a DOCA or being placed into liquidation, and ideally
would extend to understanding the percentage of the pre-appointment business that
emerges from the insolvency process as a going concern, whether through company
restructure or business sale. Such a quantitative understanding of the insolvency
statistics, which to date have been the subject of limited empirical research and
anecdotal evidence, would provide an important perspective on corporate rescue as a
matter of course, and the need for the reform of the insolvency process.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings of this research have provided insight into useful ways in which corporate
restructuring in Australia can develop. This section will outline the key
recommendations to advance the Part 5.3A voluntary-administration legislation and the
broader insolvency framework in Australia. These changes are aimed at improving the
effectiveness of rehabilitation processes and the likelihood of distressed companies
rehabilitating successfully, focusing on eight key areas:

1) The realignment of the insolvency framework and Part 5.3A restructuring focus
in Australia towards prioritised rehabilitation and going-concern preservation,
by relegating the timing of regulatory-enforcement and accountability outcomes.
2) Legislative change to extend moratorium protection to the enforcement of ipso
facto clauses under the Part 5.3A framework;
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3) Reconsideration of the insolvent-trading framework and the abandoned Safe
Harbour initiatives to facilitate improved bona fide informal restructuring,
including the potential role of a chief restructuring officer;
4) Improved guidelines surrounding practitioner independence to facilitate greater
planning and pre-defined strategy development for rehabilitation prior to an
administrator’s appointment, particularly for larger, complex appointments;
5) Refinements to the Part 5.3A framework to better align with the restructure of
medium to large companies, including in relation to reporting timelines and
procedural obligations, supported by scope-of-work scale-back guidelines for
small companies;
6) Improved guidelines surrounding court direction to achieve complicated or
creative restructuring outcomes, including prospective immunity from insolventtrading liability in an informal work-out, and the ability to pursue broader social
stakeholder outcomes;
7) Reforms to the GEERS legislation to provide greater scope for safety-net
entitlement support to restructuring under the Part 5.3A framework; and
8) Improved director-education requirements, including (as a minimum) the
completion of a directors course focused on ensuring awareness of directors
responsibilities, fiduciary duties and record-keeping. Formal accreditation
requirements could ensure this.

The present research findings suggest the need for incremental improvement, not
wholesale shift in legislation and framework. Ongoing and evolving transition to a
corporate-rescue culture, including the implementation of the recommendations above,
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are critical to ensuring prosperity and efficiency in the Australian economy and the
balancing of broader stakeholder interests.

CONCLUSION
The present research occurred at a time of growing financial uncertainty in the world
economy and a significant need to ensure cyclical viability of companies, and, indeed,
the stability of the Australian economy as a whole. Alongside this growing uncertainty,
the form in which corporations are financed has become transcendentally more complex
due to the shift towards greater informal restructuring, the role of turnaround advisers
and the introduction of the secondary distressed debt market. With such pressure to
ensure the sustainability of Australian companies, the way in which distressed
companies are handled has become a key issue in ensuring Australia’s financial health.
The present research has sought to understand the constraints upon the successful rescue
of distressed companies, and has subsequently provided a number of recommendations
that would see increased stability across the range of small to large corporations. The
recommendations highlight the need for and are conducive to a corporate-rescue culture,
ensuring that viable companies and businesses will be more likely to successfully
restructure as a matter of course and thus restored to financial health.
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Appendix A: Insolvency: A Glossary of Terms
(Adapted from the document titled Insolvency: A Glossary of Terms available from
www.asic.gov.au)

Asset Any property of value owned by a person. Can include tangible and intangible
assets.
Charge A form of security for a debt taken by a creditor over company assets. A
mortgage is a type of charge.
Compromise Agree to accept a lesser sum in full payment of a debt.
Controller A person appointed by a secured creditor to deal with assets subject to a
charge. Includes a receiver, and receiver and manager.
Court liquidation A liquidation that starts as a result of a court order, made after an
application to the court, usually by a creditor of the company.
Creditor A person who is owed money.
Creditors’ voluntary liquidation A liquidation for insolvent companies, initiated by
the company. Creditors may replace the liquidator appointed by the company in this
type of liquidation.
Debtor A person who owes a debt.
Deed administrator The external administrator appointed to oversee a deed of
company arrangement.
Deed of company arrangement A binding arrangement between a company and its
creditors governing how the company’s affairs will be dealt with, which may be agreed
to as a result of the company entering voluntary-administration. Aims to maximise the
chances of the company, or as much as possible of its business, continuing, or to
provide a better return for creditors than an immediate winding up of the company, or
both.
Director A natural person appointed as a director of a company who is then responsible
for directing and managing the affairs of a company. Also includes a shadow director.
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Dividend A share of the profit of a solvent company paid to shareholders. Also used to
describe a sum paid to creditors out of the assets of an insolvent company.
Eligible employee creditor A creditor (including the Australian Taxation Office in
respect of the superannuation guarantee charge) who, in a winding up of a company,
would normally be paid their employment-related entitlements in priority to other
unsecured debts. These creditors are given a special right to vote on a deed of company
arrangement proposal that seeks to modify their priority.
External administrator A general term for an external person formally appointed to a
company or its property. Includes provisional liquidator, liquidator, voluntaryadministrator, deed administrator, controller, receiver and receiver and manager. Other
than a liquidator for a members’ voluntary liquidation and a controller who is not a
receiver or receiver and manager, an external administrator is required to be registered
by ASIC. An external administrator is sometimes also referred to as an insolvency
practitioner.
Fixed charge A charge taken by a lender over particular assets of a company. The
company may not dispose of these assets without the consent of the lender.
Floating charge A charge taken by a lender over general assets of a company. The
company is usually able to use and dispose of these assets (e.g. stock, debtors) in the
ordinary course of business without the secured creditor’s consent. A floating charge
converts to a fixed charge over those assets if certain events listed in the charge
document occur. These usually include the appointment of a liquidator or other external
administrator.
GEERS The General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme—a basic
payment scheme to assist employees who have lost their jobs as a result of their
employer’s liquidation or bankruptcy, and are owed certain employee entitlements.
Indemnity An agreement between the external administrator and a third party to cover
the fees and other debts incurred by the external administrator.
Insolvent Unable to pay all debts when they fall due for payment.
Liquidation The orderly winding up of a company’s affairs. It involves realising the
company’s assets, cessation or sale of its operations, distributing the proceeds of
realisation among its creditors and distributing any surplus among its shareholders. The
three types of liquidation are: court, creditors’ voluntary and members’ voluntary.
Liquidator A natural person appointed to administer the liquidation of a company.
Officer (of a company) A director, secretary or external administrator (in most cases)
of the company.
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Priority creditor An unsecured creditor entitled to be paid ahead of other creditors (e.g.
employees).
Receiver An external administrator appointed by a secured creditor to realise enough of
the assets subject to the charge to repay the secured debt. Less commonly, a receiver
may also be appointed by a court to protect the company’s assets or to carry out specific
tasks.
Receiver and manager A receiver who has, under the terms of their appointment, the
power to manage the company’s affairs.
Receivership An insolvency procedure where a receiver, or receiver and manager, is
appointed over some or all of the company’s assets.
Secured creditor A creditor who has a security (e.g. charge or mortgage) over some or
all of a company’s property.
Shadow director A natural person not on the public register as a director of a company
but who directs and manages the company’s affairs and is taken by the Corporations
Act 2001 to be a director.
Uncommercial transaction A transaction that was unreasonable for a company to have
entered into. It may be able to be set aside by the company’s liquidator provided it
occurred within two years prior to the winding up, and when the company was insolvent
or if the company became insolvent by entering into the transaction.
Unfair preference A payment made or other benefit given to a creditor by an insolvent
company which causes that creditor to be in a more favorable position than other
unsecured creditors in a liquidation. The company’s liquidator can seek to recover an
unfair preference provided it occurred within six months prior to the liquidation, and
when the company was insolvent or if the company became insolvent by making the
payment or giving the benefit.
Unsecured creditor A creditor who does not hold a security over a company’s
property.
Voluntary-administration An insolvency procedure where the directors of a
financially troubled company or a secured creditor with a charge over most of the
company’s assets appoint an external administrator called a “voluntary-administrator”.
The role of the voluntary-administrator is to investigate the company’s affairs, to report
to creditors and to recommend to creditors whether the company should enter into a
deed of company arrangement, go into liquidation or be returned to the directors.
Voluntary-administrator An external administrator appointed to carry out the
voluntary-administration of a company.
Winding-up order A court order for the winding up of a company. The first step in a
court liquidation. Usually made after an application by a creditor.
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Appendix C: Participant Information Sheet
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Appendix D: Participant Consent Form
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Appendix E: Invitation To Participate
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Appendix F: Interview Guide
Can I ask a few details about yourself?
a) How long have you been working in the insolvency field?
b) What size practice do you work for (small, mid, large)?
c) What is the revenue range of companies you work?
d) What is the % breakdown mix of your appointment or work type; e.g., voluntary
administration, liquidation, receivership, advisory.

Based on your experiences as an insolvency practitioner:

1) Overall, what do you think should be the aim of the Part 5.3A legislation and what
forms can a successful outcome take?

2) In practice, how effective or otherwise do you think the Part 5.3A legislation operates
to facilitate the rehabilitation of distressed or insolvent companies?

3) What have you found to be the practical barriers to the restructuring of distressed
Australian companies under the Part 5.3A legislation, and what changes would be
needed to address this?

4) Current literature includes theories surrounding i) ipso facto clauses; ii) secured
creditor enforcement; iii) the insolvent trading regime; iv) administrator trading risk
exposure; and v) employee entitlements as potential legislative barriers to restructuring.
In your practical experience, what is your opinion on the applicability of these theories?
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5) Thinking about the companies you have worked with in VA, what percentage of
companies have the potential to be restructured as a going concern?

6) Do you think there is a difference between the ability for small and large companies
to restructure (assuming the ASIC definition) under the legislation?

7) What do you think about the idea of a corporate “rescue-based culture”? Does this
culture exist in Australia, and how could improvement be facilitated?

8) What do you think of a transition towards a more “debtor-friendly” framework, such
as the US Chapter 11 legislation, for a reconsideration of the Part 5.3A legislation?

9) In your opinion, has the role of informal restructuring and advisory increased in
importance and scope compared to formal appointment mechanisms to rehabilitate
distressed companies?

10) Is there anything I haven’t asked you that you think it would be helpful for us to talk
about?
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